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ABSTRACT
This dissertation project presents a novel approach to videogame narrative studies
through the lens of the active opposition of enemies, from boss monsters and villains down to the
lowliest encounters with irritating “trash” enemies. Using transactionism—a theory of existence
and aesthetics that claims all experience moves across a single physical plane—this dissertation
coins and defines the concept of cooposition, a phenomenon in videogames that allows for
narrative activity as co-constituted by the player and the game through active, productive
antagonism. After identifying and exploring the lingering difficulties in accounting for
videogame narrative in a complete and satisfying theory, this project establishes cooposition as
an essential and powerful force of videogame experience before breaking down four permeable
categories of videogame enemies. Through extensive examples, key texts, and gameplay
experience, this project explores ideas related to how videogame narratives construct player
identity, set aesthetic rhythms, and establish and manipulate narrative space and time. At issue is
how games use enemies as narrative technique, how narrative in videogames emerge through
cooposition, and how players co-create narrative phenomenon by “defeating” the game,
productively. This is a first step towards a new theory of game narrative that emerges from
gameplay experience, rejecting cognitive theories of literary narratology and suggesting new
design strategies for game narrative that fully capitalize on coopositional dynamics.
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TRANSACTIONISM AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO COGNITIVE MODELS OF
VIDEOGAME NARRATIVITY

1.1

Introduction: Toriel
I had an accident while climbing Mt. Ebott. Through sheer bad luck, I tripped and fell

into a deep chasm populated by monsters, where a strange talking flower immediately threatened
my life. I escaped certain death thanks to a kind, motherly monster named Toriel who guided me
to her home in the underground. Along the way, Toriel taught me how to resolve a conflict with
a grumpy Froggit and demonstrated how to navigate spike fields and other traps. Eventually,
Toriel asked me to wait alone in a safe spot. I wandered off, of course, and stumbled into a fight
with a pathetic little flying creature called a Whimsun. Without Toriel’s guidance, I wasn’t sure
how to shoo the critter away safely. I thought back on some of my previous adventures in other
worlds and remembered a trick I’d learned for hunting Pokemon—to make them compliant, you
usually needed to attack. So I took aim at the poor Whimsun, hoping a little pain might shoo it
away. I miscalculated and swung too hard, killing the creature. I was crushed; I didn’t want to
kill anything. I dismissed the Whimsun’s death as a regretful learning experience.
I finally found Toriel, who had run ahead to prepare her house for a guest. She offered
me baked snacks and told me it would be OK if I called her “mother.” I liked her, but after
resting in her cozy guest room I came to realize that she considered my quest to be over, when I
knew it was just beginning. I didn’t belong here and had to get home. I hadn’t started this
adventure to just end it eating cookies, and so I made a break for the back door. She blocked my
path, crestfallen. She told me I would have to go through her if I wanted to explore the rest of the
underground, because it was too dangerous. I would have to prove my skills.
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I recognized this, a test to make sure I was ready for adventures ahead. I thought about
that poor Whimsun and tried a diplomatic approach. I pleaded with Toriel and complimented her,
but Toriel brushed all of that off. She attacked me, and her strikes were terrifying, much more
complex than any I’d yet seen in the underground. Finally, I decided Toriel must have wanted
me to strike her, and so I did. My hits were weak; I barely scratched her. After every tiny hit, I
tried again to calm her down. When that didn’t work, I hit again. Then, suddenly, one strike went
very wrong. Instead of barely scratching her, I cut her deep. Toriel dropped to one knee, mortally
wounded. Even while dying she called me her “child” and offered advice on navigating the
underground. And then she was gone.
I sat with that moment for a while, trying to figure if I could bring her back. Maybe if I
went back into the house, I would find her recuperating in her bed. But the house was empty. She
wasn’t coming back, and it was my fault. I finally left, guilty that I’d been careless and destroyed
a person who had shown me kindness. Toriel had stopped me because she said it wasn’t safe for
me to be loose in the underground. I assumed she was protecting me from the monsters, but now
realization creeped over me that she may have been protecting the monsters from me, a person
who had now committed two murders in the underground through ignorance of how the world
worked. Killing Toriel hung over the rest of my quest. Suddenly, monster lives meant more than
my own. Toriel’s death taught me to respect the creatures I found and changed the trajectory of
my journey. I never killed again.
This story describes my early moments with the videogame Undertale (2015) from
developer Toby Fox, which has sold over a million copies and cultivated a sizeable, passionate
community of fans who discuss the narrative, characters, and lore in countless forums and
groups. The specifics of my encounter with Toriel aren’t the same for every player; there is, in
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fact, a way to spare her life and still continue your adventure. Although her attacks are designed
to appear scary, they’re ultimately harmless as Toriel avoids actually landing any blows. All a
player has to do to end the encounter is nothing—choose not to attack (through an option called
“spare”), round after round, and if you do, she eventually decides to let the player go out into the
world. There are no definite numbers on how many Undertale players have the same experience
I did, or how many successfully spared her or how many intentionally killed her (the game is
well-known for its possible “Pacifist” and “Genocide” play routes). Based on the design of the
fight, I imagine my experience is typical. The encounter is a clever inversion of what players
understand as a typical boss fight: a big, powerful creature at a threshold, placed to gate progress
to the next phase of the game. A new Undertale player receives very little information about
sparing monsters, and the textual feedback in the encounter deliberately misleads (“Ironically,
talking does not seem to be the solution to the situation,” is the response when the player chooses
the Spare command. This choice will save Toriel, but explicitly lies to the player and claims it to
be ineffectual.) Players are also likely experienced with other games and will assume their
attacks will land with a standard amount of damage, an assumption that extends from traditional
level progression models. But in the Toriel encounter one strike suddenly and unexplainably hits
for much more damage with no warning or contextual feedback—it just happens. A strike that
appears to be just another in a low-damage string inexplicably turns lethal.
In other words, despite the easily accessible pathway to sparing Toriel, the encounter is
purposely designed to mislead the player into unintentionally killing her. If, like me, the player
developed emotional attachment to Toriel, the encounter is therefore designed to produce an
affective response of shock or guilt or regret, giving the Toriel encounter enormous importance
in the narrative of Undertale. It not only changes the game state to allow for player advancement,
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but directly constitutes the emotional weight that will run throughout the play experience. The
player character is a human being, and the human ability to kill the monsters of the underground
motivates the actions of the other characters the player will meet along the journey. The player’s
emotional response to the death of Toriel will orient and define the player character’s choices as
the game progresses. If the player does not care about what happened to Toriel, then the
monsters ahead are in for a rough time as the player may choose to embark on a genocidal
conquest. If, like me, the player regrets their actions, then the story becomes one of tragedy and
sorrow and, perhaps, hopeful redemption.
But where are these narrative paths in Undertale located? I am not simply asking about
the scripted events of the game, pre-coded encounters that trigger or don’t based on particular
player actions. There are no dialogue or backstory options to define the player character’s
personality and motivation. The story of a playthrough of Undertale develops and unfolds
largely through carefully-designed encounters with enemies—encounters as significant as the
Toriel confrontation all the way down to that random, sad Whimsun. The story, in large part, is
about the player’s relationship with videogame enemies, and assumptions and expectations like
those I experienced. Undertale’s story, then, is constituted somewhere in the space between
traditional rigid elements we might identify as game narrative and a more fluid set of elements
such as player belief, experience, perception, and physical skill. These latter elements are
essential to the narrative the player experiences, without seeming to belong to traditional
definitions of narrative at all.
This dissertation project is about videogame enemies and the ways in which they are
conceived, designed, perceived, and ultimately experienced as phenomena of videogame
narrative, which I will argue is a permeable, contingent, and co-constituted phenomena of the
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world through a naturalist model of transactionism. Videogames, both narrative and nonnarrative, are in many ways defined and classified by the nature of their enemies, but
surprisingly little attention has been paid to enemies throughout the history of game studies as a
discipline, despite their ubiquity. Select almost any game at random from the shelves at a box
store, or from the game catalog on the digital distribution platform Steam, or from the old and
broken arcade cabinets gathering dust in warehouses, and you are likely to find anywhere from a
handful to hundreds of unique, proprietary enemies built and designed to oppose to the player’s
actions, provide diverse challenges, and generate fun and excitement through active antagonism.
Tabulating the history of videogames, it seems no exaggeration to say the majority of all
collective play time has been spent by players navigating enemies of some kind. Despite that,
game studies scholars have shown little interest in analyzing what it means that videogames are
willing to put a face onto its oppositional strategies and techniques.
Certainly, important work has been done on the nature of videogames to require effort
and provide obstacles to completion. Espen Aarseth famously categorized videogames as ergodic
texts, a category of media that require nontrivial effort to traverse, altering the relationship
between the text and the user in meaningful ways (Aarseth 1997). Jesper Juul wrote about games
as an artform that not only can be failed and invite failure, but also promote an expectation of
failure on the part of the user, so that not failing at any point while navigating the text might be
considered a mark against the game (Juul 2016). Mia Consalvo explored the culture and unique
pleasures surrounding cheating in videogames, a phenomenon that is both encouraged by and
irrelevant without the active opposition of the game’s enemies or other players (Consalvo 2007).
But these are explorations of difficulty, not of the game’s enemies themselves, which, again, is
the primary mechanism of most play.
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Before embarking on a serious look at videogame enemies, I must address two issues,
one definitional, the other theoretical. First, it must be stated clearly that there are many different
varieties of oppositional activity in videogames, of which enemies are only one. I will
demonstrate the necessity for separating enemies, but for now suffice to say that I am defining
“enemies” as figures expressing agency that appear in videogames in an active role opposing
player progress, goals, pleasure, experience, or other affective, narrative, and experiential
phenomena that emerge during a gameplay session. In narrative games, enemies are typically
associated with a particular world or situation the player navigates or encounters as part of the
narrative experience, and it is generally understood that enemies must be defeated, avoided, or
otherwise neutralized through available game mechanics for the player to progress. The phrase
“expressing agency” is critical to my definition, as enemies express the suggestion of a mind
working on behalf of the game against the player, whether or not that is true of the underlying
code. For example, in Donkey Kong the barrels that roll toward the player have been set in
motion by the title monster and are perceived to have no agency of their own. This is not
precisely true, as the barrels are programmed to react to the player’s directional inputs in certain
situations, to increase the likelihood of a collision, but we are not only speaking here of the
game’s programming and code, but of the emergent narrative phenomena that depends on the
player’s expectation and understanding of the game world. Since players initially encounter
barrels as inanimate obstacles, we will not treat them as enemies, whereas the fireballs in Donkey
Kong, which contain markings that indicate the presence of eyes and appear to chase after Mario
according to their own will and agency, are enemies. I will expand upon this distinction and its
importance at length in Chapter 2.
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As for my theoretical approach, one possibility for studying videogame enemies is to
look at them through a lens popular in other media disciplines: the literary. Certainly literary
narratology (as distinct from other forms, such as film narratology) has shown no such hesitation
of theorizing the role, function, power, position, construction, and constitution of the villain in
narrative. However, here we run into a major difficulty, because the discussion of literary
narrative theory and videogames together is so historically fraught in game studies that even
describing how it came to be fraught in the first place comes with its own tricky protocols.
Therefore, before diving seriously into enemies, this chapter is instead going to take a long look
at what I see as the continued struggle to define videogame narrative. I will briefly touch upon
game studies’ past arguments—while relitigating them as little as possible—and examine the
ways in which the field has attempted to move beyond them on unsatisfactory paths. I’ll then
outline an alternative theoretical approach I’m calling cooposition, a critical element of
videogame experience which emerges from the model of transactionism found in the work of
Daniel Reynolds, itself drawn from the naturalist and anti-dualist philosophies of, among others,
John Dewey. Cooposition describes the co-constitution of narrative through cooperative
antagonism. Before getting to that, however, it’s important to take an extended look at how
dualism has thoroughly confused the issue of how, or even whether, videogames produce
narrative at all.
1.2

Narratology and Videogame Theory
Undertale is just one example of a robust developing tradition of ambitious videogame

stories. In recent years, titles as diverse as Undertale, Red Dead Redemption 2, Disco Elysium,
The Last of Us Part II, Control, Death Stranding, Deathloop, It Takes Two, and others have
offered rich and rewarding stories within and throughout the mechanics of play. As writers like
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Janet Murray have predicted, videogame designers are beginning to move beyond early,
fumbling attempts at game stories which relied on remediating earlier narrative forms and have
now more fully embraced techniques seemingly natural and native to games as a means for
crafting stories (Murray 1997). Undertale’s exploration of monsters, guilt, and hatred is an
example of a story that only works as a videogame, relying as it does on the relationship between
players and the standard cannon fodder videogame enemies the game hopes they’ll reconsider.
And yet as videogame narrative thrives, experiments, and expands, the academic
accounting of videogame narrative in recent years has not. In the last decade, relatively few
significant books have addressed the many questions that remain about videogame narrative,
likely because many game scholars have understandably gravitated towards gaming’s more
visibly-pressing problems, from the turbulence in player communities to the economic and social
growth of esports, alt and indie games as rising avenues of expression for marginalized
communities, and exploitative industry practices. Humanities scholars may also find themselves
reluctant to step back into the arena of videogame narrative, a topic that holds historical weight
in the development of the field. But today, nearly two decades after Gonzalo Frasca argued that
the so-called “narratology vs. ludology” argument was overblown (Frasca), the stalled study of
how games build and communicate narrative, and especially how players perceive and reveal
that narrative, suggests a lingering anxiety in scholarship around investigating those questions
lest scholars be perceived as out-of-touch with contemporary developments in the field or,
worse, as a novice. At many academic conferences, game studies panels warn young scholars not
to waste time discussing such an exhaustively argued topic. Aarseth, fed up with young scholars
cracking open the argument to prove their bonafides, made it point one in his primer on the field
that new games scholars shouldn’t mention ‘the war.’ “Without exception,” Aarseth argues, “the
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writer doesn’t have a clue, and the paper is typically about something entirely unrelated to the
issue of whether games are narratives or not” (Aarseth 2019).
My concern with the history of narrative debate in videogames is, thankfully, not with the
particulars of the ludology/narratology debate, but rather its lingering effects within the
community. In Aarseth’s talking points, he argues that the relationship between games and
narrative is a topic worthy of discussion, preferably in a way that breaks fresh ground, rather than
rehashing the past. In my view, the limited writing in recent years on game narrative has done
neither, precisely because the question of game narrative has become a pan hot enough that
Aarseth felt compelled to tell newcomers not to touch it. I believe that “hot pan problem” is why
there appears to be a disparity between videogames stories, which have been expanding,
innovating, and diversifying, and academic attention to narrative, which has failed to produce a
satisfying resolution for fundamental questions despite—or rather, because—the starting point
for discussion was classical and literary narratology.
It’s true that many of the ludologists were trained in classical narratology and developed
their theories about the medium affordances of videogames accordingly. But many found
classical narratology to be an uncomfortable fit with the stories games offered, and especially
with the types of stories that games had the potential to offer. Some concluded that games were
not delivering narrative in any traditionally understood sense, leading to such strange bedfellows
as Eskelinen and Roger Ebert, both of whom argued in different ways that games could contain
narrative without being narratives. Eskelinen infamously attacked Murray’s hopeful discussion
of the possibility for game stories by arguing that “Outside academic theory people are usually
excellent at making distinctions between narrative, drama and games. If I throw a ball at you I
don't expect you to drop it and wait until it starts telling stories” (Eskelinen). Ebert, meanwhile,
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while debating with game designer Kellee Santiago, wrote: “one obvious difference between art
and games is that you can win a game. It has rules, points, objectives, and an outcome. Santiago
might cite a immersive game without points or rules, but I would say then it ceases to be a game
and becomes a representation of a story, a novel, a play, dance, a film” (Ebert). These are
functionally identical positions.
To respond to these points, game narrative scholars had to overcome that essential
dilemma, the presumed gap between player agency and narration. Narratology has long granted
that the receiver of the text is an active participant in narrative construction but holds that the
receiver’s role is limited to mental activity required for perceiving and building meaning. But
videogame stories are powered by affordances that allow players active generation of narrative
content. In Disco Elysium, a player’s choices determine the skills and politics of the lead
character, the fate of numerous side characters, the resolution of the central detective mystery,
and whether political violence will erupt in the city streets of Martinaise. Videogames are
defined by, and in fact rely on, variation, interaction, agency, and in many (but nowhere near all)
cases, difficulty. It’s insufficient to say that these affordances are incongruous with classical,
structuralist, and dualist models of narratology; in fact, they are often outright incompatible to
those models. The original debates about videogame stories outlined these problems at length,
and the small group of scholars who have continued to investigate game narrative in the years
since have spent significant time and energy attempting to bridge the gap, to redraw the
videogame medium inside the circle of narratology, or to redraw the circle to include
videogames, with varying results. The most notable of these is Marie-Laure Ryan, who concedes
that games do not provide narratives in the classical sense, citing player agency, choice, and
branching pathways as incompatible with models of narrative told by a narrator, even the
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possibility of an implied narrator often associated with film narration. In her book Avatars of
Story, Ryan works to marry studies of narrative with digital technology by acknowledging and
embracing fluidity and agency, suggesting that games and digital media do not explicitly narrate
stories, which she defines as fixed cognitive constructs containing certain mandatory elements,
but instead contain varying degrees of narrativity (Ryan 2006 9-10). This adds what amounts to a
volume slider—or, more accurately, a series of sliders—to classical semantic narrative models.
Ryan’s highly structuralist proposal is to consider how much narrative is present in a digital text
based on categories such as spatiality, temporal organization, intelligent agents, and causal
chains. A digital text that rates highly in these categories would contain high degrees of
narrativity, even when player agency is present. It follows that as player choice and possibility
spaces expand, narrativity would decrease in opposite correlation, making the rigid narrative of
Red Dead Redemption 2 an example of high narrativity, and Mario Paint an example of low (or
nonexistent) narrativity. Ryan offers even more granular classification options to help
researchers identify a game’s narrativity in the form of mostly binary scales—is a game more
fictional or nonfictional, more scripted or emergent (Ryan 2006 12-16)?
Ryan’s book contains a tidy, structural solution that allows narratology to enter into the
digital realm, or not, as the reader sees fit. But, consequently, despite its attempts at clarity,
Ryan’s expansive ideas about narrative leave open the possibility that those invested in the nonnarrativity of videogames can dismiss a game narrative through interpretation. For example, one
of Ryan’s many proposed scales of narrativity measures diegetic to mimetic content, a distinction
she notes goes back to Plato and generally maps the dichotomy of telling and showing. “As the
definition indicates, diegetic narration presupposes language, either oral or written… A mimetic
narration is an act of showing, a visual or acoustic display” (Ryan 2006 13). For Ryan, mimetic
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narration relies on the narrator’s voice receding behind the mimetic act, such as voiced character
dialogue that is designed and coded into the game as a triggered narrative event, but which elides
its designer to appear natural and embedded in the game’s story. Written character dialogue
might also be considered mimetic, albeit closer to the diegetic end of the scale. When Toriel in
Undertale says I must prove I’m ready for the catacombs, that is a semi-mimetic act driven by
the game’s hidden narrator deliberately designed to disorient and confuse me into making a
fateful decision to attack or not, depending on my level of suspicion. Those semi-mimetic
dialogues are combined with fully diegetic (and unreliable) prompts that explain to me that
talking won’t resolve the conflict. The double whammy of diegetic and mimetic dialogues is the
source of my confusion as a player.
But the choice of what happens next is still mine, to at least some extent: to spare or
attack Toriel. My action creates a narrative event, but is my action mimetic in the game’s
narrative? Is it a narrative event at all? When I attacked and killed Toriel, I created an irrevocable
narration event that altered my path through the game and my interpretation and experience of
the game’s story. Critically, I chose an event that the narrator not only accounted for but
designed, a formative event in the story of Undertale that is neither fully the game’s decision nor
my own, but fully designed to allow my informed choice to alter the narrative path. It’s this
feature of videogames, the player’s role in the story and power to decide what happens next, that
gives skeptical critics an opening to deny videogames the narrativity they appear to contain, in
large part because it seems counterintuitive and paradoxical that the receiver of the story could
expand beyond the limits of their active mental processing of the story and into a direct role
choosing the direction of that story. How, then, can we even call them the receiver?
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Writers as far back as David Sudnow have observed the phenomenon of becoming “one”
with the game, with growing so familiar with bodily movements and manipulations required to
play that the controller and even the characters on screen seem to become extensions of the body
(Sudnow). The player recedes behind the physical action that stands between the player decision
and the on-screen action. A trigger on a controller ceases to be the mediator of the on-screen gun,
it becomes that on-screen gun, or in the case of the Toriel fight, a press of the A button becomes
a violent strike. Does that mean my actions are diegetic in Ryan’s account, because of the
communication that pulses through the controller, or mimetic because of my physical movement
and exertion? Or, as a third option, do we remove my action entirely from the narrative causal
chain? The objection, for proponents of this option, is that the player cannot be telling the story
since the player does not know how the story will end, or even what the next immediate event
will be, or the result of this one strike or action. The player is living the story now, not choosing
a discourse in a retelling.
The problem with this belief that games contain “some narrative” becomes apparent in
the Toriel example. The game’s diegetic and mimetic narration forces me into a situation where I
must make a choice. I do so, and then the result of my action becomes the business of the game
once again. But if my actions are denied narrativity because I am doing, not making, then the
best a videogame narrative can hope for is a dotted line of narrative actions (Figure 1), where the
game’s narration presents choice points that wait for my action, which are removed from the
narrative causal chain because I performed them. In this construction, my button press that killed
Toriel would not fall into the game’s narrative at all. It’s an event that happened, the game
recognized it, but it somehow breaks the game’s narrative chain, leaving a tattered and scattered
mess of narrative fragments that can only be assembled through cognition as a coherent
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narrative. This possibility resembles the cognitive limitations placed on receivers in literary
narratology and offers a path to resolving the narratological paradox of videogames without
altering narrative theory but is unsatisfying because it ignores intentional actions. When I fight
Toriel and choose which buttons to press, I attempt to progress the narrative in the direction of
my choosing. My actions hold narrative intent. I am trying to tell the story, and my narrative
events are part of the narrative chain. Faced with the difficulty of such a radical reversal of
narrative theory, many scholars have decided on a different path, that of denying videogames
narrativity at all.

Figure 1: Graphing "Some Narrative"
By claiming that narrative events are produced and driven by the player, skeptics of game
narrative are free to conclude that the kind of mimetic player action found in game narrative is
not narration, creating a theoretical trap: the more a game relies on player mimesis (i.e., the
doing), the less like a narrative a game is; the more rigidly the game tells its story (the making),
the less it appears to be a game, since most definitions of videogames offered by scholars tend to
assume player agency as a central component of the form.
And, yet, games appear to tell stories. Ask most players if they’ve ever played a
videogame with a good, meaningful story, and you’ll hear a canon of known classics: Final
Fantasy VI and VII, Planescape: Torment, Spec Ops: The Line, The Last of Us, and many more.
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That’s why other scholars like Ryan who have invested in the clear narrativity of videogames
have attempted to overcome the problems of player action with their own version of the “some
narrative” proposal. For another example of this, we can look to Henry Jenkins and his writing
on videogame narrative design as what he refers to as “narrative architecture.” Jenkins
immediately identifies the difficulty in giving videogames narrativity under classical narrative
models, but holds firm that videogames are “story-like” in a manner closely aligned with Ryan’s
scales of narrativity. Jenkins’s solution to bridging the narrative gap is to treat games as designed
architectural spaces that must be navigated and explored. Designers might thread narrative story
elements (either mimetic or diegetic) throughout the architectural space, using software triggers
to create causal event chains as the player progresses. Jenkins ties this kind of environmental
videogame storytelling to the experience riders enjoy on some higher-end theme park attractions
and distinguishes between two kinds of narrative experiences. The first, embedded, refers to
fixed narrative elements that are told directly to the player, elements like cut scenes, character
dialogue, audio logs, and other standard game story elements. The second, emergent, refers to
the story the player develops across their gameplay sessions (Jenkins 2006 123). If Player A
struggles with Lakitu in Super Mario Bros. and Player B does not, their respective emergent
narratives are superficially different, with Player A remembering how the flying enemy
tormented Mario on the journey and Player B not remembering them much at all.
Of Jenkins’s two terms, emergent narration has had the most life in discussions of game
experience. Some scholars have used the concept of emergent narrative to bypass thorny
discussions of game narrative entirely, while others have adopted it to explain the narrativity of
games that would appear to contain little direct narration at all. Examples include Dear Esther,
Gone Home, or Everybody’s Gone to the Rapture, signature games in the genre known
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(sometimes derisively) as “walking simulators.” Dear Esther, in particular, provides little to
nothing in the way of a challenge, opposition, or direct diegetic narration. The player simply
walks from one end of a long map to the other, listening to fragmented poetry and bits of prose
that hint at a story of loss and regret. The story seems to concern the narrator’s wife, who has
died, perhaps in an accident, but a player must traverse the game multiple times to hear every
line of dialogue, but even with all of the pieces, the full picture never becomes clear. Instead,
players of Dear Esther tend to speculate and intuit their own theories on the game’s story. But is
that enough to call Dear Esther a narrative game? Not according to Ian Bogost, who wrote in
The Atlantic that environmental storytelling is not storytelling at all, but just a strategy for
designing environments. “Are the resulting interactive stories really interactive, when all the
player does is assemble something from parts? Are they really stories, when they are really
environments? And most of all, are they better stories than the more popular and proven ones in
the cinema, on television, and in books?” (Bogost)
Even for those who acknowledge games may tell stories, and Bogost is among them, this
question of whether or not videogames tell “good” stories or merely remediate narrative fiction
from other forms into an awkward assembly of narrative technique and dynamic, algorithmic
gameplay has been asked by many skeptical game scholars. Even Marie-Laure Ryan has
conceded that games may simply only be capable of inferior stories at this point, which seems to
me a disappointing claim. For writers who wish to focus their research on other areas of interest,
Ryan’s claim provides ammunition in the argument that game stories simply aren’t of interest,
bracketing them off from the field of study as someone studying refrigerators might ignore the
child’s drawing stuck to its front. As someone who once spent considerable professional effort
attempting to think of the best way to tell stories in different engines and game genres, and how
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to reach players emotionally and intellectually, I am well aware of the challenges of using games
as a storytelling medium. However, I take the optimistic view that not only may game narrative
grow and develop in complexity over time, but that it has already come very far because
designers have learned how to design for players who have learned how to play. Most
importantly, my position is that the quality of the game story is of negligible importance at this
stage. Stories may not be the primary feature of games, or even the most natural fit, but
nevertheless stories are told, and the marriage of narrative to code, algorithms, branching
causation, player agency, active competition, environmental design, and other affordances of the
videogame medium represents an important cultural movement and moment. As television and
cinema viewership declines in young people who are drawn to non-narrative influencers and
attractions on digital platforms, I don’t find it outrageous to suggest a possibility that for some
people, games might deliver a sizeable portion—or even the majority—of their narrative input
within a foreseeable time frame. Therefore, it is incumbent on game scholars and narrative
scholars to account for how games deliver narrative, and how players consume it, to fully
account for the ongoing cultural conversation and human engagement with storytelling,
regardless of whether or not these stories are “bad.” Such discourse only reanimates the outdated
and quixotic quest for the “Citizen Kane of videogames” and forestalls our obligation to account
for the storytelling games provide, rather than the storytelling we wish they would or could. The
stakes are simple: players experience games as narratives, and increasingly consume more games
than other narrative media. If games produce a different kind of narrative than narratological
models can account for, then as scholars we risk falling behind in understanding how people will
increasingly encounter and consume narrative cultural content.
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Some writers are doing just that, attempting to solve the problem of “some narrativity” by
offering entirely new approaches that allow researchers to approach game narrative dynamically.
Noah Waldrip-Fruin published How Pac-Man Eats in 2020, proposing a bridge across the
designer-player divide through a digital form of semiotics he calls operational logics. WaldripFruin explains that operational logics “combine an abstract process and a communicative role,
each refined through implementation to drive an ongoing state presentation and play experience”
(Waldrip-Fruin 7). Essentially, an operational logic is an intersection point between the game’s
design, rules, and code on the one side, and the player’s existing cultural and experiential
understanding of the expression of those elements within the game. Waldrip-Fruin uses Pac-Man
as an example of a game that relies on code to establish the boundaries of the field of play, the
precise location on that field of the playable character as well as the ghosts, pellets, and fruit, to
account for pellets or fruit to disappear as the player maneuvers Pac-Man across the element, and
to stay gone until the level is completed or failed. But it’s the player’s role in the process to
recognize pellet erasure as Pac-Man “eating,” prompted by sprite animations that show Pac-Man
opening and closing his “mouth” and the famous wakka-wakka sound effects that players are
meant to interpret as sounds of Pac-Man chomping and gobbling. The result is an operational
logic of consumption, that allows players to think of Pac-Man as more than a set of yellow
sprites on a raster screen. Crucially, Waldrip-Fruin sees operational logics as functioning largely
through player experience and understanding of previously encountered logics. Players who
become used to Pac-Man eating, for example, might come to see other 2D arcade titles in which
a figure passes over and collects dots as also eating or otherwise consuming them. Operational
logics designed into Pac-Man might therefore have some connection to later games like Gauntlet
that designed health and power-ups as items of food. Operational logics, Waldrip-Fruin goes on
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to explain, can even be used to subvert or defy player expectations—for example, his reading of
the walking simulator Gone Home as a game that intentionally uses the language and design of
first-person shooters (the game was designed by alumni from the shooter hit, Bioshock) and
horror games to belie its true purpose in revealing a story of coming-of-age within a queer
identity (Waldrip-Fruin 19). Operational logics, then, can be designed to prime players for
particular experiences, subvert their expectations, or could even be linked together or nested
within each other to create richer and more complex meanings. Complex combinations of
operational logics can therefore develop richer and more detailed story worlds and character
activity, from Pac-Man all the way up to Undertale and beyond.
I admire Waldrip-Fruin’s attempt to bring the player into the narrative experience of the
game while retaining the essential designed reality of a videogame, but one difficulty with
Waldrip-Fruin’s model is that it doesn’t overcome the issue that “some narrativity” was trying to
solve. If the problem of “some narrativity” is that it creates gaps in the causal chain of events,
leaving a perforated narrative and allowing ample space for skeptics to attack videogame
narrative or deny videogames narrativity altogether, operational logics leave those causal gaps
wide open. Waldrip-Fruin’s model is a one-way conversation, creating experiences in the
player’s mind that are then triggered or toyed with as the designers see fit. This is, at its heart, a
dualist, cognitive model that minimizes the lived, active experience of the player in the game.
Operational logics, in this way, are not far removed from David Bordwell’s cognitive film theory
and his description of cognitive schema (Bordwell) that govern viewer understanding of how
films organize their narrative spaces and aesthetic information to communicate—a one-way, topdown path of meaning that fits perfectly into classical narratological models that have proven so
frustrating for narratologists to apply to videogames. In a cognitive structure, the player is only
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given access to the narrative in order to make sense of what is being told. Operational logics, like
cognitive schema and Barthes’s five codes of meaning (Barthes 1975), transform the videogame
into a writerly text that prompts the player to construct the meaning in her mind by making sense
of what is presented to her. These processes describe how players might “read” a videogame but
fall short of explaining how a player can contribute fundamentally to a told story. Cognitive
theories like this are incredibly helpful in classical narratology, which has been heavily
concerned with the making of meaning—the act of deciphering and constructing the narrative
while committing the active task of participating with the text. But, while understanding how
players make sense of what they see, hear, and encounter in a game is invaluable, it’s only one
part of the exchange.
As we’ve discussed, what has made videogames such an uncomfortable fit for
narratology is that the player is unbound from the fixed limitations of mental activity present in
most narrative models. For example, returning to my Undertale playthrough, I made some initial
decisions based on games I had previously played. I assumed Undertale functioned like most
games tend to function. In that respect, operational logics could be argued to have a role in my
initial understanding of the tasks I faced. But much of my experience fell well outside the
cognitive boundaries of that model. I didn’t want to kill Toriel—I didn’t want to fight Toriel—
and my lived, active perception of the moment mattered in building the narrative moment of her
death. When the combat began, I felt inadequate and overwhelmed by the sudden complexity of
her challenge. I experienced confusion when I noticed her attacks weren’t hurting me. Time
seemed to quicken and press in around me as I realized I needed to solve this encounter and
quickly before something bad happened. And most importantly, when I accidentally killed her,
and realized I had lost control of my own strength, I felt guilt, and that guilt hung over me
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throughout the rest of my playthrough and influenced my decisions and choices until I finished
the game. I wasn’t simply constructing meaning and reading a text in a cognitive sense, but
sharing in a complex transaction with the game, a transaction the game’s developer had
designed. My experience in Undertale was created by a multi-layered exchange between myself
and the game, an exchange that cannot be analyzed by cognitive, narratological theories alone. In
no other medium can a player find themselves acting out a story intentionally designed for them
to experience, while simultaneously being made to feel responsible (in my case, through my
inadequacy) for the events that occur. In Undertale, I was being told a story and telling that story
at the same time. Neither the affect that drove my decision, nor the effect of the decision itself on
the game narrative can be fully appreciated through cognitive theories alone.
1.3

Videogames and Performance Theory
This opens up another possibility that some narrative and game scholars have begun to

explore: that videogame narratives can be analyzed and explored as active performances of a
narrated text. Performance theory has been offered into the conversation by various writers over
the years, nearly all in seeming attempts to reconcile the problem of agency and narration.
Interestingly, this idea has taken root in at least a few game studios and design teams, such as the
team behind Far Cry 3. In their book Slay the Dragon, authors Robert Denton Bryant and Keith
Giglio quote Far Cry 3’s lead writer Jeffrey Yohalem, who argues that narrative designers
should “understand a character’s psychological motives, perform their actions, and connect their
experiences with your own. The same can be said of a character and its player.” Bryant and
Giglio read Yohalem’s directive as a call to treat players like method actors living through a
great performance, feeling their way across the world of the game and their character’s actions as
if it were really happening to them (Bryant & Giglio 130).
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“As if?” Are the players experiences not happening to them? Did Toriel’s murder not
really occur for me? These questions risk bringing us back to the trap of the perceived distance
between the player and the game, as if the events are hallucinations, and my experience of them
merely ephemeral. How can we account for our active sensation of a videogame if it is a
construction that isn’t really happening at all? For Brian Upton, this is a problem that can be
resolved by thinking of videogames as scripted performance that allow players room to inhabit
and modulate their role and to define their own space within the text. Upton proposes that we
think of the various possibility spaces of the videogame—all of the potential branches and results
that the game’s algorithms allow—in the same way we might consider a stage play or film script.
The script constrains the action by defining the boundaries of where it can go. Hamlet, for
example, cannot allow for the audience to weigh in with their opinion on his famous question his
existence or nonexistence because he must speak the next line and the next, inevitably and
inexorably advancing towards his fatal confrontation with Claudius. Hamlet cannot stray from
the script; it will be the same set of events in the same order every time the play is performed.
And yet those who have seen different interpretations of Hamlet as a character know that there is
room to maneuver for a performer within the text. Upton thinks of videogame performance in
this way, as an ongoing set of modulations that the player executes while heading to the game’s
inevitable end (or ends—even if a game has multiple possible conclusions, any one playthrough
is nearly certain to depict just one) (Upton 202). In Upton’s model, two actors might perform the
same first line of Hamlet, but one actor might depict Hamlet as capricious and flighty, while the
other might modulate his performance differently to suggest a guilt-ridden prince, with the
weight of the world on his shoulders. The choice of how to utter this first line then informs the
reading of the next line—the performer attempting levity isn’t going to shift suddenly to the
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heavier reading, or vice versa. Upton argues that a similar set of modulations happens during a
videogame playthrough. A player might try aggression in the early levels of a game, and the
success or failure of that approach allows for them to reassess and tinker with their performance
of the text as the game goes along, all without ever straying from the boundaries set by the
game’s code (Upton 204). And yet, no matter how the player performs in their role, as long as
they achieve the game’s goals (i.e., hit their lines) the story will advance toward its conclusion.
Upton’s performance analogy is compelling, but there is one major difference between
videogame players and a stage performer. A good actor is trained to exist fully within every
single moment of the play, bracketing off as much foreknowledge as possible about what comes
next so that his performance gains authenticity and presence in the eyes of the audience. But
even the best actor is always at least dimly aware that they are executing a script. They know that
when they hear a particular cue, they must reply with a particular response. But the videogame
player experiences a game’s story as it happens, or, more accurately, the player constitutes the
game’s story as it happens. The improvisational element of performance is a key part of
Darshana Jayemanne’s own attempt to marry videogame play and performance. Jayemanne
outlines a theory of how different media cultivate desired performances from users by use of
framing, critically noting how framing devices fit within the text while also extending beyond,
reaching toward the user. “Frames are paradoxical: they demarcate real and depicted space, but
do not properly belong to either” (Jayemanne 55). In Jayemanne’s reading, art relies on framing,
from the literal frame surrounding art hung in a gallery, to rhetorical and visual framing devices,
to encourage and create performative readings, guided by the design of the art object. The
purpose is to lead the user into experiencing the art object in a felicitous manner (Jayemanne 3).
For example, in the 2002 videogame Gungrave, the framing begins on the back of the game box.
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“Use your twin guns to dispatch thousands of foes with artistic grace,” the copy promises. “Send
wave upon wave of enemy thugs to their graves.” In a features list located below the copy, the
box explains that the player will be up against “disposable enemies and destructible
environments.” When playing the game, the player discovers the avatar has unlimited
ammunition with no need to ever reload their guns. As promised, enemies attack by the dozen,
and the player dispatches them all. If she chooses to stand still while firing, the player doesn’t
even have to aim—the game will send her bullets flying at individual enemies automatically
(what a bum deal for them). When the player does take damage, it’s barely a scratch against her
massive health bar. The framing is clear: enemies are no match for the player. Keep shooting,
keep moving, and revel in the power. The path forward, in fact, is literally framed by walls on
both sides, creating tracks like long hallways. The framing doesn’t invite exploration, instead
demanding only forward movement and carnage. Therefore, through framing, Gungrave
encourages felicitous violent performance. If the player responds to the frames and performs
accordingly, she will deliver a convincing performance as Gungrave’s lead character, an
unstoppable, bullet balletic assassin. Like Upton’s Hamlet example, she has been cast and has a
script to execute. Felicitous play gets the player to the end of the script as written and designed,
while most nonfelicitous play does not. If she, say, refuses to shoot her gun, or tries carefully to
slowly aim at each individual enemy, or futilely search for a way off the path, she will fail in her
performance of Gungrave’s lead character. The game tries to frame the player’s performance,
but if the frame is ignored the game is being performed “wrong,” the videogame equivalent of
reading a book backwards or staring at the museum wall instead of the art in the frame.
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If it is true that most single-player videogame experience involves a player attempting to
complete a game, then it follows that almost all play is a non-felicitous performance, because
almost all game sessions end in failure. As comedy writer Luke McKinney once observed:
Mario has set out on a quest to defeat Bowser billions of times, and his
winning percentage has to be somewhere well below .001 percent. Mario
has died millions, maybe billions of pointless, futile deaths. His
incredibly mortal coil is repeatedly flung into everything from medieval
spiked pits to relativistic black holes -- everything human technology has
ever achieved has been used to kill Mario (McKinney).
Then again, not all nonfelicitous play is failure. Many players intentionally push games to
the limits of their code, seeking ways to modify or break apart intended gameplay performances
for various effects, most notably in the speedrunning community, whose only goal is to complete
games as fast as possible. But when thinking about successful videogame narrative, Jayemanne’s
contribution is significant. Years after Jesper Juul published the landmark game studies book
Half-Real, in which he asserted that most videogames were a combination of “real” elements,
such as rules, algorithms, boundaries, and code, and “fictional” elements that obscure or
represent the real (Juul 2011), Jayemanne’s performativity theory suggests that some elements of
videogames can belong both to the rules and to the story, and to the game and the player, at the
same time. For Jayemanne, the frame exists at an intersection point between the allegorical (i.e.,
“non-real”) and tautological (i.e., “real”) elements of gameplay, creating a merged tautegorical
function (64)—for example, the enemies in Gungrave performing their “disposable” roles serve
as framing devices directing the player’s performance of the controls and coded encounters,
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while also establishing the fictional world of the game and emphasizing the main character’s
prowess.
Jayemanne’s model of narrative performativity through the framing of felicitous action
extends beyond the videogame medium to many kinds of art, from the gallery to the novels of
Thomas Pynchon, and I tend to agree with many of Jayemanne’s positions. Jayemanne
recognizes that the player experience is just as much a part of the gameplay as anything
happening on screen, including the experience of the lived and active body, bringing everything
from the controller to the couch into the play experience. Still, I argue that Jayemanne does not
go nearly far enough, stopping short of the full implications of this idea. For all of Jayemanne’s
work in creating the tautegorical as a functioning game element, the concept remains too
cognitive and dualist to fully account for the player contribution to game narrative. Let’s return
to the Undertale fight with Toriel and the guilt I experienced when I killed her. I have argued
that her death was by design. I am meant to kill her, and therefore killing her is felicitous in
Jayemanne’s terms. It’s also accurate to say that the game used what Jayemanne would describe
as framing to accomplish this goal. Undertale frames the fight as a boss battle, shocks the player
with fast-moving, seemingly lethal attacks, and uses the system supposedly meant to save Toriel
to mislead the player into believing that the fight must happen. And yet, it is not accurate to say
that the game created my guilt through framing. Nothing in the game specifically tells me that
guilt is the correct emotion that I’m meant to experience. In fact, using Jayemanne’s model, it is
equally felicitous for me to feel not guilt, but glee. A genocide playthrough in which the player
murders every single creature in the game is considered by fans one of the standard ways to play
the game. Undertale contains a programmed ending and enemy encounters designed to reward
that choice. If the player chooses “genocide,” the game alters character dialogue to
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accommodate. The framing devices alter to meet the player, creating an alternative, but equal,
stream of felicitous play. Therefore, although the game does provide some framing that could be
interpreted as intentionally evoking sadness (for example, calling Toriel on her phone and being
reminded by a text box that she won’t answer), I could choose to feel a different way about that
text and I wouldn’t be wrong to do so. The game moves where I move and reorients based
around my subsequent actions. What Undertale considers felicitous is fluid and reactive, as is
true of most videogames with narratives that adjust based on player decision. Jayemanne’s
model, despite actively working to include the player experience into the account of
performativity, is still mostly flowing in only one direction. The model accounts for what the
game asks of the player, but it does not account for what the player asks of the game.
When it comes to narrative videogames and performativity, it might be more productive
to think of them as forms of improvisation rather than scripted performances the player is
prompted to complete. Beginning theater and improv students are often asked to play a game
called Speak In One Voice. To play, some number of students are joined together. If it’s two
students, they might make close eye contact. If it’s more than two, they might link arms in a
circle. Someone is designated as the leader, and the goal is for the leader to speak a word and for
all other players to speak the same word at the same time. Typically, the leader will start with a
sound, perhaps the first phoneme of the word. The leader speaks slowly, and the other player or
players chime in by making the same sound. Eventually, the leader might make a move to the
next sound, to prompt the other players, but at this point the players may misunderstand and take
the word in a different direction. Perhaps the leader meant to say “salmon,” but the other players
took over and it became “Santa.” The object of the game is not for the leader to enforce his or
her will and tell the other players they’re wrong. Instead, the object is to listen and react. The
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collective result is more important than the original intent. Sometimes students play a silent
version of the same game, called “Mirror,” with the object to make identical motions
simultaneously. In these games, the leader’s initial sounds or movements can be thought of as
framing devices that invite felicitous performance, and certainly a player can perform nonfelicitously, deciding to ruin the game by breaking it entirely, perhaps barking “train set” when
the leader started towards “salmon.” But, crucially, the player who is not the leader does not
know the goal word and may inadvertently divert the entire group in his own direction. The
leader has been circumvented but recovers and alters course. Many games of Speak In One
Voice result in players laughing while discussing what words each player almost said, or meant
to say, or thought they were going say. In a game with no troublemakers, any successful run
through the game can be considered felicitous, no matter the leader’s intention.
The simple exercises of Speak in One Voice or Mirror are beginning games because they
teach essential skills for advanced improvisational performance. Performers learn to react
dynamically to the information they are receiving from their partners and, importantly, they are
learning that in a shared performance there may be intention and even a framework, but nobody
leads. This basic skill is foundational for the much larger, richer, and complex improvisational
performances enacted by experienced troupes, who can even create entire narrative experiences
improvisationally on stage in a single performance—for these performers, they are telling the
story while simultaneously creating a story that they don’t know in advance. We can think of
videogames this way. Certainly, many writers have already noted the ways in which videogames
can absorb attention, alter the senses, and seem to move in unison both with and against a
sensing user. One of the very first serious works of videogame analysis, David Sudnow’s Pilgrim
in the Microworld, begins as an obsessive lark as Sudnow tries to make sense of the grip
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videogames appeared to have on an arcade full of children, and evolves into a phenomenological
dissection of the relationship between the player’s fingers, the controller, and the screen. After
spending countless hours, days, and weeks attempting to clear an entire screen in the Atari 2600
game Breakout, Sudnow, a trained pianist, came to see the screen itself as more than a field of
colored blocks, but rather a grid of trajectories and possibilities, musing that a meaningful gaze
could allow the player to see those points for what they were. “The calculating video look
[emphasis mine] gradually comes into isomorphic correspondence with nodes of the program,
the eye-hand connection geared in increasingly rational alignment with the graphic tracing of the
numbers in a way eyes and hands have never before been cooperatively scheduled… a video
neuron drafting table with you as the paper” (Sudnow 186-187). Sudnow, writing in the early
1980s, saw immediately that there was a complex exchange happening between he and the game,
something more than simple interactivity, and far too complex to be a one-way solicitation of
performance. Sudnow recognized that his “video look,” originating in his mind and heavily
informed by his history and training as a pianist, was attempting to map and translate the
information on the screen, but also that the game was working on him, rewriting his mind and
hand to meet the challenges of the game, and that these forces were occurring simultaneously,
affecting one another. Breakout offered framing devices for felicitous play, while also feinting,
moving, and reacting to Sudnow’s reactions. In fact, when Sudnow’s play was at peak
felicitousness, that is when he became the most dissatisfied. “Strategically best moves are
ultimately reductive, tailoring participation down to its absolute minimum in keeping with the
times, giving you ‘command’ from afar and behind the scenes, so to speak, with nothing much to
do” (Sudnow 192-193).
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Sudnow, writing before the official birth of game studies as a discipline, a Hugo
Munsterberg of the arcade, already understood that videogames offered something more than
most critics had yet acknowledged. And yet Sudnow couldn’t yet see how complex the
relationship between the player and the game could truly become because, frankly, Breakout and
the games of its era were not up to those demands. The simplicity of early games, and of early
game narratives which go back at least as far as Ms. Pac-Man in the arcade and much earlier in
the text and graphical adventure games on the personal computer, obscured the complexity of the
relationship between the player and the game, a dynamic relationship that lays foundation for the
rich and complex shared narratives in contemporary gaming. Upton and Jayemanne’s particular
uses of performance theory still leave us with that dualist gap and, therefore, seem to fall short of
fully accounting for videogame narrative.
1.4

Transactionism as Alternative to Dualism
Thinking of video games as an improvisation exercise, with no participant fully sure of

where the experience is going to go, or what path it will take, does not solve all the problems I
have spent this chapter unspooling. For one thing, in the exercise, the parties could collectively
take the game in any direction, while a videogame can only arrive at the destinations made
possible in its programming, what game writer Nick Montfort calls “potential narrative” (3). A
videogame can pivot with the player’s actions, but only so far as the designers foresaw. Much
improvisational performance would also fail this test.
Perhaps we can work towards resolving this dead end by using one problem to resolve
the other. It is the very nature of the first problem—that the narrative videogame is designed,
constructed, and planned to produce a variety of stories within programmatic limits—that
separates the experience of the videogame from mere emergence or improvisation. The
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videogame player knows that she is in working in concert with a videogame. She sits across from
the game screen and presses keys or buttons on the controller to communicate her intent. She
hopes her actions will be felicitous, and she learns as she goes to interpret what the game expects
of her. Meanwhile, the game is responding to inputs within the boundaries of the programming,
moving and adjusting to the player’s hopeful actions, using the boundaries of the code to restrain
the player and keep a story on track. The specific story told, however, depends on some
collaboration of player choice and the designed framework, a complex transaction in which both
entities seamlessly and simultaneously adjust to the other moment by moment. When the player
finishes the game, a single story has been told, but a story constituted and determined by these
transactions. Thinking about narrative in this way is an uncomfortable fit for traditional cognitive
narratology.
Rick Altman has long been a proponent for discarding classical lines of thought rather
than constantly attempting to reroute around the gaps that arise. “It is time to break free from the
traditional understanding of narrative and the limited forms of analysis that it has produced,”
Altman writes in A Theory of Narrative. “Once narrative itself is redefined, the way lies open to
revise our notions of narrative analysis, narrative kinds, and narrative history (2).” To be clear,
I’m making no move to dismiss literary narratology altogether. Countless scholars over many
years have produced valuable work through structuralist frameworks of storytelling. My
argument, however, is that narratology was developed and refined specifically for the media that
it was designed to analyze. In that way, narrative media and narratology co-evolved over the 20th
century in harmony, each side defining and influencing the other until the arrival of digital media
and storytelling created a rupture that, as we have seen, game studies scholars have worked to
mend. Making matters worse, narrative videogames have spent their formative years attempting
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to mimic and remediate classical storytelling technique, confusing the issue for those who might
wish to incorporate videogame storytelling into existing models. Daniel Punday is the first I have
seen to identify this issue, arguing that digital storytelling media emerged in the world as
narratological theory was cresting in academic interest in the mid-20th century. Therefore,
Punday observes, videogames developed on campuses among intellectuals and academics who,
often inadvertently, sometimes intentionally, steered the medium to work through the
philosophical and theoretical project of structuralist narrative work (Punday). But Punday
appears to overlook one critical rupture inherent in this idea: while digital technology is
malleable and can be programmed to mimic the characteristics of dualist media theory, the
affordances of videogames defy dualist description. The essential problem I’ve been outlining
throughout this chapter remains unchanged.
My proposal is to forge a new possible pathway towards investigating this continuous
and co-constitutive process of videogame narrative by looking outside of traditional models of
dualist and cognitive narratology, specifically cognitive anti-representationalism, which
Chemero calls (admittedly, with some suspicion) a “dynamical stance,” which proposes that
cognition emerges from the active and perceived engagement of a vast collection of simple
evolved mental processes activating and receding in dynamic relationship with stimuli
(Chemero). Daniel Reynolds in his book Media in Mind proposes a model that takes this idea
even further. Reynolds argues that dualist cognition has the tendency to draw an imaginary
barrier around the individual, a barrier we habitually think of as rigid, but voluntarily permeable,
to which we occasionally allow access, to food, to air, or to media. When we consume a piece of
media, we believe that we allow the text (be it a film, a book, or a videogame) passage into our
mind where we engage with it cognitively. But Reynolds, further drawing from a neglected
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tradition of naturalism and pragmatic philosophy, primarily from John Dewey, seeks to collapse
the dualist gap between the body and the mind, between the text and the individual. Reynolds
argues that “the spatiotemporal boundaries of media content, media technology, and media use
are always contingent and conceptual” (2), never entirely stable, but coming into being through a
process of active perception and constitution by the user. Essentially, the goal of transactionism
is to overcome the human tendency to see ourselves as minds inside a body inside a world, but to
see all elements of the natural world as existing on a single unbroken plane or, as Reynolds
describes it, a “continuous material sphere” (4). Objects within the single physical sphere are
never truly discrete, but permanently entangled and distinguished only by action. For Reynolds,
videogames provide a unique and powerful opportunity to examine this approach, not because
videogames provide a fundamentally new or different kind of experience than other media, but
because the physical contingencies that power our relationships with literature and film are
obscured by the properties of those media, while videogames emphasize or even rely on those
contingencies. Put another way, there is nothing fundamentally unique about how videogames
tell stories compared to legacy media, the effect is simply “louder” than in the media we think of
as primarily cognitive.
We can immediately see the implications for classical narratology under transactionism.
If, as Reynolds proposes through transactionism, there is only one natural plane of existence,
then it necessarily follows that many of the elements of experiencing narrative that we tend to
think of as cognitive must instead be thought of as physical and present. This concept is so
unorthodox to our usual, learned way of seeing the world that it can sometimes seem to defy
common sense. For example, Reynolds argues that videogames demonstrate how our bodily,
active perception creates the world in which we live by allegorizing that process through the
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bodily actions of adjusting the controller, moving the sticks left and right under our thumbs,
learning the weight and contours of the digital space, while the space offers itself to that
perception, actively bursting into being by our very act of perceiving it just as the game’s
responses constitute our understanding of it (Reynolds 19-23). The player and the game are
engaging in a complex transaction, reaching across the unified physical space to constitute one
another. The idea that the game constitutes the player seems counterintuitive, but Reynolds
helpfully explains with a simple analogy: “Media are in our minds as events are in history”
(Reynolds 26). Our minds are the accumulation of experience; our media make us who we are,
and we likewise make media what it is. Therefore, in transactionism, all media phenomena are
physical, existing in the co-constitution of the user and the text. Phenomena that we have learned
to think of internal and separate—phenomena like affect and emotion—are therefore theorized as
existing not in the body alone but in the (weakly) emergent phenomena of user and text.
What, then, of the narrative text? As we’ve seen, classical narratology is built around the
concept of the telling and the told. An imaginary story is created, and the individual tellings
indicate the choices and the expression of the narrator. The story exists outside and informs the
telling but is otherwise unaffected. As we’ve seen, this is a fundamental issue with videogame
storytelling because a text that hands agency and decision-making to a narratee cannot be
drawing from the outside story (fabula). The player doesn’t know what story is being told, and
therefore cannot be telling it. Transactionism, on the other hand, would toss this construction out
completely. A narrative doesn’t exist inside the text, or inside the player’s cognitive engagement,
but somewhere outside of the text and the user, constituted by them both through their active
perception and engagement with one another.
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A narratologist might object to this point by saying that transactionism overextends its
argument by suggesting that, with no fabula to draw from, the idea of telling a story ceases to
have any meaning at all, since all stories would necessarily only exist in the telling, coconstituted by the narrator and narratee, throwing all fiction into an existential series of “oneoffs,” but this is precisely the argument of transactionism, that existing models were designed in
tandem with the media they were intended to study, and therefore have missed essential truths
about a person’s relationship with media. “This is not to say that we do not see ourselves as
being in the world, but rather that we tend not to see the world as being in us” (Reynolds 22).
1.5

Design and Critiques of Subjectivity
Reynolds devotes much of his book to exploring how videogames reveal the transactional

nature of all media consumption, but he does not pay any particularly close attention to the
implications of narrative in a dynamic and transactional model other than to dismiss the idea that
media consumption in general, and videogames specifically, are representational in nature.
Therefore, if videogames produce narrative, meaning that a designer programs a game to
communicate a given story, and through play a user experiences that story, then it must follow in
a transactional model that story can be constituted non-representationally. I am proposing here to
advance that line of thought on naturalist, transactional narrative, a contingent phenomenon
through which stories are co-constituted and experienced through active perception, creating
nonrepresentational narrative phenomena. This is not “some narrative” by another description,
for the player’s active perception and constitution of the narrative through agency and choice is
as essential to the creation of the narrative as the work of the designer, author, or videogame
algorithms. The essential idea is that through constituting the experience, the videogame and
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player create a story together, with no firm boundary between player or game, teller or told,
action or reaction.
Before I take my first steps into exploring and defining the parameters of this approach, I
must add an important caveat. I believe that videogames do not create a radically new
relationship with media, but rather reveal previously unseen characteristics that dualist models
were not designed to locate. Dualism can provide tremendous insight into the creation and
delivery of narrative information from the side of the designer but are ill-equipped to explore the
player’s involvement in the constitution of the text because of the need to assume the player’s
limited role in constituting the narrative strictly through mental activity. However, it is quite
difficult to speak of narrative at without relying on terms that carry with them dualist meanings
that exist in contradiction to the argument I’m using them to build, not the least of which is the
word “narrative” itself, which implies the pre-constituted representation of story that is parceled
out by the single narrator. Plenty of work in narratology has complicated that idea, but not by
using the contingent, co-constitutive model that transactionism offers. There simply isn’t
language available to discuss videogame storytelling without either relying on dualist
terminology or creating havoc by inventing an entirely new set of terms that must be defined and
defended within the text of this project. I have chosen to use existing narratological terms within
limits for the sake of clarity, while simultaneously seeking to complicate or expand those terms
by rethinking them through a transactional lens. Although I will make every effort to avoid
confusion in my meanings, no doubt I will occasionally fail and leave a seeming paradox or
contradiction in my terms. In those (hopefully rare) moments, please know that my intention,
always, will be to position a term through transactionism and not through its classical origin.

37

With that established, in Media in Mind Reynolds names narrative comprehension as one
of the many elements co-constituted by the media text and the media user, a list that also
includes perception, emotion, and interpretation (106). This is a potentially confusing claim in
Reynolds’s work, because it seems counterintuitive to our natural perception of the event, and
yet transactionism holds that narrative comprehension and meaning—as well as emotion and
affective response to that narrative—do not exist solely within the user, belonging neither fully
to the user or to the text, but existing outside of both. To make sense of this claim, it’s important
to explore how Reynolds defines the relationship between the user and the text as a weakly
emergent platform, a departure from traditional thinking of platforms that dominates game
studies and popular subfields like platform studies. In the dualist model, a platform and a user are
thought of as two discrete, separate units with rigid, firm borders surrounding their forms. When
the user reaches out to the platform, those borders merge to create a new, third entity of strong
emergence, with a firm border that has expanded to surround all parties. Within this structure, a
free exchange of information and interactivity creates the experience that the user takes away
when the session ends and the game console is turned off. “To designate a platform is to draw a
boundary, in space and in time, around part of a boundless dynamic and assert that what is within
that line is stable and self-contained. It naturalizes that thing, not in the sense of claiming that it
always was, but in urging us to take its wholeness and utility for granted going forward”
Reynolds writes (99). Those familiar with game studies might see the immediate similarities to
Huizinga’s magic circle, a firm boundary within which play is allowed to happen, free and clear
of the world outside, and from which Huizinga supposes the player can simply walk away,
consequence free when the play session is over because that constituted the condition of play to
begin with (Huizinga). But just as Mia Consalvo identifies the problems with thinking of the
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magic circle as impermeable and sacred (2007), Reynolds likewise pokes holes in notions of the
platform—nearly literally—by disputing the very existence of a strongly emergent platform by
describing the permeable and unstable boundaries that surround them. In thinking of experience
as dispersed across a single, physical plane of existence, rigid boundaries cannot exist. When I
play Undertale, my mind reaches across to the game, to the controller, and to the images on my
screen. The game likewise reaches out to me, requiring my senses to constitute its existence,
needing me for it to be seen. We are both affected by our physical positioning in the room. We
both breathe the same air to maximize performance—mine through respiration, the machine’s
through its fans and air filter. My previous experiences with video games, my values, and my
beliefs all affect my bodily perception of the text, just as the game is affected by its institutional
memory written into its code, placed there by a designer with ideas, beliefs, agendas, and
mandates. These permeable boundaries mean that we do not create a new, strongly defined entity
defined by what it is when it comes together, but rather that we reach across to one another to coconstitute a weakly emergent platform defined by what experience the platform creates, not by a
perceived set of innate characteristics defined by a redrawn set of borders. The experience of a
videogame, from the active play itself to the comprehension of the narrative to the emotions
associated with that experience do not exist solely within the user, locked away behind an
impermeable border of the body. These elements are co-constituted by the text and belong to
both—and to neither.
This raises one concern in terms of narrative analysis, which is a major task of narrative
studies. How can we even hope to approach narrative study in a transactional sense if we think of
narrative in these terms? This model risks drawing many of the same criticisms of subjectivity
levied against phenomenology, related to the perceived difficulty in analyzing personal and
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individual experience. The narrative constituted by transactional play would belong only to the
player and the game, making it impossible to analyze, ending study of transactional poetics
before it starts. And while it’s true, in the transactional model outlined above, the experience of
play and narrative comprehension includes my own personal contexts, living room space,
console setup, and other environmental factors that affect my perception, and in that way, we
might assume there as many different experiences of Undertale as there are players of Undertale,
I disagree with that objection. Instead, I argue that we in fact can grasp the narrative qualities of
videogames through particular shared elements found in the contributions of the text and the
user, elements of design. These elements refer to the specific and identifiable means (perhaps we
can think of them as “soft frames,” to modify Jayemanne) through which the user of the text and
the text itself reach across to purposefully tell or be told a story through the particular
affordances of the medium at hand. As a phenomenon of the weakly emergent platform, there is
no fixed boundary here, and the line between who or what is doing the telling may be crossed
freely on a spectrum defined by media affordances, but the essential point is that both the text
and the user must intend the story for the story to exist. This idea opposes the concept of
emergent narrative as the user-focused account of experience in the game as Jenkins describes it,
or in the way Janet Murray suggests Tetris could be considered as a narrative in her work. Tetris
does not intend to tell a narrative, no matter how actively a user may intend to read one into it,
nor do the multiplayer battles of Call of Duty: Warzone, which takes place in a rich setting of the
fictional Eastern European city of Verdansk that appears replete with history, tragedy, and livedin verisimilitude, the kind of theme park-esque environment that could evoke a narrative, but
makes no effort beyond suggesting the idea of one. Storytelling isn’t the point of Warzone.
Verdansk is simply a vast arena where players hunt one another to death, like the artificial
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landscapes of The Hunger Games. No matter what an environment suggests, successful narrative
requires active and constructed effort on the part of the text, designers, and players.
Narrative activity requires the willing extension from the player and the game text, what
Reynolds calls “reaching across” a continuous plane. The “reach” implies activity. There is an
intention to reach across to a connected entity. The narrative text reaches across through
designed narrative content and through the tools and methods by which the narrative content is
intended and programmed to reach across to the user. In older games with fewer tools at their
disposal, designers often remediated the tools of legacy media when trying to grab players with
narrative content. Text adventures remediated the novel and the roleplaying game. Cutscenes
remediated cinema. Bioshock’s audio logs remediated voice recorders. Steadily, however,
designers have developed more proprietary and sophisticated tools for delivering narrative, tools
that have co-evolved with digital technology and are now widely adopted and incorporated in
narrative games, built into the worlds, characters, challenges, and enemies players encounter to
co-constitute narrative experience. These elements protect game narrative from the accusations
that player agency makes the game’s narrative too personal, and therefore unfit for study.
Designers think and plan for narrativity. They know the technology and the limits of that
technology. During my time as a designer, I worked for a prominent social gaming company and
knew I had only minutes of a person’s day, at best, to communicate story content, so I designed
content to grab them fast, with large images and big f/x, to convince them to make a quick
choice, with instant feedback. Players were then encouraged to return later in the day for the next
stage in the story. The player had agency to complete the story, to choose the story that was told,
but it was still a story that fit within the design I offered, a design that relied on the
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understanding and assumption that the player was part of the storytelling experience. I reached
across to tell them the game’s story, but the choices in that story remained theirs to make.
But all of my storytelling efforts would be meaningless if the player failed to reach across
to the game, with the purpose of receiving and participating in the creation of that story. Did
every player who encountered my story on their lunch break engage with it? Likely not.
Guessing even fifty percent engagement would almost certainly be a massive overshoot. A truth
about videogame play and players is that while videogames can tell stories, videogame players
do not have to listen to those stories, and in fact quite a few choose not to, rapidly pushing
buttons to blow past cutscenes to get back to the action. There is nothing wrong with this style of
play, and in fact we should think of it as simply a different co-constituted experience that
emerges from the transaction between user and text. Examples are everywhere. Every day on the
video game streaming platform Twitch, or in popular charity speedrunning marathons, players
attempt to twist, contort, and stretch games into barely recognizable versions of themselves,
pushing the limits of the code to access glitches to complete specialty runs, hoping to traverse
games that take dozens of hours to complete in a fraction of the time—sometimes in minutes.
These feats often require the player to execute certain actions that “break” the game’s narrative,
such as skipping events, experiencing chains out of order, killing important NPCs for some
calculated benefit, skipping dialogue and cutscenes whenever possible, and generally ignoring
every potential piece of story offered by the game, even in some of the most beloved narrative
games of all time. Although the words “skipping” or “bypassing” seem appropriate when
discussing speedrunning narrative games, they are really misnomers. Players are not skipping the
narrative activity. Narrative is not occurring at all, because the player is not reaching across to
the narrative content. The game is reaching across as designed, but without the player’s
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reciprocal movement, the narrative phenomena cannot emerge, and therefore cannot be skipped.
Story, then, becomes a weakly emergent phenomenon within the emergent platform created by
the user and the text, meaning that they must necessarily permeate one another. Story and play
are inseparable and non-discrete.
I want to take a short aside here to address a word that I’ve been avoiding in this
discussion: interactivity. Reynolds critiques the word for its dualist assumptions of separation,
suggesting that the player and the game are distinct from one another and act upon one another in
turn, one after the other. Reynolds makes a compelling case against this concept by exploring the
hand and eye movements of high-level Tetris players, arguing that at the peak of videogame play
the speed is too fast for cognition to account for the implied turn-taking of interactivity, and
indeed Tetris players appear to process information through the act of play itself, extending
cognition into their fingers, the controller, and the screen to shave precious seconds from their
reaction times (Reynolds 75-78). Therefore, I prefer a useful term offered by Gordon Calleja—
digital involvement—which Calleja uses to complicate what he calls the “unidirectional” concept
of player immersion in a game space. Instead of thinking of a game as a discrete environment
within which the player immerses herself, Calleja offers involvement as a way of thinking
through “fluid intermingling of players’ experiential intensities” (Calleja). I repurpose the term
here to apply it in a more transactional sense, suggesting the digital game involves itself with the
player as much as the player involves herself with the game, and I believe it is a more accurate
term overall to explore how players and games tell narratives together near simultaneously,
leading one another at the same time, each reading the others’ cues of intention.
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1.6

Rhythms of Narrativity
Once the videogame and the user have reached across, the narrative elements and

information have to be transacted. Time and space must be co-constituted, characters and events
offered for perception and sorted for their importance to the narrative. Cognitive theory is the
standard tool for analyzing this process, but in a transactionist account that places narrative as a
permeable phenomenon belonging not solely to the mind, this cannot suffice. Reynolds draws
transactionism heavily from John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley’s Knowing and the Known and
its complications of the epistemological assumption of preexisting, pre-constituted reality, but I
am taking significant cues in this work from Dewey’s earlier aesthetics lectures, Art as
Experience, which likewise refuses the idea of the art object as pre-constituted. The art object,
for Dewey, sits within its context, within its milieu, and the aesthetic appreciation of the object
relies on what resembles a complex transaction—although Dewey rarely uses that word as
directly—between the object and the observer. For Dewey, as in Reynolds’s work, the purpose
of the art object is its function, not what it is but what it does, because art emerges in context
with its environment and acts upon the observer, which is no passive brain, but an active, sensing
being who acts upon the object in return to perceive it and constitute its meaning (Dewey 1-19).
This is accomplished through what Dewey describes as a kind of deciphering of the art object’s
aesthetic rhythm. Dewey argues that all existence is a series of natural rhythms that our bodies
and minds have learned to interpret—the rise and fall of the sun, sleepfulness and wakefulness,
the tides, seasons, aging, and many more. We are, in fact, in a constant state of attuning (or, in
Calleja’s term, involving) ourselves with the rhythms around us (Dewey 15). Dewey describes
the aesthetic appreciation of art in precisely the same terms. When confronted with a painting,
what we actually see are an initially haphazard and random collection of paint strokes on a
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canvas, but by perceiving the gradual shifts of the browns, or strokes of white against blue, we
bring order and natural rhythm to the initial chaos of the art object. Part of the aesthetic pleasure
we receive from perceiving art is through this process of attuning to it and involving our
attention into it and being rewarded by the fact that there is a rhythm, that our attention was
rewarded and we discovered what the artist designed. Rhythm is the means through which the act
of reaching across reaches culmination. (This presents the possibility of failed aesthetic art, in
which both the text and the user reach across, but a failure in design or some other issue causes
the observer to rescind the approach, either because the piece is rejected or because the observer
believes they are mistaken in believing there is information there to receive. Likewise, a novice
observer might reach across but be unable to attune with particular techniques and thus not
perceive the narrative content on offer. In both cases, some minor aesthetic appreciation may
occur, but not the transactional experience of the weakly emergent platform—and no narrative, if
the text were a narrative text).
Dewey considered rhythm in terms of equilibrium. “We live in an environment, but not
just in it. We live through direct interaction with it. We are part of the environment, it is a part of
us. Our well-being depends on equilibrium with that environment. If the gulf between our bodies
and our environmental conditions grows too wide in either direction, we will die” (12). To be
what Dewey calls a “live creature” in the world, one must maintain a balance, ignoring neither
the conditions of the environment nor the needs of the body, nor how these states influence,
permeate, and alter one another. Dewey considered this process innate and natural, a part of the
lived experience of human existence. We cannot help but look for rhythms in art objects, or
narratives, because we encounter them in our environment—in fact, they are our environment-and we instinctively pursue equilibrium with them. The goal is to have what Dewey calls an
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experience, a term which he uses in a specialized way to describe to a completed, fulfilled event
that rises above a combination of mechanical, individual moments which are elevated through
accumulated rhythm and intention. “In a work of art, different acts, episodes, occurrences melt
and fuse into unity, and yet do not disappear and lose their own character as they do so,” Dewey
writes (38). The emphasis on melting and fusing, like the blue of the painted sky giving way to
the white strokes that define the cloud, demonstrates Dewey’s belief in contextual meaning.
Open the script for an Ibsen play and choose ten lines at random, and while they may be
brilliantly written, they will not be an experience because they have been stripped of contextual
history and rhythm. The same is true of the brushstrokes of the painting; removed from their
contextual meaning, they cease to be more than themselves. Transactionism holds that this is not
only true of conversations and art objects, but of all lived experience. Humans are in the
environment and the environment is within humans. We seek equilibrium with our environment.
All experience arises contextually from the physical world, and is therefore a part of the physical
world, which is itself a co-constituted phenomena made up of the sensing human and the
environment. It follows, then, that the experience of videogames, and videogame narrative, is a
physical phenomenon, and that the pursuit of equilibrium with it is a primary process through
which that phenomenon is constituted. Helpfully, this concept is not foreign to game studies, but
has been the subject of study for many years under a different name: flow
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi coined the term flow to describe a psychological theory that
mapped what he termed “optimal experience,” (Csikszentmihalyi 2008) and although he did not
initially intend for his work to apply directly to videogames, it is widely cited and discussed in
the field precisely because it appeared to perfectly summarize the process of mastering a long
and challenging game. Csikszentmihalyi proposed a model in which optimal experience does not
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mean a person stays in a zone of perpetual comfort, but rather than they are occasionally
challenged enough, in a manageable way, that the person finds it possible to overcome the
challenge and master it. Then, just as that challenge transitions into rote repetition, a new, more
difficult challenge arises, and so on (Figure 2). In essence, to achieve optimal experience, the
person must be stimulated with ever increasing difficulties that remain manageable, pleasing the
person as they observe themselves mastering one skill, and convincing them that when a new
challenge arises, they will be able to master that one as well. (Csikszentmihalyi 1998)

Figure 2: Csikszentmihalyi’s Flow
Csikszentmihalyi’s model is contextual. The experience he writes about cannot become
optimal unless it is preceded by the previous points on the graph, degree by degree. The
experience must become gradually more difficult, and then gradually less so, with each
individual, mechanical moment flowing, one into the other. Flow has been widely adopted by
game designers and even design scholars to depict the ideal model of videogame play, because it
provides a roadmap towards “the zone,” a supposed area of perfect equilibrium, where player
and game move in tandem, respond expertly to one another, and all other environmental and
sensory concerns fade into the background to be forgotten. To many designers this is the peak of
interactivity, but from a transactional perspective, this is Dewey’s contextual experience, albeit
amplified into a particularly intense wavelength.
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Flow, however, is not without problems. Recent work by Braxton Soderman has
challenged what he calls the “uncritical” adoption of Csikszentmihalyi’s model in both games
and game studies, which he argues convincingly masks flow’s underlying ideology of
individualized actuation of happiness that rejects the collective alienation caused by the natural
excesses of capitalism. By seeking flow in a person’s daily activities, Csikszentmihalyi argues a
person can find happiness and a cure for alienation within the system without discovering the
need to affect change. I agree with Soderman, and do not wish to deploy flow uncritically, but
rather to divorce it from Csikszentmihalyi’s individualist interpretation. My argument is that
Csikszentmihalyi’s initial discovery of flow was descriptive rather than prescriptive, identifying
the extreme sensations found during particularly intense attunement. Csikszentmihalyi often
described his so-called “ideal experience” as one in which the flowing subject, as Soderman
describes them, loses sense of self and engages fully with the activity, often forgetting to eat or
to sleep because they are so embedded in the “zone.” The description of such extreme
unalignment with the body’s lived rhythms and survival needs does not sound like ideal
experience to me, but something gone wrong with our natural senses as a “live creature.” Instead,
Csikszentmihalyi’s ideology has presented flow as an uncritical good when, in fact, we might
think of the “zone” as an extreme attempt at attunement to a task that usurps and overwhelms the
otherwise natural processes of transactionism and dynamic rhythm. When I speak of flow in this
dissertation, the word will refer to the less intense, natural, and often invisible process of
reaching across and experiencing the world through transactional rhythm, what I call “low-flow.”
Returning to Dewey and context, we can see how his ideas may be applied to many kinds
of experience beyond art, such as the transaction of a conversation. Individual points in a
conversation are meaningless, it is the flow and the rhythm of the conversation that transforms it
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into an experience, which forms from the chaos of potentialities, and must emerge from the
environment through discovering rhythm, moment by moment, action by action. Game players
often describe the steepest “learning curves” taking place in the early stages of a game, before
the player has enough contextual information for the experience to arise from the various button
presses, on-screen events, and game feedbacks. The same might be said of narrative texts, with
users confronted with disorder and arrythmia and gradually understanding the order and patterns
they see. Players reach across to the reaching game through initial soft framing, but begin in a
state of narrative confusion, until enough context allows them to gradually piece together
concepts such as characters, setting, and world before events disrupt those concepts, leading the
user to question their standing in the narrative and whether they are still attuning, until events
begin to crystallize in what direction the story is progressing, and so on.
Although rhythm (in the form of flow) is widely adopted in game studies, the missing
piece from a transactionist position is the player’s essential role in co-constituting the experience,
not just in perceiving it, but in creating it and giving it existence in the physical plane thorough
the act of perceiving it. What is fascinating is how often in Csikszentmihalyi’s writing he veers
close to a continuous and contingent edge of his model. For example, Csikszentmihalyi wrote at
length about the body and its role in achieving flow. While listing an assortment of bodily
activities like touching, throwing, and climbing, Csikszentmihalyi takes a surprising turn: “to this
I might add imagination and imagining” (Csikszentmihalyi 1990 95). Csikszentmihalyi is quick
to concede that body and mind function together and affect one another through perception and
action, the beginnings of an essentially anti-dualist gesture that never fully arrives. In another
passage, Csikszentmihalyi describes consciousness itself as constituted by things we “feel, think,
and desire—our information that we can manipulate and use. Thus, we might think of
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consciousness as intentionally ordered information” (Csikszentmihalyi 26). Csikszentmihalyi
calls consciousness ordered information, but just prior to that defines that information as usable
information. This appears to define consciousness itself as active function, by its use value,
suggesting that the difference between my consciousness and another person’s is not any
fundamental difference in what it is, but in how it is used. This rhymes with Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenological definition of consciousness as consciousness of something or, as Keogh puts
it, an enmeshed consciousness in the world (2018 72-74). Transactionism only takes this a step
further, eliminating the rigid boundary between the mind and the world altogether, locating the
mind as a phenomenon of the world, in a shared plane where all experience occurs. Returning to
Dewey, we find complementary ideas couched in aesthetic theory. For example, Dewey writes of
aesthetic form, defining it as “the operation of forces that carry the experience of an event,
object, scene, and situation to its own integral fulfillment.” The form of the art object works to
define itself and carries agency to self-actualization based on the intentionality of the design. For
the observer whose perception brings the work to fruition, the contingency of the individual
elements matters:
There can be no movement toward a consummating close unless there is
a progressive massing of values, a cumulative effect. The result cannot
exist without conservation of the import what has gone before.
Moreover, to secure the needed continuity, the accumulated experience
must be such as to create suspense and anticipation of a resolution.
Accumulation is at the same time preparation, as with each phase of the
growth of a living embryo (Dewey 142-143).
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As we have seen, the essential event is the media user and the art object reaching across
the physical plane to each other. The mutual reaching across must be sustained; retraction by the
user or the art object can occur at any time, and the weakly emergent narrative phenomenon
would collapse. If the reach is maintained, what happens next is the ongoing process of finding
rhythm, of pulling narrative clarity from the primordial chaos, of discovering the contextual flow
of events, the process that Dewey, in the passage above, calls accumulation.
Dewey’s model of aesthetic accumulation is the less-aggressive version of
Csikszentmihalyi’s intense flow, although both processes gradually expand and retract as
contextual meaning cascades and coalesces in a single direction. One area where they would
appear to differ, however, is their belief in the value of the destination. For flow, the destination
is less relevant than the journey, but for Dewey, the point of the experience is to reach an
experience, which emerges from the combined contingency of the individual mechanical events.
Without the sense that the flow is leading somewhere, or that progress is being made toward an
overall goal, then the individual challenges or the perception of the individual brush strokes lose
their meaning. The point of this rhythmic pursuit is that it is a flow forward, toward a
destination. However, we mustn’t overlook that Dewey’s destination of equilibrium and aesthetic
order from aesthetic chaos is not meant to be a joyless slog until, suddenly, the “aha” moment of
truth. Transactionism suggests both the process of attuning and the satisfaction of achieving the
experience produce pleasure.
Returning to Undertale, let’s test this notion of narrative as a transaction of aesthetic
rhythm by reframing the Toriel fight under the terms of reaching across, involvement, and
accumulation. I reach across to Undertale when I pick up my Nintendo Switch and select the
program. In my life outside the game, I have heard of the its reputation as an engrossing and
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emotionally affecting story, and I’m hoping to have a similar experience. The Switch, responding
to my button presses, accesses the game’s code and begins to run the program. The game
emerged from the design of Toby Fox, who intended players to be able to access multiple paths
throughout the game, with very different consequences, challenges, enemies, and results for
selecting those paths. When Undertale begins, all paths are equally valid and available. The
game has no preference. Instead, the game presents its opening images and scenarios—the angry
flower, the kindly Toriel. These are mechanical events, in Dewey’s terms, meaningless and
arbitrary individually, but they emerge in context, contingent on one another, and on me, the
observer. My active perception—my eyes and ears, my fingers on the buttons, my hands sensing
the weight and vibration of the Switch I’m holding—bring Toriel and Flowey into existence, just
as they co-create my perception by being perceived. I am prepared for story content, and so I
discern the characters, outlined in white, as characters, defined from the black backgrounds. The
hateful rage of the flower in context to Toriel’s kindness prompts me to have an opinion. I hope
the story goes in Toriel’s direction.
As the combats begin, the game and I look for the rhythm of one another’s strokes. I am
unsure what the game wants from me. To kill the Whimsun? The game, likewise, is unsure. It
waits to feel the choice I make, for that will determine future choices. Slowly, encounter by
encounter, moment by moment, I accumulate enough intentional information—the brushstrokes
of the narrative—to begin to perceive the order of some things. Toriel really is kind, I see that
she’s not just fattening me up to eat me. The Froggit really was pathetic and worth saving; she
wasn’t just shooing it away so it wouldn’t blow her cover. My understanding of the narrative I’m
both receiving and creating is moving into focus like flow—just as I think I have a grasp on it,
something happens that pulls the rug out from under me. Did I really kill Toriel? Is she really
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dead? Am I on my own? Surely this is a dreaded low point, but thankfully another character
named Sans arrives to provide guidance, bringing me back to a sense of mastery. With each
narrative event I accumulate, the picture becomes clearer. From disorder and the unknown
emerges order and stability.
Together, the game and I make choices that constitute the narrative phenomenon. Since
we are not closed systems, the factors that might influence my narrative choices are numerous,
anything from my personal values to my experiences in other games, or even my earlier
experiences in this same game—many players replay games they’ve already played to create
different narrative events. The game’s influence on the narrative is no less varied. While it’s true
that the game code itself contains only so many potential narrative paths, anywhere from zero to
a small handful, usually, with only a handful of robust games (for example, Mass Effect)
containing many more, the code, like the player, is not a closed system, and its narrative
decisions can have arisen from any number of factors: the designer’s politics, market conditions,
limitations of the intellectual property, available memory. The game and I each attune to each
other’s rhythms through mechanical events, or soft frames—me from the happenings on screen,
the game from my choices and button presses. Gradually, narrative phenomenon forms from the
combined accumulation, from the textual flow of one intentional event into the other. This is not
accidental or random, it is designed. The game wants to tell this version of its story, just as it
wants to tell any version of its story. The game accepts my narrative input to guide its choices,
and the game’s choices guide my narrative input, but we are not interacting, but rather moving in
tandem, mirroring one another. Take, for example, Toriel’s hit box, seen in Figure 3. In
Undertale, monsters attack by unleashing patterned blocks against a tiny heart that I control. I
am allowed to defend my health by moving the heart to avoid the blocks. If the heart takes too
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many hits, I will lose the game. The more difficult the fight, the more complicated the patterns
get, until it becomes nearly impossible to avoid a hit. In the Toriel fight, the patterns are
outrageously complicated, and far more difficult than anything the player sees up until that point.

Figure 3: Toriel’s Complex Fight Pattern (Undertale)
The secret of the Toriel fight is that Toriel is not, in fact, trying to kill the player,
meaning that although her patterns look complicated, the blocks intentionally dodge around the
vulnerable heart. If the player doesn’t move the heart, the patterns will veer around the heart and
miss it entirely. But if I take the heart and move it around, the patterns try to adjust
simultaneously, moving as I move. This is how transactional poetics function—perceiving and
perceived, telling and being told, all simultaneously, and with no meaningful boundary or
separation. The example of the blocks and the heart are a visual description of what I will call in
this dissertation a “feeling-through” of the experience. I cannot see that the intention of the
blocks, or the movement of the patterns unless I move the heart icon, feeling-through how the
experience shifts under my extended touch. Likewise, the game is feeling-through the player
with which its been dealt. It feels me shift and move under its own extended touch, and it moves
with me. We are “speaking with one voice,” foundationally learning and experiencing the
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method through which we will create a larger and more complex narrative together, moment by
moment.
Thinking of narrative in this way, we can at last account for the special properties of my
Undertale experience that “some narrative,” emergence, cognitive theory, and classical
narratology all failed to explain. My guilt in killing Toriel was not an emotional reaction to the
narrative; it was the narrative. It was not an outside force that affected me, and therefore affected
my play; it was a planned and designed experience that prompted and then moved in tandem
with my choice. The guilt I felt affected my interactions with the rest of the characters I met in
the game, including a major antagonist, Undyne, whose primary motivation is to kill the player
to protect the rest of the monsters in the underground. My accumulated experience with Undyne
would have been different if I had been intentionally pursuing genocide, as the involvement of
the game and the involvement of my own choices would have altered, shifted, and fluctuated,
moment by moment, transforming the narrative one encounter at a time. In that way, Toriel,
Undyne, the Whimsun, and all of the potential enemies of Undertale provide a powerful example
of transactionally emergent, contingent narrative devices.
1.7

Enemies and Cooposition
As stated in the opening pages of this chapter, enemies are remarkably undertheorized in

game studies when, especially from a transactional standpoint, they are perhaps one of the most
valuable and essential elements of any videogame. Almost every videogame contains some kind
of enemy opposition, even if those enemies are other players, as in the very first videogames like
Tennis for Two, Spacewar!, or Pong, where programming limitations made it unfeasible to
include enemy artificial intelligence. Punday argues that this choice to turn videogames into the
site of frenetic combat arises from the academy interest in concepts of narratology, including
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those of dramatic events and action. (Punday 9). The videogame emerged from its contexts to
represent actions first and foremost, which led to Alexander Galloway’s famous assertion that
actions are the essential component through which videogames should be defined. “If
photographs are images, and films are moving images, then video games are actions. Let this be
word one for video game theory” (Galloway 1). As videogames moved into the arcade, the
financial incentive to increase player churn led to waves and waves of enemies designed to
quickly separate hapless players from their quarters. By the time gaming moved primarily to the
home space, the logic of gaming as a lone player overcoming long odds against armies of lethal
opposition was well-ingrained to such an extent that games with no enemies to speak of are
considered by some players to fall short of their definition of a game.
The prominent role of videogame enemies grants them incredible value when attempting
to analyze contingent and contextual narrative, and for several reasons. First, an enemy’s design
emerges from contexts that include thematic, ludic, and narratological considerations. Take, for
example, an iconic enemy from Super Mario Bros., the Goomba. This beginning monster
presents little challenge for the player as she advances in the Mushroom Kingdom, moving
slowly towards Mario and easily dispatched with a single stomp. The Goomba is a thematic fit
for the world of Super Mario Bros. It has a mushroom shape, befitting its namesake kingdom.
It’s sinister, but not horrifying. It retains an essential cuteness that fits it within the rounded,
pleasant atmosphere of the game meant for children. The Goomba also has a narratological role,
as in the game’s lore they are considered traitors to the Mushroom Kingdom who betrayed the
Princess to Bowser and joined his troops. Finally, they emerged in a critical ludic role, as an
easier replacement for the more difficult Koopa Troopa, to help ease the player into the opening
worlds of the game. By creating a mushroom that the player learns to stomp, the game teaches
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the player to be brave with mushrooms, a lesson that pays off seconds after the first Goomba
encounter when the player encounters the first mushroom power-up. (Figure 4). All of these roles
emerged in context with one another, and with other design contexts, such as the development of
the player character, Mario: the Goomba can be jumped on because Mario’s primary ability is to
jump.

Figure 4: Goomba/Mushroom Designed Confusion
The player, meanwhile, while involved with the game and seeking aesthetic rhythm, coconstituting the experience, does so primarily by reaching across to the game’s enemies,
touching and influencing, and being influenced by, those intertwined contexts. Much has been
written throughout the history of game studies on the player’s relationship with the on-screen
avatar, the character through which the player controls the game, but as players reach the
experience, it is exceedingly common for players to describe becoming “one” with the controller
and the avatar. The player apprehends the rhythm of mechanical event after event, which in most
videogames means enemy after enemy—intertwined context after context. The player touches
the controller which sends electrical signals to the console that send similar signals to the
display; the player touches the game, touches the enemies in an unbroken, continuous plane, and
in so doing experiences, combat by combat, the game’s design decisions, narrative choices, and
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thematic meaning. Although they will most likely never meet, the player and the designer
constitute the game’s narrative together by reaching across, and they do so through active and
cooperative opposition, the mechanism for the emergence of narrative phenomena.
This project is about the continuous, contingent, narrative nature of videogame enemies
as they emerge rhythmically from the milieu in order to be perceived and thus elicit active
response. This is an essential plank in the process of accumulating aesthetic narrative experience
during videogame play. Enemies, of course, are not remotely the only kind of opposition found
in video games. Beyond enemies, players may be menaced by anything the designer can
imagine: chasms, platforms, puzzles, traps, mazes, timers, tricks, conversations, terrain, and the
like. Some games have even forced the player to alter the settings within their console hardware
before allowing them to advance. Each of these types deserves its own account, but my argument
is that enemies have a unique and privileged position in the narrative platform because the player
is as invested in the idea of the enemy almost as much as the designer. Buckles, writing on Propp
and his work on folktales, recognized the importance of enemies to the narrative text, believing
them to be “the symbolic representation of forces working to seemingly hinder, but actually
promoting, the hero’s or heroine’s development” (cited in Montfort 112). The same is true of the
videogame enemy, which marks a mechanical event, a single moment that, in context, constitutes
the narrative experience, which, as we’ve seen with flow, means in a literal sense the player’s
physical skill development as much as it means the narrative development of the game’s hero in
the fiction. The videogame enemy opposes the player, wholeheartedly. The enemy is
programmed to attempt to halt the player’s progress, sometimes through extreme aggression. The
player, meanwhile, does everything in her power to destroy, defeat, bypass, or otherwise
neutralize the enemy threat. Both “sides” in this transaction are attempting to defeat the other,
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but both are doing so to promote the development of the other—the game is attempting to
provide challenge, fun, skill increase, and narrative, while the player is trying to advance game
states and enact transformational action. Therefore, in a key term I will use and develop
extensively in the chapters ahead, I will refer to this unique relationship as one of cooposition, an
essential characteristic of most videogame narrative play.
However, it is easy to anticipate a critique here. No doubt there will be questions about
the prominence of enemies in this study when there are so many other ways a game can mount a
coopositional stance. When it comes to hazardous game objects, whether it looks like a spike, a
bullet, a boulder, a chasm, a tank, or a Goomba, all that truly matters programmatically is the
calculation happening in the game engine between the relative locations of the player character
and the “hit box,” or the threshold where damage is assigned by contact with the object.
Therefore, from a pure computer science perspective, there is no real difference among the
various threats I listed above, and it no doubt seems silly to some to pick out one for special
attention—in fact, it’s likely this reason has contributed to enemies being understudied in the
first place. None of these objects are actually real, the thinking probably goes, and should
therefore be equalized in importance. However, in transactional poetics, we must think of the
player’s role in co-constituting the narrative, and the fact is that players do perceive enemies
differently than those other types of objects because the game phenomenon emerges from the
lived experience of the physical world. In her study of videogames and emotion, Katherine
Isbister notes a study that showed players were not only able to quickly identify friendly and
aggressive responses in videogame NPCs, or non-player characters—a larger class to which
many enemy types would belong—players tended to respond to NPCs based on those perceived
attitudes just as they would another person giving them social cues. Isbister concludes that our
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need to respond quickly in the videogame world leaves the player with no time to relearn social
cues or acquire new environmental rules, and so the player applies their acquired environmental
understanding of their world to the videogame (Isbister 20), a theory supported by transactional
poetics which supposes that the mental phenomena of the experience emerge from the preexisting environment, pre-reflection. The player has accumulated rhythms of social interactions
and cues in the environment, and only readjusts to arrhythmia as the narrative phenomena
emerges from that environment. Therefore, in transactional narrative, an enemy is an enemy and
a bullet is a bullet, because they player sees them that way and will react to them as such until
arrhythmia convinces them to readjust. Likewise, as the game reaches across, it depicts bullets
and not, say, schoolhouses because the player is likewise softly framed through the assumed
knowledge they bring with them from the world.
Since enemies have been an integral part of not just the videogame experience but also of
videogame evolution, they are taxonomically diverse. Their design is limited only by the
imagination of the designer and is reconceived from scratch for the needs of every title. There
are, however, broad categories of enemy types that defined slowly, but firmly from the combined
needs of gameplay and, as Punday noted, narrative. In the chapters that follow, I will explore
four of these categories through a transactional lens, looking at how we might see enemies and
opposition as a major process of narrative phenomena. Chapter 2 is about villains, the “final
bosses” of many games, and a category that includes many of the most famous characters in
videogame history. Villains often appear on game box art or in other key marketing texts, and
can often be the central character of the game in which they appear. As a counterpoint to
traditional arguments about the avatar as the organizing and orienting object of gameplay for the
videogame user, I will show how villains act to situate the player into the narrative and orient the
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emergence of the game’s narrative, exploring how games use villains to create fertile conditions
for particular behaviors and responses.
Moving down the videogame enemy hierarchy, Chapter 3 will examine bosses, also
called level bosses or boss monsters. These enemies, which share thematic similarities to what
Joseph Campbell called threshold guardians, typically exist at the end of game levels and
gatekeep the player from advancing to the next stage of the adventure. I will explore the unique
phenomenon of bosses who despite—or perhaps because of—their prominent roles are often
both beloved and despised by player communities. Applying and complicating theories of
rhythm and arrhythmia, well as the concept of artistic ugliness, I will show how bosses create a
ludic ugliness that acts as an essential link between transactional experience and the flow of socalled optimal game design.
Chapter 4 is focused on the primary type of enemy that players experience in their
narrative adventures, the enemies informally called mobs. These enemies, typically found in
clusters or roaming units in most games, make up the bulk of most gameplay experiences, and
provide the individual mechanical events that, in context, build the experience of the game. Less
appreciated is the role of mobs in building and maintaining setting and space in games. Using
theories of place and rhythm, I will demonstrate how individual mob encounters are nondiscrete, creating landscapes, boundaries, and maps, not just of terrain, but of skill,
accomplishment, emotion, and theme. Mobs allow players to feel-through space and actualize
the experience beyond one of rote execution of felicitous play. I will introduce the concept of the
rhizomatic maze, a transactional sense of space that connects all spaces to one another while still
allowing for movement and antagonism to create the experience.
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Finally, in Chapter 5, I will look at one of the least known and least recognized types of
enemies, a subset of mobs that players have nicknamed trash. These enemies are defined much
more by what they do than by what they are. Players recognize trash as a type of mob that is
designed or placed intentionally into a level, raid, task, or other event for the express purpose of
sapping the player’s time, and therefore provides an opportunity to discuss enemies that irritate,
annoy, complicate, and extend the playing experience. In this chapter, I will take a transactional
look at the history of theorizing game time in game studies before demonstrating how trash,
along with mobs, extend the temporal possibilities of the rhizomatic maze. Through this work,
we can begin an understanding of why some narrative play brings pleasure, while other, nearly
identical play, brings anger, frustration, or a termination of the play experience.
Throughout this project, the goal will be to look at enemies as present, active, and
nontrivial to the accumulation of the coopositional experience of game narrative. If drama is
conflict, then videogame narrative is, almost always, identified, embraced, and experienced
through direct coopositional conflict. My goal is to reveal that player struggle and agency against
this opposition is not a weakness in the pursuit of narrative, but rather the process through which
narrative comes to exist at all.
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2

VILLAINS: COOPOSITIONAL AVATARS OF NARRATIVE ORIENTATION

Bowser, Dr. Eggman, Sephiroth, Ganondorf, Joseph Seed, Asgore, Andrew Ryan,
GLaDOS, Handsome Jack, Lady Dimitrescu, Arthas the Lich King, Kefka, Mother Brain,
Wart, King Dedede, Dr. Wily, Big Boss, The Transcendent One, Wesker, Count Bleck
2.1

Introduction: Vaas
I knew Vaas Montenegro before I knew myself. My player character in Far Cry 3, Jason

Brody, doesn’t appear on the cover of the game box. Instead, a mohawked criminal wielding two
handguns sits cross-legged on a beach, a scenic set of mountains behind him, just past two men
in the near background hanging by their ankles from a tree. This is Vaas, and his victims are
irrelevant to him. He’s conquered them. Instead, he looks forward, directly at you, the person
holding the box.

Figure 5: Far Cry 3 Front Cover
Vaas is a top man on a Pacific island harboring pirates, and when my friends and I
accidentally trespass, Vaas kidnaps and terrorizes us. He plans to hold me and my brothers for
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ransom, but I break free into the jungle and contact the locals who arm me, train me, and
decorate me with ceremonial ink. Over time, as I fight back against Vaas’s operation, I transform
into a warrior and a killer—a killer like Vaas.
Vaas is the face of Far Cry 3 and one of the most popular videogame villains ever
created, at least in terms of fan engagement. Played by the actor Michael Mando, Vaas first
appeared in a promotional video for the game at the E3 conference in 2011, where Vaas rambles
out a monologue about the definition of insanity, which Vaas he describes as doing the same
thing repeatedly and expecting different results. The video ends with Vaas dropping the unseen
player character off a cliff into the lagoon below. Far Cry series publisher Ubisoft recognized
that Vaas had the potential to become a fan favorite character, and at the PAX East conference
the next year paid workers to shave willing attendees’ heads to match Vaas’s mohawk
(Crecente). The initial Vaas video went viral, racking up millions of views and driving
anticipation for the title. It also gave the Far Cry series an identity; since Far Cry 3, the series
has organized its narrative presentation almost entirely around its eccentric core villains. Far Cry
4 is all about Pagan Min, a psychotic Chinese autocrat and drug lord, while Far Cry 5 pits the
player against American cult leader Joseph Seed. The most recent entry, 2021’s Far Cry 6,
boasts actor Giancarlo Esposito as Anton Castillo, a Caribbean dictator, but the closing moments
of the game revealed the return of Vaas in future installments, despite his apparent death in Far
Cry 3. The character returned as a playable figure in a Far Cry 6 downloadable content pack
called, appropriately, “Vaas: Insanity.”
The enthusiastic player reaction to Vaas is especially impressive when considering his
limited appearances throughout Far Cry 3’s gameplay. A player may spend dozens of hours in
Far Cry 3, but in all of that time Vaas appears on screen for less than fifteen minutes. Instead of
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dealing with Vaas directly, the player is encouraged to explore the island, battle pirates, liberate
supply stations, hunt wildlife, and collect items. Many franchise games developed by Ubisoft
since 2007, from Far Cry to Assassin’s Creed to Watch Dogs, are infamous for their signature
style of open world map exploration, which forces players to unveil large sections of the map
through a particular task (in Far Cry 3, this involves climbing a radio tower and looking around
at the surrounding landscape). The map then populates dozens of points of interest within the
revealed zone, giving the player hours upon hours of repetitive tasks that can be accomplished
quickly and relatively easily at their own direction and leisure, ensuring that even a short play
session results in the player feeling that some progress has been made. The player chooses tasks
based on a preferred playstyle, as many tasks have only a tangential, at best, relationship with the
story, leading to the kinds of dissonant play that open world games use as their basic draw. The
player-character’s voice performance and dialog suggest rescuing his friends from Vaas is his
one single and driving goal. But once freed from the plot shackles and set loose in the open
world, the player-as-Brody is encouraged to leave his friends at the mercy of pirates in order to
embrace other activities, such as collecting ancient relics or hunting sharks in the ocean.
As with most Far Cry protagonists, Jason Brody is barely a character. He is young, male,
and white, the middle of three brothers. His oldest brother, Grant, has military training and has
seen combat but doesn’t survive the opening cinematic. Jason, by contrast, fits the archetype of
the unlikely hero, representative of the “wrong guy at the wrong time” action story trope. Despite
this, the open-world design of the game and the fluid combat transforms Jason within minutes
into an unstoppable killing machine, a hero and liberator to the island’s native population, and a
revered spiritual figure. Jason’s implausible competence is not lost on the game’s designers. In
promotional videos, the Far Cry designers describe their goal to gamify repetitive tasks as a

65

strategy to push players into further extreme behaviors, plotting to seduce the player into further
violence. This descent leads to scripted plot scenes late in the game; after Jason rescues his
friends, he then quickly abandons them to continue his crusade. Vaas, a murdering psychotic
who plans to butcher his own priestess sister Citra for obstructing his goals, intentionally mirrors
that journey. Jeffrey Yohalem, the game’s lead writer, explains that Vaas is meant to represent a
possible future. “Vaas was a warning about what could happen to the player character”
(Driver/Purslow). By letting the player observe how repetitive and guiltless violence drove Vaas
into full insanity, the designers place Vaas as a moral guidepost, a symbol that can either draw or
repel the player’s performance of the generic protagonist. The final choice in the game is a
binary one, in which Jason can either embrace his violent spirit and slaughter his friends or
escape the island and reject his new destructive nature.
Far Cry 3 is built around and entirely defined by Vaas, its villain, and not its protagonist,
Jason Brody, despite the vast disparity between the size of their respective roles. This lopsided
construction is quite common in videogames, which tend to reserve the villain for only the most
climactic encounters at the end of narrative adventures, while simultaneously intending for
villains to drive narrative play and ludic strategies. In this chapter, I will explore the
characteristics of the videogame villain from the perspective of transactional narrative and
cooposition, further elaborating on those terms and ideas throughout. The villain is an unusual
figure in videogame stories, almost completely constituted through traditional narrative
technique and largely disassociated from ludic concerns. In fact, as I will argue, the villain is
identified by their actions; although most villains will, at the end of the narrative, serve as a final
boss for the player to fight, the power of the villain is found in its core characteristic of
unavailability, of not being subject to ludic combat. The villain exists to taunt and to motivate,
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not to fight, and by doing so plays an essential role in facilitating narrative co-constitution on the
part of the player. I will further argue that the game studies tradition of focusing attention on the
player’s relationship with the avatar/player character is, at best, over-emphasized and that the
player’s impetus to sense and locate narrative orientation and alignment through opposition to
the villain makes the villain not only a critical phenomenon for narrative orientation, but defines
the villain as a coopositional avatar for the videogame, its design, and its antagonistic elements.
2.2

The Role of the Videogame Villain
Vaas is an iconic example of the role of the videogame villain, a core antagonist typically

presented as an ongoing, long-term target for the player and a key figure in many narrative
games. It is important when defining the villain to clarify how the villain stands apart and
beyond the other enemies of the game, at least phenomenologically, within the player’s
perception. Unlike the hordes of enemies and challenges a player may face in any game, the
villain is typically singular, distant, and all-powerful, appearing as the game’s central figure of
opposition, seemingly unbeatable. Usually the other enemies in a game work for the villain, who
stays off the main stage unless directly confronting, taunting, or attacking the player character.
The villain usually fills a leadership role of some kind and, in contrast to the typical player
character, is a figure of outsized personality. Videogame villains are known for being impossibly
cool (Sephiroth, Final Fantasy VII), charismatic (Dutch, Red Dead Redemption 2) or
entertaining (Handsome Jack, Borderlands 2). Sometimes, as in the Far Cry series, the villain
appears on the cover of the game box and in much of the game’s key promotional art. When
Vaas stares out at the player from the cover of Far Cry 3, his scowl functions as an invitation. In
front of him is a recent victim, buried in the sand. Vaas appears to be beckoning the player to try
and do better.
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However, unlike a common enemy in a level or a periodic boss monster, there is no
expectation that the player will fight the villain regularly while playing a videogame (Bowser is
an exception, showing up to fight Mario at the end of every World in the original Super Mario
Bros. He evolves to a more standard villain role in future appearances). Instead, players have
learned through decades of videogame storytelling not to expect to face the villain at all until the
end of the game, if even then. In the rare games in which the player meets the villain in combat
early, the villain will either easily defeat the player in a show of strength or find himself
protected by designed narrative gates—for example, Darth Malak from the Star Wars roleplaying
title Knights of the Old Republic (2003) is saved from losing in combat by sudden cutscenes
which simply depict him winning instead.
Before Vaas in Far Cry 3, the most prominent villain in the Far Cry series was a gun
runner named The Jackal, the villain of Far Cry 2. Clint Hocking, that game’s creative director,
is quick to identify the character in both narrative and gameplay contexts as a “macguffin,” an
object of pursuit. “He’s really there to give the player a high-level target and a high-level goal
that the player doesn’t have any expectation of being able to get to until they’ve worked their
way through the content. He’s not really a gameplay function, he’s just a motivation”
(Driver/Purslow). This is how the videogame villain is usually perceived, more of a destination
than an active threat. Many contemporary videogames present the player’s character as a work in
progress, using design elements of the role-playing game to allow the player to unlock and
practice new skills and weapons throughout the course of play. Like Jason Brody in Far Cry 3,
the hero is very often a different and more powerful figure at the conclusion of the story than at
the start. In this scenario, as Hocking suggests, the villain functions as a kind of finish line for
the completed experience, an endpoint for the player character’s narrative journey and the
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player’s game experience, a destination that exists beyond the step-by-step encounters players
experience on the path through the narrative, including standard enemies or even bosses. Villains
extend beyond them all.
Some of the most memorable videogame villains assert their motivational role by
taunting the player’s incompetence. GLaDOS, the sinister AI that functions as the villain of the
puzzle action game Portal, mocks the player throughout each puzzle, with quotes ranging from
backhanded compliments (“You did so well, I’m going to note this on your file… ‘Did… well…
enough’”) to emotional manipulation (“Despite your violent behavior, the only thing you’ve
managed to break so far is my heart”) to outright insults (“Here come the test results: ‘You are a
horrible person.’ That’s what is says. We weren’t even testing for that”). After suffering her
abuse for hours, many Portal players are delighted to finally have an opportunity to face her in
combat, using skills they’ve sharpened in the earlier “tests” for a final fight that is as stuffed with
one-liners as it is with danger for the player. (After the player destroys one of GLaDOS’s many
nodes, for example, the AI chastises her by claiming that particular part made “shoes for
orphans”). GLaDOS is so famously skilled with her verbal assaults, that some writers have even
suggested that Portal uses ridicule as a functional game mechanic. “Ultimately, the ridicule dares
the player, motivating her or him to keep pressing onward” (Grewell, et. al).
The use of the villain as a motivating game mechanic evolved slowly across the history
of the medium. The earliest arcade titles rarely featured villains, in large part because they rarely
featured narratives. Since the goal of the arcade machine was to separate players from their
quarters and clear the machine out for the next player, sessions were designed to be quite short
and punishing. Donkey Kong is one exception, with the antagonist of the game receiving top line
billing and his face on the side of the game cabinet, and the game’s giant gorilla villain fills
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much the same role as GLaDOS or Vaas, standing at each level’s literal finish line and hurling
threats at the hero. Unlike most villains, the player never gets to fully defeat Donkey Kong;
although the player can drop Kong from a tall height every fourth level, the game simply repeats
the cycle on the very next screen as Kong continues to capture and imprison Pauline, the player
character’s girlfriend, until the player’s lives expire. Villains can be found scattered only
sporadically throughout other early arcade games, such as filmmaker Don Bluth’s laserdisc game
Dragon’s Lair, in which players memorize patterns to help the animated Dirk the Daring rescue
a princess from the evil dragon Singe.
One of the most interesting examples of the arcade villain appears in the game Sinistar, in
which players are tasked with defeating an evil, talking warship in space. Players pilot a small
starship and navigate through a zone filled with enemy ships and small asteroids. By mining
asteroids, the player earns special bombs used to defeat the Sinistar, the game’s eponymous
villain, which is built by enemy worker ships while the player mines for bombs. When the
Sinistar is completed, it comes to life with stereo-supported dialogue, from disconcerting
screams to taunts (“Beware! I live!”). Once in play, the Sinistar pursues the player’s ship,
destroying it with a touch while the player desperately launches the collected bombs to eliminate
the threat. The villain in Sinistar therefore motivates through temporal pressure; the player
knows the Sinistar is under construction but can’t know when it will be completed, promoting
rapid collection of bombs and, hopefully for the cabinet designers, pressuring the player into
making mistakes. If GLaDOS weaponizes ridicule as a motivating game mechanic, the Sinistar
weaponizes time in the same way. This same mechanic appears in another 1983 title, the Atari
2600 cartridge Frankenstein’s Monster, in which the player must collect stones and build a
barricade around Mary Shelley’s creature before a lightning storm wakes it. Unlike in Sinistar,
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the monster is constantly visible throughout play but gradually changes color to indicate how
much time the player has to complete their task before failure.

Figure 6: The villain on the cover and in-game in Frankenstein's Monster

As games moved out of the arcade and to home consoles and personal computers, the
longer and more comfortable play sessions (removed from the need to cycle quarters) soon led to
more complex narratives, and therefore more villains. Legendary text adventure Zork famously
contains a wicked Thief who appears throughout the game at random to steal items and must be
killed and looted by the player to finish the game. The Thief is memorable but arguably falls
short of true videogame villainy because he is not the motivation of the player’s quest but simply
a personified obstacle the player meets along the way. It isn’t until Zork II in 1981 that true
villainy appeared in the series. Frobozz, a sinister wizard, appears on the game box and
periodically appears to attack the player with harmful spells. The player can only stop Frobozz
by gaining enough power to finally confront the wizard. Nick Monfort, in his writing on game
narrative, cites the Zork games as aligning with Propp’s theories of literary villainy. “Propp
believed villainy to be the most important function in the folktales he examined,” Montfort
writes, while elaborating ideas first proposed by Buckles writing about the text game Adventure.
“[villains are] ‘the symbolic representation of forces working to seemingly hinder, but actually
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promoting, the hero or heroine’s development” (Montfort 112). Following that thought, Frobozz
appears in Zork II not just to provide an obstacle for the player, but to encourage the
development of the player’s skills in overcoming obstacles.

Figure 7: Frobozz on the cover of Zork II
This connection from Propp to Zork II and Adventure is justified because the template for
videogame villainy was established in legacy media, from classical folktales to fairy tales,
adventure stories, and popular fiction. After adopting narrative and villainous foils, videogame
studios soon worked to establish the most popular as transmedia figures—for example, 1980s
Nintendo games generated such a robust rogue’s gallery of memorable baddies that the company
spun them off into film and television, including the Saturday morning advertainment cartoon
Captain N, in which a 1980s teen is zapped into Nintendo’s shared universe to fight an
assortment of Nintendo heavies. It didn’t matter that videogame villains couldn’t yet compete
with their analog predecessors for depth or complexity; the villain’s role was to stand
permanently opposed to the goals of the videogame heroes and, by proxy, the player,
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establishing early the popular assumption that videogames, by their nature, perform as heroic
wish fulfillment simulations in which the player grabs his controller to engage in battle against
implacable foes.
In this way, the adoption of fiction tropes related to heroic quests and villainous
opposition opens study of videogame narrative to classical narratological theories of the role of
the villain, such as those of Propp, who believed the villain held a central and critical role in the
folktale. The villain is the figure who creates the “actual movement” of the story (Propp 29), and
early incidents in the plot, including the basic setting and any tragic backstory that exists in the
life of the character such as the absence of a parent, serve primarily to set the stage for the
villainy that occurs. The villain, then, is the engine of the adventure that will change and develop
the hero into a more powerful version of him or herself. The literary villain is the reflection of
the hero; it is by comparing the evil of the villain and the goodness of the hero that the reader
comes to understand the hero’s nature and identity. The juxtaposition of evil with good creates a
mutual reflection, and the qualities of each shine brighter due to the comparison. In fact, this
observation of Propp’s, which has ascended into common understanding of fictional villains over
time, is one of the possible reasons why the videogame villain, and character-driven opposition
as a whole, has remained undertheorized in game studies. Literary and narrative scholars have
centuries of villains available to study and catalogue, and, as Arenas has noted, the assumption
appears to be that the question of the villain has been thoroughly picked over and little new
awaits our inquiry. Arenas writes that the academic consensus is that “fictional characters should
not keep us too busy, since they are mere patterns of recurrence within a text, or mere functions
within a plot,” (Arenas 3) functions that include collecting and personifying those textual
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patterns (we might consider them rhythms) that position the character as a recognizable agent of
Aristotelian agon.
While this seems evidently true, that does not mean that villainy is a settled question,
especially for videogames. In fact, Arenas’s work was on the possibility of opening villains up to
advanced scrutiny through a blended approach of psychoanalysis and cognitive psychology.
Arenas explores how and why people embedded in particular cultures might identify character
traits as villainous by way of cognitive analysis and intuition. For example, suggesting that
readers are constantly processing and analyzing presented characters for the presence or lack of
character traits such as trust, straightforwardness, altruism, compliance, modesty, and tendermindedness (20). In Arenas’s account, the villain should not be psychoanalyzed to discover the
hidden desires of the author but rather studied through psychology to determine why persons,
groups, or cultures respond to villains as negative reflections of their own values.
While Arenas and others work to find new life in the villain, the same interest has not yet
emerged in game studies, where the consensus appears to be that villains aren’t of particular
interest, as little research has addressed the topic. The villain is such a staple of literary studies
that its analysis has been abandoned to the application of literary tools, if at all. (Once again, the
suspicion of game studies for theories that emerge from outside disciplines has an overbearing
effect.) As we have seen, however, allowing narratological concepts to cross freely into game
studies can create intractable problems. The dualist rift returns when trying to mirror the villain
off the videogame’s hero because the nature of the hero itself—especially in relationship with the
player—remains such a hotly debated topic. It seems to me that to assess the videogame villain,
one must ask a series of foundational questions about the relationship of the videogame villain to
the literary villain, to the videogame hero, and of the hero to the player, applying our
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transactional lens to look at these relationships in terms of aesthetic rhythm, flow, and
continuous experience.
2.3

More Than Just a Mountain
The first question we must ask is whether or not the villain of the game carries any

special relationship at all with the player or player character. This is not a simple question,
because the videogame villain is a significant figure of narrative opposition and motivation but,
as any player can attest, videogames are filled with all manner of oppositional forces, not the
least of which is the hardware and underlying code itself. Players are acutely aware that the game
is programmed to work against them, and active perception of the game requires a multi-layered,
continuous, and malleable appreciation of the game’s coopositional rhythms (more on this term
later) in order to achieve a state of rhythmic equilibrium, what Csikszentmihalyi thinks of as
flow, or what Jayemanne might consider felicitous engagement with the game’s framing. In that
way, villains are just one of the narrative game’s many oppositional targets. For example,
returning to Hocking’s description of The Jackal in Far Cry 2 as a high-level goal for the player,
we might point to the 2012 game Journey, which includes no villain or enemies in its premise.
Instead, at almost all points during the game, players may observe a gigantic, glowing mountain
spire on the horizon. Without any prompting, instruction, or dialog, players inevitably move
toward the mountain, because it is the most dominant feature in the landscape and, therefore, a
goal.
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Figure 8: The mountain guides the player in Journey
Like defeating Vaas, approaching the mountain is an impossibility without undergoing
some improvement in skill and ability. The player must take time along the path to collect
extensions to the player character’s whirling scarf, which in turn allows the player to catch the
wind and fly for longer periods, aiding in the solving of environmental challenges or puzzles.
The mountain awaits, and the player must rise to meet that challenge—just like the player must
do with the villains we have discussed.
If ascending the mountain is the ultimate challenge of Journey, and if the pursuit of the
mountain drives players to increase the player character’s skills and abilities, then is the
mountain a villain? As many designers and game scholars have noted (Anthropy and Clark, for
example), there is little difference programmatically between the mountain and Vaas, GLaDOS,
or any other videogame villain. Underneath the graphical expression of mountains, villains,
chasms, monsters, sandstorms, and dragons, these entities are each just expressions of computer
code given visual, aural, spatial, and temporal characteristics meant to distinguish them from
other coded phenomena within the text—what designers call “fiction,” or the textual patterns
meant to disguise the object’s or obstacle’s true nature as code and mathematical calculation. A
ruthless reading of the Journey mountain might then suggest that it is the villain of the game,
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because any sufficiently motivating obstacle—especially an obstacle that drives the overall arc of
gameplay and progression expected from contemporary videogames—qualifies, since all code is
the same as any other. This is the ludological reading of game narrative, in which the
presentation of coded items is ultimately irrelevant, since in the end, like say in Tetris, it’s all
“really” just blocks and shapes, no matter what we call the pieces. (Gee 15-17)
However, as Katherine Isbister has noted, the crucial element missing from that account
is the player’s active perception of the videogame mountain and the videogame character as
elements of her world. Isbister notes that players can engage in intense emotional relationships
with videogame characters through parasocial interaction (Isbister 7). Shira Chess, for example,
has noted how casual games will deploy cute characters, such as a polar bear mother with her
cubs, to manipulate players emotionally, even in games with stripped down, casino-like
mechanics. And Yee has argued that humans have a difficult time treating digital persons
differently than flesh and blood people (Chess 156-157). For this reason, the social game studio
Zynga often included romantic interests in their games to great success, even though the love
interests were little more than static NPCs with no game function, such as the lovers Lisa Latte
and Joe Espresso found in Café World. Simply put, players see mountains and characters
differently, even if they’re much the same “under the hood.” Gee is half-right when he claims
that no amount of fiction will make Tetris more than blocks and shapes in the code; what he
misses is how players will adjust relationships to those blocks if they are encouraged to perceive
them as characters instead. One of the most famous examples of this in videogames is a literal
block: the Weighted Companion Cube, one of GLaDOS’s insidious pranks from Portal. One
level in the game requires players to manipulate the position of a cube in order to solve a puzzle.
GLaDOS, however, identifies the cube as your companion and alters its basic design with hearts
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(otherwise the cube is standard in every way). Once the player has completed the challenge,
GLaDOS orders the player to drop the companion cube in an incinerator, and many players
expressed shock and dismay over having to “kill” the block.

Figure 9: The Companion Cube in Portal
Imagine, then, if the block had been replaced with the 3D model of a baby polar bear, and
it becomes easy to see Isbister’s argument. “Avatars and NPCs [non-player characters] allow
players to identify and engage in new ways, awakening different kinds of emotions… a feeling
of responsibility and of the complexity of relating to other beings” (Isbister 41). To return to a
concept from Chapter 1, players perceive villains experientially as distinct from other kinds of
digital objects, no matter what the underlying code suggests. Journey does no work to encourage
players to see the mountain as having agency or as a companion. It is just a mountain. On the
other hand, it is the perceived agency of the villain—from Sinistar to Vaas—that allows it to
emerge from the milieu as a recognizable and coopositional figure. And as its agency appears to
the player as an extension of the game’s design and desires, these figures emerge as avatars for
the game.
To expand on this point: when the player of the narrative videogame reaches across
through perception and movement using her senses and controllers, she attempts to achieve a
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felicitous rhythm with the narrative material of the game, aligning her own biological and
cultural rhythms with that offered in the narrative game not as a distant, separated text but in a
way, as Anable puts it, that sees the game as “part of the historically and technologically
grounded, yet emergent and evasive, shifts in the everyday conditions of the computer-mediated
world” (Anable xiii). The player reaches across as an entity of biological and cultural rhythms—
what Apperley and others call a “polyrhythm” (Apperley 38)--embedded continuously in a world
with its own massive polyrhythm. Through perception and play the player attempts to align with
the polyrhythm of the game, which is perceived as a physical extension of the computermediated world in which the player is enmeshed. A game that offers narrative rhythms in
addition to gameplay rhythms—both of which emerged through combined rhythms of design,
technology, and culture—provides just one more wave with which the player may attempt to
align, in the same way Dewey’s spectator aligns with a set of organized brushstrokes to perceive
the image offered by the painter. In this way, the villain is quite different from the mountain
because the player does not perceive them both as coded obstacles but as expressions of physical
rhythms in the world. Rather than rely on Arenas’s cognitive approach to analyzing literary
villains, we can instead think transactionally, as the player reaches across to align with a game’s
narrative rhythm, then perceives as the “brushstrokes” of character emerge from the milieu, first
by way of appearance, then by way of action and dialog and conflict and perceived agency, all of
which rely on the player’s cultural and environmental milieu to inform how they are perceived.
It’s for this reason that we can think of villains as more than their ludological ontology but as the
weakly emergent phenomena between player and game—less a node of textual information than
a emergent rhythm that sits on the extreme outside of the player’s aspirational aesthetic—like
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Vaas on the cover of Far Cry 3, a character that demands defeat before all the polyrhythm can
align.
2.4

The Problem of the Avatar
I have just argued that the villain maintains a special, privileged position in the eyes of

the player. The villain is not just like every other obstacle, no matter its “true” nature as code.
But the second question that must be asked—whether the videogame villain fills the role of the
literary villain, as a foil who gives identity to the hero through juxtaposition—runs into a very
serious problem, one that has consumed game studies far more than questions of opposition and
antagonism. That problem, put simply, is who or what we should identify as the hero. At the
heart of this problem is the dualist rift that I have argued has stymied game and narrative studies
for many years. At issue is the special, privileged relationship the player has to the game avatar
or player character, which I will approach as separate but related concepts.
To explain this problem, let’s return to the character of Jason Brody in Far Cry 3. As
explained earlier, Brody is a mess as a character. If the average player’s actions in Far Cry 3
were written out as a novel, the character would become a hopeless tangle of contradictions.
Brody is not a trained soldier, although he is said to have shown aptitude with a gun when
shooting with his older brother. But within minutes in Far Cry 3, Brody is an unstoppable killing
machine. The emotional conflict in the story is about Brody being torn between his new nature as
a killer and his stated goal to rescue his friends and escape the island. But in actuality, players
will likely spend hours guiding Brody on busy work and side quests. This disconnect is by no
means restricted to the Far Cry series. Many games with open-world design struggle with the
same problem. For example, in Grand Theft Auto V (2013), the character of Michael De Santa is
depicted as living a quiet life in the suburbs, laying low after having left his criminal past behind
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him. Eventually, the world of crime and chaos finds Michael in the plot, but long before that
happens the player can take Michael on a killing spree and joy ride through the city, causing
enough mayhem to bring the National Guard down upon them, but the next cutscene in
Michael’s life ignores that and returns to the idea that Michael just wants to hide his destructive
past. These examples point to an alleged disparity between the player, the player-character, and
the manifestation of that character controlled by the player, the avatar. So, if the videogame
villain is acting as a reflection, drawing out the identity of the hero, the troubling question is how
to identify the hero from that milieu.
The videogame avatar has long been seen and studied as a critical element of videogame
play. Researchers have proposed that the avatar acts as an extended self that allows for
construction of player identity (Turkle 177), as orientating figures in a virtual environment
(Vella), as cybernetic arrangements (Keogh 22), inhabitable protagonists (Isbister 11), as doubleconsciousness (Salen & Zimmerman, by Vella); and as a second skin (Consalvo/Begy 108-109).
Each of these metaphors and approaches tries to make sense of what, in a ludological sense, is
the ultimate distinction between videogames and legacy media, the link between the player and
the actions of the character the player controls. Most game studies approaches to the avatar
follow along these lines, suggesting that the player and the avatar merge in some significant way
that allows the player to experiment with being a different person or trying on another set of
perspectives and cultural values. One of my students once described his experience playing a
Batman videogame in those terms, feeling like he was Batman saving Gotham from a wave of
crime. His description lends credence to these ideas, which appear at first to be evident. But my
student said something curious next. When he was not successful as Batman, such as when he
fell from height or lost a combat to a random thug, he blamed the character, not himself, taking
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credit for all of Batman’s skill and yelling at the superhero for being bad at his job when it was
the student himself who made a mistake. The instant and sudden dismissal my student described
is not unusual for videogame play and seems incompatible with true “second skin” constructions.
Keogh has written that players exist both in the game world and the real world simultaneously,
shifting perception as needed based on environment. For Keogh, this is a phenomenological
transition between perceptive states (Keogh 51). My transactional argument is that this is
possible because there is no boundary between any of the individual states to begin with,
precluding the idea of the avatar as a second skin or a costume to be worn to enter a digital
space. Plenty of research, such as Consalvo and Begy’s study of the rise and fall of the browser
game Faunasphere (2015), have shown that players do not need an avatar to find themselves or
to form identities in games. In fact, I believe that game studies has misunderstood and
overemphasized the role of the avatar and player-character as a driver of player identity in almost
all narrative games.
Walt Williams, the writer of the lauded narrative shooter Spec Ops: The Line, once
described the enormous gap between fictional characters and avatars. “A character can be
flawed, hypocritical, or just plain evil. An avatar has to be a blank slate, so that its personality
doesn’t conflict with that of the player.” (Williams 169) The videogame avatar is falsely looked
upon as a character when in fact they are closer to, as Newman suggests (2002), collections of
affordances. Aarseth correctly noted this distinction early, calling out the dissonant play when a
player using an avatar cannot perform basic actions or techniques that the character would be
able to perform if not trapped within a videogame (Aarseth 121). However, Aarseth saw this as a
flaw of thinking of videogames as narratives, when it is really a flaw of dualist narratological
theory to account for all ways in which stories and storytelling have transformed through digital
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media and videogames. Avatars, as Walt Williams suggests, do not contain anything more than
superficial character traits—from visual design to audio dialog to animations--to leave the
character as empty as possible to be filled with player action. Klevjer is among the scholars who
have attempted to reconceptualize the inflated understanding of the avatar, instead arguing for
what he calls “prosthetic telepresence,” (Klevjer 17) with the player relationship to the avatar-inthe-game more akin to driving a car on a city street. Apperley’s analogy is perhaps preferable,
considering his interest in gaming rhythms. Apperley extends outward from the avatar to the
player, and from the player outward into the polyrhythm of the player’s situated body in the
world, what he calls a “situated ecology.” Noting how videogame players often dream of the
game when they aren’t playing, or believe they see the game’s targeting reticles when moving
throughout the real world, Apperley believes videogame play, and videogame avatar
manipulation, is more akin to dressage, or preparation for tasks required to complete the game
(Apperley 34-35).
Considering these ideas, while it is true that avatars are often given names, histories,
personalities, and faces, one natural experience for players is to looks past the avatar or beyond
it. The avatar, in most cases, carries very little emotional or narrative weight. Translating and
adapting these ideas into transactionism, we can return to Reynolds and his account of The
Unfinished Swan. As he describes the player’s manipulation of the avatar Reynolds describes the
critical importance of moving the avatar, designated as a character named Monroe, through the
world. Monroe’s movement is an act of perception through which the player makes sense of the
game’s invisible architecture as the player hurls paint and understands the revealed threedimensional space based on the relationship between the avatar’s presence and the splotches on
the wall. The avatar is not a character in those moments but a collection of perceptual

83

affordances that allow the player-as-Monroe to “aestheticize the world by perceiving it,” and
vice versa (Reynolds 19-22).
If the avatar and the player-character are not synonymous as Apperley and others suggest,
and if the avatar is a mere expression of player affordances to which the videogame villain is
providing identity through reflection, then should we consider the player-character as the
protagonist in the videogame story? Is the protagonist the character or the player who drives it?
Which is the more important phenomenon, the player-as-avatar, or the player-as-character?
Fortunately, this is a false binary that reflects the larger difficulties with theorizing narrative
under player control, as outlined in Chapter 1. When we return to thinking of narrative
transactionally, we can see there is no separation between these weakly emergent constructions.
Remember, the player constitutes the narrative through active perception, just as the game
situates and constitutes the player’s body, attention, and perception through the course of play.
The player-character as a narrative element is continuous with the player-as-avatar, allowing a
character-narrative-player eurhythm, to use a term coined by Lefebvre (1992) to describe the
culmination of many dissonant polyrhythms into a single experience. The villain is not separate
from this rhythm; it invites coopositional alignment. Put simply, the player seeking narrative
experience will identify and then align in opposition to the villain, meaning that the villain
reflects the identity of both the player-character and the player herself.
2.5

Villains as Coopositional Avatars
It is necessary now to expand on my previous descriptions of transactional cooposition.

In chapter 1, I described cooposition as “cooperative antagonism.” To that description, I want to
add that cooposition is not only cooperative, it is also productive antagonism, and a foundational
element in active perception of any narrative, although it is most prominently displayed in
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videogame narrative. To explain cooposition, I want to return to Walt Williams and his military
shooter, Spec Ops: The Line. Released in 2012 to little attention, the game (the tenth entry in a
lesser-known military shooter franchise) quickly gained a positive reputation for its strong and
twisty narrative. The player controls Walker, an American soldier sent into Dubai which, in this
world, has been swept off the map by a sandstorm of unbelievable scale. Walker leads a small
team on a reconnaissance mission but gradually grows obsessed with a man named Konrad (the
game contains overt references to Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness) who has gone rogue from
the military and begun committing atrocities against the survivors of the sandstorm. As Walker
pushes his team deeper into the ruins of the city, each grisly discovery only makes him more
determined to find and eliminate his enemy. After endless firefights and explosions, the player
controlling Walker commits his own atrocity—believing he is facing a large squad of Konrad’s
troops, Walker drops lethal white phosphorous on a population, only later realizing that the
group contained only innocent civilians. As the player-character Walker spirals into madness, the
player controlling the avatar of Walker must confront his own complicity in war crimes. There is
no choice to avoid Walker’s orders if the game is to continue, save for refusing to play.
In the final stages of the game, the player discovers that Konrad is not Walker’s enemy.
In fact, Konrad was dead before the game’s story even began. All of the atrocities that Walker
has been attributing to Konrad are, in fact, Walker’s own atrocities, reworked in his mind to
attribute them to Konrad after Walker’s own guilt over the white phosphorus attack sent him into
a mental breakdown. The events since the civilian attack are then recontextualized and represented to the player, who sees how at each stage the villain was, in fact, the player-character
Walker, and that the dialog from the men under his command were actually concerned pleas for
Walker to come to his senses even as they followed his orders. Faced with this moment of mental
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clarity, the player’s final choices are to surrender to a squad of troops or to embrace the Konrad
inside himself and open fire… or to commit suicide and truly defeat the villain.
The events of Spec Ops: The Line illustrate how cooposition develops player and
character identity through conflict. Since he is deceased, Konrad is a purely narrative
construction, a narrative Walker tells himself, one created by Walker’s perception of the world.
Walker defines himself as opposed to the Konrad figure he’s created. Even when Walker
commits his war crime, he justifies the action by positioning it next to Konrad’s worse actions,
and even by blaming Konrad, who “forced” him to drop the white phosphorus. Like the
videogame villain he is, Konrad sits at the end of the journey, unstoppable, backed by hundreds
of minions, and Walker’s goal becomes single-minded as he’s driven to find and confront the
villain on the (metaphorical) horizon.
But like the player, Walker is changed by his journey. The closer he gets to Konrad, the
more like Konrad he becomes. Meanwhile Konrad is becoming less of a threat—by the time
Walker gets to him, he’s no longer a boogeyman but a corpse who died weeks ago on a balcony.
Coopositionally, Walker and Konrad advance one another’s’ journey through active antagonism.
Their conflict is a productive conflict. Although Konrad and Walker appear to be engaging in a
fight to death, in reality there is no actual separation or gap between them. They exist within
each other, and the pursuit of Konrad makes Walker more than he was at the start while
simultaneously advancing Konrad toward his own actualization as a full character, one that can
only be properly assessed and understood when his fate is revealed.
This is how cooposition works in videogame narrative: as productive opposition. The
player approaches the game and its narrative, but because of the nature of the experience they
must be opposed. The game must work to challenge the player and to prevent the quick and easy
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accomplishment of the player’s goal. The two forces appear to be at odds, pushing against one
another in a conflict that, typically, the player will ultimately win. But this antagonism is an
illusion. As the player pushes back against the game, the player is in fact progressing through
conflict. The game advances when defeated. Likewise, as the game pushes back on the player,
the player learns the techniques and skills required to win the next round, meaning that the
game’s opposition helps to constitute the player’s experience and skill. Even when the player
suffers a setback in time or effort through the loss of a life or some other defeat, the player’s
experience with the game is not reset, rebooted, or erased. It is brought forward. In other words,
cooposition is active opposition that productively advances the emergent game in every instance.
It is opposition as net positive. This model evokes Csikszentmihalyi’s description of flow,
Dewey’s model of aesthetic perception, and Lefebvre’s thoughts on rhythm, all of which rely on
(to various degrees) an understanding that attuning to and aligning with the positive emergence
of phenomena, or what Dewey calls an experience, means engaging in a struggle with rhythms
until a balance is found. Productive experience and sensation can be thought of as the organism
and the environment struggling together, forward. Lefebvre argues that to discover and attune to
surrounding rhythms requires the analyst to be grasped by it. “One must let oneself go, give
oneself over, abandon oneself to its duration” (27). Transactionally, however, we can think of the
rhythms around us, of our environment, of our media, of other people and minds, as doing the
same for our rhythms—all the rhythms of the world, attempting to grasp and be grasped by all
others they encounter. The perception of artistic rhythms, including that of narrative, are
therefore active and oppositional. We attempt to grasp the narrative activity while the narrative
activity attempts to grasp us. Perceiving is an active task, and the perceived environment resists
its own constitution through struggle to constitute us. We sense the struggle—even if only lightly
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and through “low-flow”—and when we make sense of the art before us we feel satisfaction in
overcoming its challenge and equalizing its rhythms with our own.
Returning to the question of whose character and identity is illuminated by the wicked
actions of the villain, I believe the clear answer in a transactional sense is that the narrative
videogame villain acts as a central engine of identity construction for the merged player, avatar,
and player-character and not just for the player-character itself. Put another way, the player is not
merely making the story happen through play but is included in the weakly emergent narrative
phenomenon. The player’s own identity, both as a player and as an agent in the narrative, is
illuminated and defined by the villain, just as clearly, or even more so, than the player-character
itself. The avatar is a special tool of narrative production with no clear boundaries between itself
and the player, or between itself and the player-character, but the avatar has no particular identity
of its own to discover through cooposition with the villain.
How, then, does aesthetic rhythm alignment produce identity? At issue is the construction
of the player-character/player/avatar, which I have called a weakly emergent phenomenon of
play. Is it important to reiterate that this is weak emergence and not a cybernetic or prosthetic
construct favored by some phenomenologists. The cybernetic approach to the player/avatar is
tempting because the player and the avatar superficially appear to merge during the course of
play. Take, for example, the oft-observed way players tend to move their bodies along with the
avatar they control, as if trying to assist Mario in making his leap across the chasm with a little
extra oomph. This is the basis for Klevjer’s suggestion of “prosthetic telepresense,” extrapolating
from Merleau-Ponty’s famous example of the blind man and his walking stick, as if the player
dons the avatar like a suit, allowing for an exploratory, perceiving presence within the digital
game world. If we follow that line of reasoning, we might conclude that the player-avatar
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construction is an individual construction, in the sense Gilbert Simondon describes individuation,
as a gradual, iterating presence that elevates a machine (in this case, the player-avatar prosthetic
assembly) from its embedded environmental milieu as it becomes more efficient and less reliant
on external support through a process he calls concretization (1980). In this account, the play
session and the play experience would be seen as the process of individuation, and the alignment
with the game’s rhythms—the aesthetic flow—would represent the moment that the playeravatar emerges from the chaotic milieu into a fully concrete cybernetic individual. This is strong
emergence as found explicitly and implicitly throughout phenomenological readings of games,
such as those of Keogh or Crick, whose work extends from Sobchack and seeks to identify the
“game body” in play, such as the manipulation of the game camera as separate from the avatar,
seeking what Crick calls “a better understanding of how the player is theoretically able to exist
within differing spatial domains during a first-person gaming experience, operating both on and
in the game's space from their own physical space" (259).
Cybernetic and strongly emergent models, however, become untenable from a
transactionist and naturalist perspective when trying to determine where exactly the emergent
construction ends. Simondon in particular argues that an individual only emerges—only becomes
concretized as more than a collection of components—when the entity no longer requires
maintenance, resources, or other material from its associated milieu. Naturalism tells us that this
never occurs. The moment never arrives where the associated milieu becomes irrelevant or
otherwise loses its influence over the machine. There would be no such thing as an individual.
Circumventing this problem is the appeal of transactionism, which asserts that the essential
element of existence is not what something is but how it acts. If the avatar and its permeable
boundaries between the narrative player-character and the actively perceiving player can be
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thought of as a set of affordances—Apperley’s dressage analogy—then we may reconfigure the
relationship between the three nodes of the player/avatar/character as one of action, with each
reaching across to constitute the other, and then disengaging when the play session ends. The
player, having been partially constituted by the cooposition of the game, takes with her the
experience, the memory, the muscle coordination between her eye and thumb, and she will bring
that with her the next time she reaches across to the game. But she never becomes a full
cybernetic construction; she is always influenced and affected by her contexts, her social world,
her culture, her environment. The player-character is likewise not a closed entity, affected as it is
by the perception of the player, the design choices made during development, and the technology
that gives it existence. Neither is the avatar a closed system, bound as it is by the game engine,
which itself branches outward towards the engine’s design and designers, and so on. The
contexts branch out ad infinitum with no fixed boundary, ever, and the videogame villain
becomes a critical and essential context for the player/avatar/character construct as it engages
with the narrative.
Therefore, in rhythm alignment with this model of the player, I propose to reconsider the
villain as the game’s avatar, specifically as an avatar of cooposition, representing the
coopositional force that produces the narrative and co-constitutes the player and her active
aesthetic perception. Players are always aware during a videogame play session that the game
itself and the code represent the design and contexts of the designers to provide opposition. In
fact, as Juul asserts, players typically become deeply frustrated when a game does not oppose
them enough (2013). Game designer Richard Rouse III persuasively argues that particular types
of game genres, namely horror, have thrived in videogame cultures because generic needs and
affordances align with the nature of the videogame itself—in both horror and in gaming, the

90

spectator/player knows the threat is real, somewhere off where it cannot be seen (15). Narrative
videogames that present a strong villain are essentially offering up an avatar of the game’s
antagonism. The villain controls the environment and the enemies within it, in the same way that
designers have built the challenges, puzzles, chasms, and threats of the world for the player to
traverse. The villain’s usual placement as the final threat to overcome in the game world is in
rhythm with the game itself. Just as Walker and Konrad inch closer to each other via each
conflict, only learning at the end that they were never separate in the first place, the playeravatar-character emergence inches closer to the game-designer-character emergence of the
villain with each step, adding skills and experience, constituting and being constituted by the
phenomenon. Every obstacle the player overcomes is another element in that journey, but the
villain wishes to be perceived as above it all, controlling it all, claiming to wish destruction on
the player, while actually working to lift up, improve, and facilitate play-- the permeable avatar
of productive antagonism itself.
2.6

Identity and Inverse Orientation
Sara Ahmed wrote that “it matters how we arrive at the places we do” (2). She was

speaking in part of the way that objects and emotions orient us in our lives, determine how we
exist in spaces, and in which directions we orient towards and why. The Far Cry writers cited
above spoke of Vaas and The Jackal—iconic villains—as orienting forces that direct and move
players toward the designers’ goals. Vaas in particular was meant to orient the player by
demonstrating what the player’s violent actions, such as what repeating the same violent tasks
over and over again, as per the game’s design, might do to his mind. The player orients toward
Vaas as the villain, the apparent end goal of the game, but the contours and rhythms of gameplay
create the illusion of an inverse orientation, the desire to turn one’s self, or the character of Jason
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Brody, or the avatar, away from Vaas. At least that is one possibility. The player may also
choose to orient herself toward Vaas positively, as a model for the kind of personality and ethics
that guarantees survival on Vaas’s lost island, happily choosing the late-game options to murder
Brody’s friends and accept his role as a spiritual vessel of vengeance from the island’s priestess.
There are many other kinds of orientations as well. The player may ignore the narrative elements
and orient toward the task list or mindless carnage, or perhaps the player orients towards the
space itself to seek secrets and easter eggs via exploration.
That plurality in videogame play and the vast disparities between play styles are key
reasons why dualist theories are often insufficient to account for videogames. The villain, as the
central avatar of the game’s cooposition, invites a particular kind of spatial orientation within the
game world. For Ahmed, orientation relies on bodily and emotional inhabitance in a space. “We
might fear an object that approaches us. The approach is not simply about the arrival of an
object: it is also how we turn toward that object. The feeling of fear is directed toward that
object, while it also apprehends the object in a certain way, as being fearsome… emotions shape
what bodies do in the present, or how they are moved by the objects they approach” (2).
Ahmed’s phenomenological approach to orientation can give us insight into a transactional way
of approaching the orientation “line” between the player and the videogame villain. We of course
would not see the emotion as separate from the physicality of the body, nor would we see it as
isolated and trapped within the confines of the body itself. Emotion, like cognition, extends
beyond the body by way of how we are oriented towards our environmental milieu. The highlevel Tetris players discussed in Chapter 1 demonstrate this extension. Reynolds describes how
cognition itself moves beyond the body of the player and into the game space through rapid
object manipulation, where movements are too fast to be accounted for through cognition alone.
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Orientation through a coopositional villain is the same phenomenon, expressed through a
different processional rhythm.
If we were to describe the process through which identity and orientation within the game
world is formed, we start with the villain. The villain, rich with its presented character traits but
also an avatar for cooposition and displaying the designed antagonism meant to create productive
play, exists within the game space. The player begins the game and enters into the complex
emergence of player-character-avatar. Character traits, game states, and interpretations assert
themselves from the continuous milieu in the same way that the painting of a boat on the ocean
becomes clear when perceiving the white strokes juxtaposed with the blue. The player, in
continuous and extended relationship with her environment and culture, aligns and turns toward
objects, determining orientation. Perhaps she will choose the narrative orientation. If so, then her
consciousness and player-avatar-character emergence will begin to push against the game world
in pursuit of the narrative tasks she perceives and understands. As the villain emerges from the
milieu, she rapidly perceives and assesses it, her interpretations and emotions the result of
infinite contexts that constitute her and extend beyond her in every direction. The villain is
constituted of its own contexts and rhythms. There is no separation; the villain exists only for her
perception and to invite her orientation. The villain exists to be pursued. It exists because it is
pursued. The player’s impressions are not located solely within her but reach beyond into her
actions, which snap back and inform her impressions like the feedback of a bat’s sonar sounding
off against an obstacle. With each micro-action and micro-reaction, perhaps dozens per second in
a frantic moment, the player and the game world—recall, under the direction of the
villain/game—enter into a new rhythm. The effect is not unlike two sets of wave pattens or
swells in the ocean crossing to create an unusual, perpendicular collision at sea; at first the swells
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run in opposition, but given enough energy and time, they will align with one another to create a
new swell pattern unlike either of the two that began the phenomenon. (Crucially in that analogy,
it’s all still one continuous ocean, with different waves patterns created from their own milieus
before meeting at the intersection point.) The videogame player in this description arrives in play
with her own rhythms, aligns her rhythms with that of the character and avatar to form a weakly
emergent pattern, then through active engagement with the villain aligns a new pattern—forming
an identity unique to the aligned player and character. Perhaps the player will admire Vaas and
want to be more like him. Perhaps the player will want to destroy Vaas and follow the prescribed
path the designers laid out to kill him and reject his ways. In any case, the narrative choice is
valid and relies on player identity that is developed and honed through productive opposition to
the elusive videogame villain, an inverse orientation in which orienting toward the object--in this
case, the villain--feeds back into the constitution of the player herself, helping to form a stable, if
permeable, identity-in-relation that becomes an inseparable phenomenon of the experience of
play. As Ahmed writes: “When we follow specific lines, some things become reachable and
others remain or even become out of reach… we do not have to consciously exclude those things
that not ‘on line.’ The direction we take excludes things for us, before we even get there.” (15). It
only remains to be made clear that this applies not only to the forward direction of productive
cooposition but also to the inverse feedback of the construction of identity. As the player and the
game work together to constitute identity, the narrative belongs at once to the designer, the
player, and all points between. The unique experience is dispersed across the weakly emergent
platform as a narrative phenomenon.
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2.7

The Point on the Diagonal
When Far Cry 3 was in the design phase, Vaas was not the original choice to act as the

game’s villain. Instead, according to producer Dan Hay, the original design called for a huge,
bald hulk named Bull to be the face of the game’s cooposition. “We absolutely didn’t get it right
on the first go,” Hay admits (Dyer). It wasn’t until the actor Michael Mando auditioned for the
part that the villain morphed into the character players came to know, with his different mixture
of intensity and lithe physicality cited as the reason for the change. By the time Vaas was
revealed to fans, he had been completely rethought as the charismatic killer who would taunt the
player throughout the game experience. His “definition of insanity” speech was influential
enough to inspire fan art and memes. The speech signals the narrative’s intent to challenge the
player’s rote repetition of easily-accomplished tasks:
Did I ever tell you what the definition of insanity is? Insanity is
doing the exact same fucking thing over and over again expecting
shit to change. That. Is. Crazy. The first time somebody told me
that, I dunno, I thought they were bullshitting me, so, I shot him.
The thing is, he was right. And then I started seeing, everywhere I
looked, everywhere I looked all these fucking pricks, everywhere I
looked, doing the exact same fucking thing over and over and over
and over again thinking 'this time is gonna be different' no, no, no
please... This time is gonna be different (“Far Cry 3”).
Vaas continues to rant along these lines, until finally, just before he drops Jason Brody
into a lagoon with a weight tied around his ankles, he pauses, seemingly confused, and turns
back to the player: “Did I ever tell you the definition of insanity?” The speech does its work to
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present Vaas as a non-aspirational figure whom the developers hoped would prompt the player to
think about and explore the tasks in front of them. But the speech, effective as it is, has a very
clear and strategic gameplay role. Another quote from Vaas later in the game, however, is more
telling about his role, not just in the narrative in confrontation with Jason Brody but in his
relationship with the player beyond. While Jason hunts Vaas, the villain tries to justify his
actions with a piece of pop philosophy: “The world is on a diagonal. I am the balancing point.”
Unlike Vaas’s (incorrect) definition of insanity, this hits closer to the truth. Of course, many
videogames contain no narrative at all, and of those that do, not every videogame organizes its
narrative around a central villain. Of those that do, the villain holds a special, privileged position
as an orientation point within the game world, inviting productive antagonism and narrative
development while facilitating the player’s emergent identity within the game world. Throughout
videogame narratives, there are thousands of villains just like Vaas, and millions of heroes who
align their identity with, around, or against them. Where Vaas errs in his statement is on the
structure of the “world.” Videogame narratives and videogame worlds do not rest on a diagonal,
with only binary sides at stake—up or down, left or right, good or evil. The villain crosses many
different possibilities, as many as there are play sessions and players to co-create them with the
game. But the villain is a key orientation point within the aesthetic milieu that reaches out to the
player and asks to be formed, just as Vaas on the cover of Far Cry 3 invites the player to take
him on. Players come and go within the environment of the game, but the villain remains,
organizing cooposition and aiding in the construction of its own impending defeat—a balancing
point across the horizon of narrative possibilities.
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3

BOSSES: UGLY EXPERIENCE THROUGH LUDIC ARRHYTHMIA

Dancer of the Boreal Valley, Culex, Omega Weapon, Psycho Mantis, Malus, Kai Leng,
Ornstein & Smough, The End, Old King Allant, Baldur, Vortex Queen, Mothrakk, Kraid,
Seth, Manus, Yuki-Onna, Hard Man, Dark Link, Skolas, Ludwig von Koopa
3.1

Introduction: The Pigs
I startle from a drunken stupor to find myself in a destroyed hotel room. My tie is

hanging from the ceiling fan and my gun is missing. I rescue my tie successfully, but the gun is
gone. My hangover is so cataclysmic that it takes serious effort to even remember my name:
Harry Du Bois, lieutenant double-yefreitor of the Revachol Citizens Militia (RCM), a police
force only barely recognized and not even a little bit respected in the district of Martinaise. I was
there to solve the murder of a mercenary sent to break up a local dockworkers’ strike. Most of
Martinaise could muster motive for killing any outsider, and especially an outsider interfering
with union politics, so I set aside that issue in order to listen to the competing voices in my head,
remembering—or deciding—what kind of man I was. In that context, the fate of my gun seems
important; re-arming symbolizes my journey back to the competent officer of the law I hoped I
was, while losing it forever locks me in as a screw-up.
Eventually, I get a tip. Someone calling themselves “The Pigs” has been waving a gun
around, and chances are it belongs to me. To follow the lead, I visit a boardwalk at night.
Gloomy shadows and limited visibility set my nerves on edge, but what’s really off-putting is the
sound of a siren that grows louder as I approach. I finally spot The Pigs, a hunched and crazed
woman with flashing police lights strapped to her back, cranking a rudimentary siren and
brandishing my gun. She whips the barrel in a flurry of directions and barks police jargon into a
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megaphone. “This is the Pigs. Show me your hands. *RIGHT NOW*!” She swings the gun in
my direction.
I’ve been playing Disco Elysium (2019) for many hours before reaching this encounter,
and nothing I’ve experienced yet has prepared me. There is almost no physical combat or
struggle in the game, which is mostly a detective procedural about questions, interviews, puzzles,
and transcendental self-reflection. In that environment, the standoff with The Pigs is disorienting.
It’s not that I haven’t been in danger before; even the precarious act of recovering my tie from
the ceiling fan in my hotel room had the potential to end my life and initiate a Game Over. But
rarely have I been threatened so directly as The Pigs is doing now. I wonder whether she’ll shoot
if I make the wrong move, and if I have the physical skills necessary to dodge a bullet. I worry
that even if I can avoid getting killed, my police partner, Kim Kitsuragi, won’t be so lucky.
Engaging with The Pigs requires navigating a complex set of dialogue options to, hopefully, say
the right thing at the right time. This isn’t new. Dialogue is the primary means through which I
experience the world and characters of Disco Elysium. But the sirens, the gun, and the aggressive
orders serve to convince me that this would be tougher than usual. I have to be thoughtful if I
want to save everybody’s life, but that siren keeps wailing, setting my nerves on edge.
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Figure 10: The Pigs
I start with de-escalation. I try to convince The Pigs that I’m not armed, which is of
course true. But her answer rattles me: “Failure to comply. Suspect is displaying aggression!
OFFICER UNDER DURESS! OFFICER UNDER DURESS!” My own heartbeat is elevated.
I’m nervous. I don’t want to screw this up. I want to save everybody’s life. I want the narrative to
proceed in my preferred direction, and I try to think about successful strategies I’ve used in
previous conversations that accomplished that goal. Nothing works. While searching for new
options, a thought comes to mind, offered by my Empathy skill: “So this is what the weather’s
like on the other side of a cop’s gun?”
I’ve chosen to begin this chapter on videogame bosses with an example fraught with
potential controversy—the encounter with The Pigs conforms to very few of the traditional
definitions of the “boss fight,” one of the most famous and fundamental videogame experiences
shared across all generations and platforms of play. But The Pigs fulfills what I define as one
major functional role of the Boss, that of a singular, memorable experience that gates and
influences moments of transition and transformation in videogame play. There is no encounter in
Disco Elysium quite like The Pigs. Most of the conversations that drive the game are with
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characters who are hostile or confrontational to Harry Du Bois and his investigation, but
exceedingly few are this hostile. Worse, the perceived threat from The Pigs is of a kind Du Bois
hasn’t seen yet in this story: the encounter is driven by terror. In Disco Elysium, Du Bois sifts
through fractured memories and nascent thoughts to discover who he is as a person and the
encounter with The Pigs constructs a scenario that allows Harry and the player to experience “the
weather” of disproportionate police response. The Pigs shows us one kind of police expression.
She demands compliance and her own control while terrorizing Harry and the player with the
trappings of authority: sirens, megaphones, lights, and a gun. The experience is dissonant. I am
powerless, unarmed, and want desperately to calm the situation and survive. But The Pigs is
driven by her own fear, oblivious to the ways in which her powerful stance is intensifying the
emotions of every actor in the scene. No matter how the situation resolves, I have now seen
police power from the perspective of those against which it is applied, and to find harmony with
myself and my job I will have to incorporate that new knowledge. I will have to decide what side
of the weather I’ll be on.
This scene from Disco Elysium is a moment of conflicting rhythm, both in its
sociocultural situation and the ludic construction of the scene. As the player, I entered the
encounter with The Pigs in harmony with a particular gameplay rhythm of investigation and
conversation: search, interrogate, track, recover, arrest. I was following up on a lead and
searching for a perpetrator, a gun thief. I played to fill a role in the narrative and the world of
Martinaise, but The Pigs confronted me with an entirely different and dissonant rhythm of
authority, an arrhythmic emergence of the police constructed from the same iconography and
paraphernalia, one that clashed experientially with the rhythm I thought I understood. In a game
containing little combat, the sudden and loud intrusion of an armed threat disturbed my
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understanding of the world I was experiencing, forced me to consider new or novel approaches
to resolve the encounter, and illuminated the advantages and deficiencies of my approach and
perception of the game. And, critically, the encounter served as a gate between two major game
states. Navigating arrhythmia in the ludic and narrative experience served to propel me into the
later stages of the game. The Pigs may not resemble a videogame boss, but she is a significant
example.
In this chapter, I attempt a transactional look at the boss monster and its primary
expression in the “boss fight” as phenomena of ludic arrhythmia, arguing that mainstream
contemporary design practice and player expectations trend towards an experience of ludic
harmony and “beautiful” design, while videogame bosses intentionally disrupt, distort, and
distend that rhythm through a variety of gameplay and narrative strategies. In essence, bosses
pursue a rhythm of ludic ugliness that forces players to confront arrhythmia as a strategy of
producing challenge, memorable experiences, frustration, accomplishment, and narrative
struggle. The player relationship with a boss is one of the most complex and ludically driven of
any form of videogame coopositional phenomena, and one that is absolutely essential to
understanding how cooposition produces strong narrative experience.
3.2

The Boss Monster
The boss monster is a fundamental feature of videogame design history, so ingrained in

the form of both narrative and non-narrative games that the actual origin of the term is obscured.
Some critics have linked the boss as a game term to popular culture depictions of the mafia boss,
or to the Bruce Lee film The Big Boss (1971), although the plot structure of Lee’s posthumous
Game of Death (1978) more closely resembles the level-based construction of most boss battles
(Grayson, et al. 2021). In games, most critics point to 1975’s dnd on the PLATO computing
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system as the first to design a boss encounter, the “Golden Dragon,” which guarded a magical
orb needed for completion of the game (Pellett; Lee), tying the boss monster closely to the
earliest days of popular, commercial videogames.
Due to player familiarity and near-ubiquity, there are nearly as many permutations and
variations on the boss encounter as there are bosses themselves, but generally speaking a boss is
a significant encounter in the course of videogame play that functions as a gate or skill challenge
for the player before she can progress to the next phase of a game or earn some kind of reward.
Bosses can appear almost anywhere or anytime during gameplay but are most often associated
with discrete videogame levels or locations, and the player’s defeat of a boss typically serves as
the final capstone or achievement in that level. Through various techniques—large open spaces
suddenly appearing, or the location of save points and powerups—players are usually aware of
an impending boss fight, and players expect to face at least one boss before an area or a level can
be considered complete. Often, bosses are thematically designed alongside the level’s
environment, suggesting that the environment was constructed or created specifically to house
that boss. The many robotic bosses in the Mega Man series of games are famous examples of this
phenomenon. For example, the stage for Fire Man in the original Mega Man (1987) is dominated
by the color orange and features flame columns, lava pits, and floating fireball enemies, while in
Dark Souls (2011) the player might navigate through crystallized architecture and battle halfcrystal minions in the Duke’s Archives level in order to reach the crystal dragon Seath the
Scaleless.
The boss monster is positioned as the strongest threat in their area, but narratively the
boss monster is almost always subservient to the game’s villain, if one exists. It’s important to
remind here that there are no fixed or impermeable boundary between a boss and other enemy
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types within a game. In some games a villain might appear as a boss in the early stages but
survive the encounter and return to their role as an orienting destination. Conversely, it’s
common for a defeated boss monster to appear again in later levels as a standard enemy type that
exists in the game world. In transactional narrative it is the function of the phenomenon and not
its intrinsic properties that define its role, and so in these edge cases outlined above we must
consider the function of the enemy in that moment in order to know how to approach it. A villain
who appears as a boss—such as Kefka in Final Fantasy VI (1994), who begins as a clownish
misfit in an early battle and an all-powerful force in a later fight—must be considered by how it
functions in each appearance. When Kefka serves as a gatekeeping battle in the narrative, Kefka
is a boss, but when Kefka serves as an orienting, motivating force the players must pursue, he is
a villain. Villains often, but not exclusively, appear as “final” bosses, but this is an area of
permeable experience, and one of the characteristics that separate villains from other kinds of
enemies, including the boss monster. The player’s active perception of the enemy’s role in the
narrative is enmeshed in how the player co-constitutes the narrative activity, and therefore has
influence on affect, comprehension, decision-making, and other aspects of the transactional
phenomenon. In the case of the boss, videogame players typically understand that the boss is a
significant challenge that must be overcome but that doing so will not mean the completion of
the game. The boss is merely a major milestone in the journey. As such, player relationships to
bosses are complex and emotional. Player culture is filled with stories of how players
approached or experienced particular bosses, and bosses routinely rank among the most
memorable and popular figures in any game.
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Figure 11: Kefka as an early boss in Final Fantasy VI

Figure 12: Kefka as a final boss in Final Fantasy VI
Narratively, the above description bears similarities to what Campbell called the
“threshold guardian,” a spatial and antagonistic figure in myth that Campbell argued must be
overcome by the hero but also assimilated in some way as part of Campbell’s structuralist
outline of the hero’s journey. The incorporation or assimilation of the threshold guardian is as
important for the hero as the defeat, with countless examples throughout media. For one
example, in the film Labyrinth (1986) teenage Sarah, played by Jennifer Connelly, must defeat
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the comical fox knight Sir Didymus in order to progress to the goblin city, and once bested the
fox agrees to join her on the journey and becomes a friend. In another, a deleted scene from The
Batman (2022) depicts an imprisoned Joker (Barry Keoghan) offering Batman clues as to the
identity and methods of the Riddler (Paul Dano) from behind a pane of glass.
Campbell’s belief in the “monomyth,” of which the threshold guardian is an essential
element, has met with widespread criticism from folklore and religion scholars, psychologists,
and more (Northup; Beggan), but Campbell’s easy-to-follow blueprint was adopted by authors
and consumers of popular culture in the years since it appeared in publication and on public
television documentaries, giving the threshold guardian concept an entry point into mainstream
literature and media. This may serve in part to explain how threshold guardians/bosses found
such a prominent role in videogame ludic and narrative structure. Early game designers were
largely influenced by fantasy stories and roleplaying scenarios, both of which are full of
examples of threshold guardians and overlords backed by armies of minions, with one of the
most popular early forms of the latter being the “dungeon crawl” in which players work through
progressively tougher challenges that culminates in the dungeon’s “boss” giving up his hoard of
treasure in defeat. Subsequent sessions of a roleplaying campaign might pit the players against
progressively harder bosses, acknowledging the increase in skill and power that defeating
previous bosses made possible. It was an easy and natural transition for early game designers to
move the concept of the boss monster and its specially-crafted dungeon into the world of video
games, which had already had the concept of individual levels introduced in programmatically
structured “boards” or “stages” in the arcade. Donkey Kong (1981), to name one example, puts
players in pursuit of the ape, only for Kong to escape with the damsel just as the player reaches
him on the first, second, and third boards. But every fourth board of Donkey Kong puts the
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player into a direct boss confrontation with the ape, as the hero must remove pegs from steel
girders to bring a superstructure crashing down and Kong with it. The cycle then repeats for the
next series of four boards.
The fourth board of Donkey Kong provides us a window into how bosses distort ludic
rhythms. In the first three boards I described, the player is presented with scenario built around
progression. The player may attack or avoid enemies, make perilous jumps, and climb ladders,
all in pursuit of forward momentum towards the goal at the top. These boards function like an
obstacle course with completion of the course the player’s only task.

Figure 13: The first three boards of the Donkey Kong cycle
The fourth board, however, is not designed for forward momentum. Gameplay on this
fourth level follows a different ludic structure. Instead of advancing through an obstacle course,
The player must work his way backwards and forwards to touch a series of nodes, presented as
pegs that must be knocked out of the superstructure in order to collapse it. As the player removes
pegs from the girders, he adds new obstacles for himself—holes that have to be jumped in order
to avoid a sudden death. Enemies track the player as he works to remove pegs by running over
them. Often, the player must treat the pegs as attacks of opportunity, targeting the closest peg
that isn’t also swarming with danger. Haphazard approach to pathing through the pegs usually
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results in the player having to backtrack, sometimes descending ladders he’s already climbed,
and retracing his steps.

Figure 14: The "final boss" board of Donkey Kong
Importantly, the player character’s verbs (Anthropy) do not change in this level. The hero
still navigates the stage using his basic skills of jumping, climbing, running, and hammering. The
use of those verbs must be applied in new directions—backtracking instead of progressing,
collecting nodes instead of reaching a finish line. These changes mean that the 4th board of
Donkey Kong is the only avenue through which the player can confront the gorilla directly, in
something resembling a boss encounter. The player is not simply trying to reach Kong, she is
trying to bring him crashing down. The change in architecture and ludic strategy transforms the
board into a boss arena, a specialized place where the boss may be confronted and defeated.
The periodic chance to defeat Donkey Kong comes at the cost of comfort with the
rhythms of jumping and running that the player has practiced in the previous three boards. In
order to bring Donkey Kong to the ground, the player must reconfigure the skills he’s honed
through the previous three boards, altering his rhythms and adapting to the new stage’s rhythms
while under threat from ancillary enemies and a timer. Defeating Donkey Kong and restarting
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the four-board cycle demands a demonstration of expertise with game systems beyond the needs
of the journey required to arrive in the arena.
Bosses, then, are manifestations of ludic arrhythmia, constructing and presenting a novel
and unfamiliar rhythm for the player with the goal of gating progress in the game until the player
demonstrates enough mastery with ludic systems to adapt, incorporate, and harmonize their
previously understood rhythms with the new. The word “harmonize” is key here. What I am
proposing is that we look at bosses through a lens of ludic distortion and of narrative distortion
in story-based games. Both are distortions that players are encouraged to confront, challenge, and
resonate with in order to drive the narrative and the gameplay forward. The transactional nature
of the boss encounter makes literal the assimilation role ascribed to Campbell’s threshold
guardian. Critically we may also rethink that role as an assimilation into the complete milieu of
the game in order to constitute coherent and contingent narrative phenomena.
3.3

Ludic Rhythm and Arrhythmia
By discussing ludic arrhythmia, I am asserting that ludic rhythm likewise exists and is

identifiable but not discrete. We have approached ludic rhythm before in this study in discussion
with flow and with Dewey’s claim that perceptual attunement with the natural rhythms of the
environment are the key to aesthetic approaches to art, but many game scholars have observed
that games appear to offer rhythms and that pursuit of pleasant engagement with those rhythms
might be among the sources of pleasure in digital play. Keogh claims that “videogames are all
about finding a rhythm. The rhythm of a kill streak, of an active reload, of 8 goombas being
knocked out with a kicked shell. We find a rhythm and then we lose ourselves to it.” (Keogh
2012, 18-19). Keogh later writes of “input-microrhythms” that produce pleasure by oscillating
between the player and the game a rhythm of interaction—“the fluctuating feedback loop of
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input and output, input and output… the pleasure of acting and the pleasure of being acted upon”
(Keogh 2018, 120). Anable notes, however, that games can motivate players through displeasure,
through a state she refers to as “radical arrhythmia.” In her analysis of how social and casual
games, especially games in the Invest/Express genre, produce disorder and chaos to encourage
rhythms of work and productivity, Anable suggests that games contain “the capacities… to wrest
us from our everyday rhythms, to make our bodies move in ways that confound efficiency and
productivity” (73). For Anable, arrhythmia encourages play and affective engagement, the path
towards meaningful appreciation and pleasure. Even Sudnow, writing in the early days of the
arcades and Atari’s first home console, saw in games the potential to absorb the player so
completely in its rhythms that he joked pop psychologists might consider game play as a
pathway to finally unlocking the psyche.
…therapists in California always looking for a new gimmick can
talk about “neurolinguistic programming”… Watch your moods
realized in the pure mathematics of an algorhythm [emphasis
mine], start dreaming about Breakout angles instead of your
mother, and it’s bye-bye Freudian, hello Nerdian psychology
(Sudnow 131-132).
Sudnow’s near-transactional analysis of the gameplay in the Atari hit Breakout identifies
the rhythms in play but also observes, right at the kickoff of game studies, that there appears to
be no meaningful separation between the player’s rhythms and the game’s, comparing it to the
flow-like experience of losing himself in the playing of a piano (128) before concluding that he
“couldn’t find a locus for the skill” (130), suggesting that mastery of the game resided
somewhere elusive. Sudnow suggests that the skill could be located “deep inside,” but a
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transactional reading of rhythm suggests that the skill cannot be located because it doesn’t
belong solely to the player or the body. Instead, it’s extended beyond and into the rhythms of the
game experience. A player cannot develop skill or rhythm without the environmental milieu
required for its existence.
Apperley has perhaps has gone the furthest in his work investigating rhythms of play.
Specifically, Apperley is interested in the bilateral movement of rhythms found both in the
situation of play and in the “real” world of the player, arguing that since gameplay must be
situated in the world, it is subject to the biological and cultural rhythms of those who experience
gameplay and the biological and cultural rhythms relevant to the game’s production. (Apperley
8) Among Apperley’s goals is the attempt to map digital game ecologies as inseparable parts of
the player’s sociocultural milieu, investigating “the abstract circuits of technology, culture, and
marketing in the lived experience of players through material accounts of play.” (Apperley 16).
Critically, Apperley believes that the rhythms of the player and the game become a polyrhythm,
an “intertwined” phenomenon in which the game teaches the player to align with the game’s
rhythms in order to achieve success and pleasure, a process Apperley calls “dressage.”
The body produces its own rhythm, while the game's rhythm varies,
together the rhythms enact a ‘duration,’ a moment of congruence
where the game’s rhythm and the rhythm of the everyday take on a
common refrain, which can be interrupted with any variance or
difference in either rhythm… The everyday is not a
hermeneutically defined sphere (Apperley 20).
Suggesting that the game interferes with the player’s bodily rhythm, and not the other
way around, is a critical move that Apperley makes to situate videogames into a position of
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power in the model of media consumption, a key claim to permit further exploration in how
videogames affect the rhythms of culture, identity, and politics (Apperley 25). Of course, a
transactional way of looking at videogame rhythm fundamentally rejects the parsing of
multidirectional rhythms of play, which departs from Apperley’s ideas. For example, Apperley
suggests that players approach videogames through two cognitive processes. The first process is
concerned with the core facilitation of play, what Apperley calls the “rhythmic, kinesthetic,
ergodic” process needed to push buttons, manipulate control sticks, focus the eyes on key
portions of the screen, and so on. The second mental process Apperley describes is the
imagination and interpretation needed to make meaning from the game text. “The movement
between these two imbricated processes provides a space for exploring and negotiating the
residences between the digital game ecology and the everyday life of the player that is flexible
enough for creative improvised spontaneous and stylistic adaptations of rhythms.” (24-25). But
why must these processes be separated at all? Instead of a space between these perceptual
processes to allow for improvisation, transactionism and cooposition, suppose that there is no
boundary between them—meaning can be made from button presses and the composition of UI
elements; the interpretation of narrative can be kinesthetic and ergodic. Importantly, all of these
processes are happening simultaneously and inseparably. In the case of the boss fight, the
difficulty of the required button presses and the dissonant rhythms encountered contribute to and
affect the boss monster’s narrative role as a being in the game world with a function to fulfill.
Apperley’s work is heavily influenced by Lefebvre and his book Rhythmanalysis, which
proposes no less than an entire field dedicated to the study of rhythms in culture and society. For
Lefebvre, all rhythms from the cosmic to the micro are defined by repetition (both cyclical and
linear) and measure (roughly synonymous with form or character), which are identifiable in all
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situations, environments, and things. In fact, Lefebvre dismisses the importance of things at all,
as all fixed forms of matter are temporary and an expression of the underlying rhythms from
which the object emerged (6-8). Studying the thing is a distraction from studying the actual
phenomenon of its rhythm. Of course the observer and scholar contains his or her own rhythm
that complicates analysis, and so Lefebvre asserts that those who study rhythm—
rhythmanalysts—must first develop an affinity and understanding of their own body and place in
the world before attempting to understand the rhythms around them, as those rhythms work on
the analyst as much as they do any other object under their influence (19). To study rhythm
under Lefebvre’s model is phenomenological, starting from one’s self and gradually expanding
outward in all directions, describing and critiquing what is found.
Lefebvre establishes key analytical terms to aid the rhythmanalyst, including dressage
(later adapted by Apperley), polyrhythmia, eurhythmia, and arrhythmia. (16). The first,
polyrhythmia, describes those moments where multiple distinct rhythms are moving together in a
single phenomenon. The weak emergence of videogame narrative and play experience appears
polyrhythmic, with various rhythms coming together and permeating one into another to create
the experience from which the gameplay experience emerges. When those rhythms synchronize
and harmonize with one another to the complete or near-complete elimination of dissonant notes
in the rhythm, that creates eurhythmia, with the failure of polyrhythms to harmonize creating an
unsatisfactory and potentially damaging arrhythmia. Lefebvre notes, for example, that the body
is a polyrhythm that in most cases exists in a state of eurhythmia, but that can be disrupted by
states of arrhythmia, either obvious or invisible under more dominant repetitions. But Lefebvre’s
key example of rhythmanalysis in action is the roiling polyrhythms of a city street outside his
Paris window, which he likens to the polyrhythm of a symphony in action (27). For this reason,
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studies of locations and environments find Lefebvre appealing for discovering complexities in
the polyrhythm of people, culture, technology, and environment pursuing eurhythmia in a public
space (Simpson).
But videogames are not environments that players visit through a drivable protagonist.
The player constitutes the videogame world through perception, and that world likewise
positions and constitutes the player in the space of the play experience. The environment of the
game, then, is not in a fixed location inside the code or the computer monitor but a weakly
emergent phenomenon that exists in no fixed place and belongs to neither the player nor the
game exclusively. Lefebvre and Apperley’s work thinks of rhythm as parallel tracks of two or
more distinct, isolated rhythms that work on each other but maintain their individual distinctness
even in eurhythmia, an idea influenced by cybernetics and the concept of closed systems of
components that find eurhythmia by achieving a balanced harmony by working on one another.
But as we’ve seen transactionism dismisses the myth of the closed system, acknowledging that
every system extends outward in every direction, expanding to move beyond the player and the
game—or even the sociocultural contexts of the play session and game development—outward
directly into the cosmic rhythms from which all contexts emerge. As we have seen in Dewey, it
is the nature of the human being to pursue equilibrium (read: eurhythmia) with environmental
milieus, which have been developed within the rhythms of the tides, seasons, circadian rhythms,
and so on, outward, forever. As sensing, perceiving beings--Dewey’s “live creature”—we
developed within these environmental contexts and, in fact, the ability to perceive and harmonize
with environmental rhythms is a fundamental survival strategy necessary for the success and
prosperity of the organism. Human perception is always “on:” we feel fluctuations in
temperature and the air on our skin, we listen to our surroundings even when we sleep.
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According to Dewey, it is for this reason that aesthetic appreciation of art is even possible,
because of our innate survival instinct to achieve eurhythmia when otherwise out of rhythm with
our environment. We see the disorder in the art object—the brushstrokes of a painting, the
elliptical cuts of a film edit, the pixel rush of a boss battle—and take pleasure in achieving
eurhythmia.
What Apperley and Lefebvre call dressage is an acknowledgement of the player’s pursuit
of eurhythmia, suggesting that players willingly concede the power in the play experience to the
game that must train them to achieve on the game’s terms, but such a one-way model obscures
that the player’s rhythms likewise affect the game. Eurhythmia, in this transactional sense, is not
numerous rhythms finding harmony with each other, but multiple rhythms becoming inseparably
involved in the weak and temporary emergence of a new single rhythm, made possible through
the single physical plane of experience. Rather than think of a symphony or a polyrhythmic city,
this model may be properly explained by thinking of ocean waves. Despite the classification of
various seas, eddies, currents, and streams, all oceans are continuously connected into a single
water mass, and yet these individual elements within the ocean maintain their own rhythms and
directions and momentum. When waves moving at different rhythms and character (“repetition
and movement”) intersect, they may find eurhythmia and form a larger, more powerful single
wave system with its own rhythm and existence, or they may find arrhythmia, at which point the
conflict may neutralize them both. (Salmon 20). Eurhythmia, in this case, would not allow either
of the original waves to maintain their character. And yet, no matter the result, the waves remain
continuous phenomena across the single plane of the ocean. The same is true of the player and
the videogame: rhythms along the same plane moving at different repetitions, and in different
directions, and encountering each other in the play session, at which point all rhythms form into
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a single eurhythmic or arrhythmic experience. Typically, the experience is initially arrhythmic as
the player and the game adjust to the new rhythms, before settling into the eurhythmia the player,
the “live creature,” naturally pursues and typically desires for aesthetic enjoyment.
Note that some players intentionally pursue and enjoy aesthetic arrhythmia with the
videogame. Games such as Bennett Foddy’s Getting Over It are designed to frustrate and irritate
players who often react with amusement and astonishment when confronted with a game that so
actively hostile to their play experience. But games such as this—and the players who pursue
them—are not representative of mainstream play. In most cases, arrhythmia is considered a
failure in terms of play, either a failure of the game (perhaps due to shoddy design) or a failure
on the part of the player to create eurhythmia through mastery of the game’s ludic elements.
Apperley describes a kind of arrhythmia through a well-known episode of the television
series South Park. The episode “Make Love, Not Warcraft” first aired in 2006 and depicted the
four main children adventuring in the massively multiplayer online game World of Warcraft.
When an anonymous player with incredible skill defeats the kids, they commit themselves
completely to the game in an effort to avenge their losses. Their skills grow and they acquire
powerful new abilities and items, but their physical bodies change to reflect the perceived
downsides of never leaving their computers—they gain weight, grow acne, and fall into ill
health. In one moment (among many) of scatological humor, the character of Cartman demands
his mother ring him a bucket so that he can purge explosive diarrhea without leaving the game.
Apperley argues that the boys’ push to create a perfect eurhythmia comes at a price of grossly
distorting the rhythms of their body, but that Cartman’s mother and the bucket work to neutralize
that arrhythmia and maintain the pursuit of eurhythmia by extending the game’s rhythm out into
the physical world (Apperley 20).
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A transactional approach to rhythm disagrees with this conclusion. The South Park
version of the game is a fiction, one that demands total loss of attunement with one’s own body
in order to succeed. In truth, the game turns its rhythms toward the player just as the player turns
toward the game. After all, when the player takes much needed “bio breaks” (presumably not in
a bucket) or steps away from the game for any other reason, then the game loses its actualization
through perceptual constitution—the game relies on the player as much as the player relies on
the game to form the experience. But video game history and culture contain notorious, actual
stories of bodily abandonment during incidents of extreme attempts to attune to the rhythms of
the game. Many are sensationalized, some are all-too-real and very tragic (Parkin). I argue that it
is a mistake to consider these stories, like the South Park episode suggests, as the tragic result of
achieving a perfect videogame eurhythmia, but rather as results of extreme failures to achieve
eurhythmia.
Humans live through direct experience with the environment. We do not simply exist in
the environment; the environment also exists within us, from gut biome activity to beneficial
bacteria and parasites on our skin. Our well-being depends on equilibrium in and within the
environment, which is why our active senses are always on, always testing and pushing us to
achieve that equilibrium, because our continued existence relies on it. As Dewey writes, “the
career and destiny of a living being are bound up with its interchanges with its environment."
(12). Therefore, when confronting a new environmental rhythm, our biology compels us to adjust
and adapt. And since, as we saw in Chapter 2, our initial instinct is to treat NPCs and fictional
characters we encounter as we would a flesh-and-blood person in the real world, it is logical to
assume our senses drive us to perceive and encounter videogame environments and worlds as
rhythms we must attune with in order to survive, just as we strive to equalize with our physical
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environment. But what happens when a person tries, but fails, to achieve eurhythmia? Perhaps
the player abandons the game, retreating from the world instinctively rather than remain in a
state of arrhythmia. On the other hand, the player may continue to pursue eurhythmia and fail for
whatever reason (likely incompatibility of rhythms, leading to frustrating “neutralization” in the
play experience, like incompatible ocean waves). In extreme cases, the player may pursue
equilibrium so intensely that eurhythmia becomes impossible because their own biological
rhythm becomes distorted. Perhaps the player forgets to eat, disrupts their circadian rhythms and
loses sleep, or some other damaging side effect. All the relevant rhythms are continuous across
the physical plane, which causes friction and frustration when they cannot easily be reconciled
into a unified rhythm through natural processes of perception. This is the failure of eurhythmia
transitioning into extreme arrhythmia, a stymied attempt to equalize with an encountered rhythm
that promotes a strategy of disengagement from the known rhythm to better intensify the focus
on the new.
This arrhythmia could explain some of the more troubling aspects of Csikszentmihalyi’s
concept of flow, which his positive-psychology approach frames as a pleasurable and fruitful
interaction with the external task. Reynolds notes that decades before Csikszentmihalyi proposed
the concept, John Dewey had already identified the phenomenon, describing it as “smooth
running functions” that extended from existing perceptual processes (Reynolds 66-68). Flow is
not a state one enters; it is an extreme expression of a state one never leaves. Our continuous and
borderless adjustments to our environment and our active perceptual activity—our transactions
with the world around us—are dynamic and inescapable. Perhaps we should call this low-flow, to
describe a flow process that is invisible to us, that is “smooth running,” precisely because it is
inseparable from the continuous task of survival, of aligning rhythmically with the world. What
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Csikszentmihalyi identifies as his heightened state of flow is the process intensifying and rising
to the level of awareness, characterized ironically by the supposed unawareness of the
environment to focus on the task at hand. That flow can be enjoyable and productive is not at
question. Rather, my argument is that the pleasure is an essential feature of a natural state that
promotes the continued survival of the organism through eurhythmia so intensely that it
arrhythmically decentralizes basic bodily awareness and needs. Dewey recognized this: “The
rhythm of loss of integration with environment and recovery of union not only persists in man
but becomes conscious with him; its conditions are material out of which he forms purpose”
(15). Dewey argued that the live being is always pursuing that integration, usually
unconsciously, and that the pursuit of what he called integration could only stop in one of two
conditions—either total order, or total chaos. Neither is remotely possible in our environment.
When the player and the game reach across to each other, the game presents as a condition of the
player’s environment, and the player’s senses and actions pursue eurhythmia as a condition of
survival in the environment. Why should the organism’s drive for integration consider its task
any less urgent because the rhythms it perceives emerge from a videogame? When experiencing
extreme arrhythmia, the pursuit is made conscious and the body’s inherent rhythms are
deprioritized. In this model, we might reconsider game designers’ attempts to keep players in a
state of flow as a deliberate manipulation of arrhythmia.
3.4

Ugly Bosses, Ugly Rhythms
It follows, then, that novel rhythms encountered are favored when they match or conform

to rhythms experienced in the natural environment, the “cosmic” rhythms Lefebvre and Apperley
describe, the pursuit of which Dewey proposes allows for the appreciation of aesthetics.
Transactionism, in one respect, is the pursuit of a model in which aesthetics, rhythm, and the
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natural world are desegregated, their assumed boundaries dispelled. Once allowed to exist on the
same plane, continuous with one another, we can begin to consider some rhythms as pleasing
and attractive in the same way that the viewer of art may find pleasure in its beauty. If the ludic
properties of videogames are pursued for eurhythmia, then is it possible to think of gameplay
rhythms themselves as attractive, even beautiful?
On April 21, 2022, game developer David Szymanski wrote a tweet saying “Elden Ring
is a rhythm game” and, copying a meme format for bold opinions, asked readers to change his
mind (Szymanski). However, describing Elden Ring (2022), a fantasy action title, as a rhythm
game should not be as controversial a claim as Szymanski believes. Game developers long ago
discovered that regular, sustained rhythms are a benefit to combat games. The classic Batman:
Arkham Asylum (2009), in fact, was initially developed with an explicit rhythm mechanic, asking
players to smash colored circles in precise timing in order for Batman to land his strikes
(Sterling). The final title removed the colored circles, but retained much of the timing
mechanic—the player must push buttons at precise moments to effectively strike and counter
waves of opponents, with rewards piling up the longer the player can maintain their combat
rhythm without taking a pause or an enemy’s hit.

Figure 15: David Szymanski's Elden Ring rhythm tweet
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Elden Ring also encourages precise timing as a play strategy, especially with weaponbased melee combat. A player in Elden Ring is in continuous danger of catastrophic damage;
even a lowly, lone enemy can be deadly if the player fails to defend. Players are motivated to
learn an enemy’s attack timing so that they may defend by dodging, shielding, or parrying as the
enemy’s weapon strikes. Successful timing opens the enemy up for a devastating counterattack
from the player which in turn shortens the encounter by depleting an enemy’s health bar faster
than any normal strike, reducing the number of attacks the player must face from the enemy, and
so on. Many Elden Ring enemies attack in rhythms familiar to players, with strikes coming at
regular intervals interrupted by a sizeable gap before the attacks begin again. The gap is the
player’s chance to stop defending and go on offense. These rhythms are repeated by every
instance of that enemy found wherever the enemy is placed throughout the game. Other enemies
might have different rhythms, but as players continue to experience the game they will attune to
those as well. To play an expansive game such as Elden Ring is to integrate, to use Dewey’s
term, with a host of continuous, connected rhythms, adjusting contextually as play continues.
But Elden Ring bosses escalate the challenge and promote new rhythms and experiences
through a strategy of radical arrhythmia. Below is a sketch posted on the subreddit r/Eldenring
by Reddit user WeeziMonkey. It depicts a slightly exaggerated model of how Elden Ring bosses
disrupt the player’s eurhythmia through intentional confusion and rhythmic disintegration. The
drawing mocks a common characteristic of almost all Elden Ring bosses: the extension of an
entirely new rhythmic pattern unique to the boss that disrupts the player from any area of
comfort, increasing the odds of successful strikes from the boss and of mistakes on the part of the
player. (The depiction is quite accurate; my only critique of the sketch is that it attributes to
‘Normal bosses’ a standard rhythmic attack pattern, but just because Elden Ring bosses are
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designed to promote extreme forms of arrhythmia, the arrhythmia of ‘normal’ bosses in context
with their surrounding levels and gameplay milieus should not be dismissed.)

Figure 16: Internet joke about Elden Ring's arrhythmia
The style of arrhythmic combat depicted in the drawing is only one strategy Elden Ring
uses to create rhythmic confusion for players; another is spatial arrhythmia. One of the first
bosses encountered in Elden Ring is a Tree Sentinel, a powerful knight on horseback visible from
the hill on which player initially spawn after completing the tutorial area. The Tree Sentinel
stands out as unique and in motion against the still landscape, and many players are drawn to
challenge him in their first few minutes in his area, Limgrave. But the Tree Sentinel is much
more powerful than any starting character and the encounter is extremely likely to end in quick
defeat. The Tree Sentinel communicates to the player that the traditional rhythm of videogame
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progression, in which players usually face enemies of equivalent threat as they gain experience
and move across the game world, does not apply in Elden Ring, and that dangerous bosses could
lurk anywhere, even within sight of the starting position. Another boss, the Fallingstar Beast,
uses both arrhythmic combat and spatial arrhythmia (this time, appearing suddenly and without
warning at the peak of a long mountain climb) to disrupt players but adds a complication with its
“hit boxes,” the zones on its body that are vulnerable to player strikes at any given time. As you
can see in the below images, the Fallingstar Beast is almost fully vulnerable during some of its
attacks (the yellow mesh over its body in Figure 17) but strangely invulnerable during others,
(seen by its lack of hit boxes in Figure 18). Even if the player aligns with the Fallingstar Beast’s
rhythm and attacks during a perceived opening in its attack pattern, the attack could still be
entirely ineffective, further destabilizing the player in the game’s rhythmic regime.

Figure 17: Fallingstar Beast. Yellow boxes indicate vulnerable areas.
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Figure 18: Fallingstar Beast. The boxes have vanished with no explanation.
If, as Anable suggests, radical arrhythmia is a strategy of affective engagement, then that
could help to explain why, despite their apparent difficulty and intentional disruptions, Elden
Ring bosses generate endless discussions, art, memes, and media from players—much of it
dedicated to their outsized difficulty. Perhaps bosses promote this affective engagement because
their difficulty represents such a dramatic distortion of the comfortable, regular rhythms of play
that their ludic rhythms have become aesthetically grotesque, even ugly. Dewey argued in his
analysis of aesthetics that it is reductive and incorrect to think of the ugly in art as an aberration
or corruption of the aesthetic. Instead, the ugly contributes to the whole of the aesthetic object
precisely because it appears to be individuated, and the seemingly individuated arrests the
attention of the viewer (212). Dewey’s idea sounds paradoxical, but it’s quite practical when you
consider that the ugly aesthetic cannot be removed or separated from the art without disrupting
the whole, but the ugly aesthetic suggests an individuation that draws the eye and the attention.
In our transactionist account, that attention is fixated on the ugly as the viewer attempts to master
the rhythms it offers, which differ from the whole and its aesthetics of beauty. Boss monsters in
particular are notable for their tendency towards ugliness. The Pigs in Disco Elysium is
physically distinguished by characteristics of poverty and disease. Other characters that arguably
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rise to the level of boss in Disco Elysium by virtue of their complex, arrhythmic dialogue and
aggression include Cuno, a trollish little boy who harasses the player as he tries to deal with the
hanging corpse at the center of the game’s mystery, and Measurehead, a towering, heavilytattooed racial supremacist who blocks the player’s path through the docks. Within the context of
Disco Elysium—a game filled to bursting with exaggerated and distorted characters—The Pigs,
Cuno, and Measurehead are particularly striking in their physical distortion. Elden Ring, and the
entire franchise of Fromsoft action games from which it derives, is likewise famous for its
grotesque collection of bosses. One of the earliest bosses in Elden Ring, Godrick the Grafted, is a
monstrosity gathered from dozens of “grafted” limbs, somewhere under which lies the region’s
mad king. A later boss, the Fire Giant, is distinguished from other giants by the fire-vomiting
face inside the giant’s torso that erupts and escalates the conflict at its midpoint. Godrick
likewise resists player attunement to his rhythms by amplifying his arrhythmic distortions
midway through the fight—after suffering enough damage, Godrick severs a useless arm and
replaces it with the somehow-interchangeable head of a dead dragon, which can now spew fire in
a concentrated stream at the player. If ludic rhythms can be ugly, then the ugliness of those
rhythms match the typical ugliness of the boss monster itself.
But is it fair to think of ludic rhythms as beautiful or ugly? To answer this question, we
have to consider definitions of aesthetic beauty that have shifted and changed throughout history,
and are often considered too subjective to codify, or that they confuse the issue of art
appreciation. Kant, for example, wrote in his aesthetics that the beauty of an art object allows for
aesthetic appreciation of the object as distinct from cognitive appreciation, a phenomenon that
allows for both subjectivity (i.e., taste) and rigid formal aesthetic rules to coexist. But this
boundary has long frustrated scholars of Kant because it seems to suggest that any item that can
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be aesthetically appreciated—virtually everything—must therefore be beautiful (Kieran).
Ugliness, therefore, either doesn’t exist or would deny aesthetic appreciation and be relegated
purely to the realm of disgust or dismissal on formal terms. In his attempt to resolve Kant’s
aesthetic crisis, Kieran argues that beauty, in fact, derives from harmony, and that it is possible
for ugliness to contain its own internal harmony that diverges from the beautiful harmony that
surrounds it—in other words, ugliness is consistent, continuous, and contextual. However,
Kieran goes on to state that a viewer is able to aesthetically appreciate the work of, say, Francis
Bacon because the internal harmony of the work develops “our cognitive understanding of what
certain human possibilities would or could be like” (387). In this solution, experience of the ugly
remains cognitive, not aesthetic, a move that satisfies Kant but remains frustrating for those who
have experienced being struck by art in a pre-reflective moment.
Kuplen attempts a different cognitive solution. She argues that schema of beauty and
rhythm effectively form laws in our appreciation of new experiences, and that our free play of
imagination (the initial aesthetic evaluation that arrives before cognitive understanding) is struck
by aesthetics that appear to violate those laws. “Only when the imagination in the given object
plays freely and spontaneously (that is, the sensible manifold is not constrained by determinate
rules), then such an object ‘is always new for us, and we are never tired of looking at it’”
(Kuplen). By why limit this experience to the cognitive? As we have seen, our active and sensing
bodies are always “on” and pursuing eurhythmia, which I claim is not parallel rhythms moving
together or a third rhythm emerging when two collide but many rhythms on a continuous plane
shifting to temporarily move as one, together. If, as Dewey says, the only end to aesthetics is
either a world in total disarray or a world totally without rhythms, then the live being is
physically struck by both outsized beauty and outsized ugliness, both of which exist as
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disruptions from the low-flow rhythms in the surrounding milieu. Subjectivity and formal “rules”
can coexist in this model, the model of Lefebvre and rhythmanalysis. The “rules”—which are in
actuality not rules at all, since as Eco masterfully details in his work, even the so-called formal
rules morph and collapse over time (391-408)—are the aesthetics that achieve eurhythmia with
the rhythms of the culture and society from which they emerge, while the individual is
continuous with that society but also with a specialized and personal milieu of existence, and
therefore may experience deviations of taste based on his or her own rhythmic sensations.
Ugliness, therefore, is not a binary of beauty. As Henderson writes, if there is an opposing force
to aesthetic appreciation, it is “neutral comfort,” (Henderson 12), since both beauty and ugliness
are distortions of the low-flow rhythms within which we are all inherently immersed. As
Henderson goes on to write: the physical engagement of the viewer and the ugly art “suggest that
we, as perceiving subjects, might be matters out of place” (128).
Videogames, by definition, deny neutral comfort, or as Reynolds writes they “stage an
encounter that facilitates a new mode of presence and new conditions for expression” (Reynolds
49). Some games like Getting Over It (2017) or QWOP (2008) or Octodad: Dadliest Catch
(2014) use comically extreme rhythmic distortions to satirize the antagonistic design of ludic
rhythms that resist eurhythmia, making the player’s every move fraught with disastrous,
unintended chaos (for example, in QWOP, players try to run a dash with each of the title keys on
the keyboard controlling a different individual muscle on a runner’s leg. The result is almost
always instant wipeout). With occasional exceptions, games like these do not contain bosses
since the challenge of the regular ludic distortion is challenging enough. Other games, like
Shadow of the Colossus (2005), work to transform ludic distortions by attempting eurhythmia
with player expectations (the discourse surrounding the game is how the “boss fights” in the
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game were actually akin to “levels” in other games—effectively supplanting one kind of rhythm
with another). But Elden Ring’s strategy is typical of most mainstream games. The boss is a
distortion of a regular rhythm, a ludically ugly aberration contextually against the beautiful
rhythms of regular play, rhythms that are perceived as beauty because they emerge from the
social and cultural rhythms of not only the player’s personal milieu, but also the cultural ecology
of the videogame medium itself. This can explain why over the decades of mainstream
videogames, certain control schemes and button layouts have found near-unanimous adoption
across consoles, developers, genres, and game franchises. As Eco described of art, some rhythms
find favor as the standard of aesthetic beauty in a medium based on the culture and contexts that
perceive them. Therefore, intentional distortions of those rhythms are, by definition, ugly—but
ugly for a purpose. Ugly rhythms shock, draw attention, and provide challenge for the perceiving
organism who wishes to attune to them. The boss monster, often an example of visual ugliness,
is ludically ugly to the same degree.
3.5

The Pigs, Overcome
Let’s reexamine the encounter with The Pigs through narrative and ludic rhythm. In

Disco Elysium, the rhythms include active conversation, the narrative obfuscation of the
detective story, and the ludic milieu of the point-and-click adventure. As Harry, it’s my job to
investigate a murder. The various suspects, antagonists, bystanders, and pains-in-the-neck stand
in assigned positions throughout the city. They wait for me to discover them and initiate a
conversation, the results of which might reveal a clue or send me to another location. Some exist
merely to elaborate on the game’s many political themes and social climates. Some of the
characters disappear or move to different locations after I chat with them. In the early hours of
the game, I have the option of asking most of the characters around town about the whereabouts

127

of my missing gun, but I only find out about The Pigs after I’ve accomplished a few milestone
tasks, after I’ve grown comfortable with the rhythms of the game. My own rhythms constituted
from my cultural milieu and from previously encountered media (from detective stories to
adventure games) facilitate my eurhythmia with the experience and the mode of presence the
game stages. But the encounter with The Pigs is ludically distorted, rhythmically ugly. The
flashing lights and siren disrupt my comfortable eurhythmic low-flow. My attempts to calm her
enough to lower the weapon only agitate her. To this point in the game, I’ve never been under
direct attack, but she levels my own gun at me. My unflappable partner pulls his gun and puts me
in the middle of a standoff. The game offers me a chance to rush her and take the gun for myself,
but the chance is low, a result of my character’s poor physical skills. I’m nervous. I suddenly feel
like I don’t know how to play this game and that I could make a wrong choice and ruin this
playthrough. At this narrative moment in Disco Elysium, both Harry Du Bois and I face an
uncertain future in which we are possibly undone by the choices we’ve made. Ludic ugliness
stages a world out of control, that moves against the player from an unknown direction. This is
also the narrative role of the boss monster, to disrupt the world as the player knows it and to
signal a new world beyond. To enter that world, Harry Du Bois has to find eurhythmia with The
Pigs and her radically distorted encounter. I don’t know how to help him at first; we are in a
shared arrhythmia. But through active attention and perception I gradually facilitate the
encounter. I guide Harry as he uses logic and rhetoric to unnerve The Pigs, to make her question
the weapon in her hand and the man who sold it to her. The encounter ends and I retrieve my
weapon. I return to the beautiful rhythm of the game, and Du Bois approaches closer to the
rhythm of the cop he wants to be (at least as I play him). The world of the game state is changed.
I have the gun now, and my encounter with The Pigs will inform my decision on how, or
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whether, to use it. The narrative of Disco Elysium and my experience playing it permeate
through each other inseparably. The Pigs changes the game world for me and Harry
simultaneously, moving together. Like all the best narrative boss encounters, I may return to the
feeling of low-flow rhythms, but they are not quite the same. The achieved eurhythmia of the
boss encounter has joined them.
Players consider boss monsters and boss fights as constructs that stage difficult
encounters to promote player training and skill. In the process of mastering a boss encounter,
failure is not just to be expected but often the point of the encounter itself. But as Anable writes,
encounters that emphasize difficulty “are asking us not to celebrate failure but to flail with it for
a while and learn its contours. Maybe flailing with failure through games that jerk our bodies out
of the smooth rhythms of frictionless labor, or deny our participation at all, will shift our
attention away from the perceived personal failings and back to the failures of a larger
ideological formation—say, a user interface, a digital platform, or even an economic system"
(Anable 129). To that I might add the failures of a struggling policeman or a warrior struggling
to become the Elden Lord. Narratives thrive on rhythms; stories are inert when they approach
“neutral comfort.” The boss monster is a construction in narrative games that distorts rhythms to
deny comfort to the player, the character, the game world, and the player’s milieu. The game
confronts us with visual and ludic ugliness to provide us an opportunity to resolve it and
neutralize its nonconforming rhythms, to bring the game world and the story back into
eurhythmia with the environment—imperative to our survival in this unknown world. To
confront a boss is to experience the disruption required to engage with new narrative and ludic
expressions because a boss expresses differently. We learn to express with it, then take it with us
into the conditions of the changed world.
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4

MOBS: THE FEELING-THROUGH OF NARRATIVE SPACE

Rhinotaurs, Prairie Chickens, Vegetoids, Koopa Troopers, Slimes, Murlocs, Darkspawn,
Creepers, Zombies, Head Crabs, Pidgeys, Infected, Elites, Octoroks, Lickers,
Necromorphs, Locust Grenadiers, Iron Virgins, Goombas, Zebbos, Bats, Icecaps,
Bandits, Gargoyles, SOLDIERs, Molded, Bloatflies, Shpiders
4.1

Introduction: The Night Folk
I’m trudging through the bayou near Lakay at night—already a desperate decision

but one intended to keep me safe from the searching eyes of Pinkerton agents. It’s 1899,
and my partners in the Van der Linde Gang have similarly gone underground after a
series of disastrous and spectacular failures. We botched a bank robbery in Saint Denis
and barely escaped with our lives. Every hideout we’ve tried to make a home has been
blown. Afraid of moving west, we’ve retreated to the southeastern swamps, but even that
was a misstep. The Pinkertons found us almost immediately and put us back on the run.
I’m searching the swamp for secrets, valuables, and pelts. I’m hoping to raise
enough cash to pay off a debt I owe to the town of Strawberry, a quaint and archetypal
old west town filled with deputies primed to shoot me on sight. It’s been a long time
since I’ve been able to enjoy the hospitality of a town. My beard is overgrown; I have
dark circles under my eyes and a persistent cough that squeezes my lungs at random. I’m
dying of tuberculosis, but I’ve decided that’s nobody’s business but mine. I’m trying to
see my gang through to safety before the end.
Somewhere nearby in the trees I catch the sounds of a woman crying. It’s not
uncommon to run into strangers out in the wilderness in need of assistance or willing to
offer me some kind of task, potentially for a nice reward. It’s also not uncommon to be
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lured into a trap, and so I approach the woman carefully when I spot her. She’s hunched
over in the moonlight, sobbing. I inch towards her and announce myself, but she doesn’t
respond. My attention is on the surrounding area, but she appears to be alone—no horse,
no provisions, and no nearby town. How did she get out here? Was she kidnapped,
perhaps, carried off in her sleep? Finally, I’m just inches from her. I’m still trying to calm
her down when she suddenly whips around and slashes at me with a knife. She doesn’t
say a word, she just sprints deeper into the swamp. That’s when I notice her companions.
They’re pale, painted white across the face and arms. Their clothes are tattered and damp,
and they carry only knives. They say nothing. Did they come up from the water? From
behind the trees? I missed their entrance because I was looking at the woman, but no
matter. I draw my pistol and fire off some shots to neutralize the first two, but the third
slices me across my rib cage before I can level the pistol at him and fire. With the three
painted men dead, my last decision is whether or not I’ll fire at the fleeing woman who
lured me into this trap. I let her go and dig the pockets of her accomplices. There’s not
much of value, just some tobacco and bits of food. Times must be lean in the swamp.

Figure 19: The Night Folk
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My dangerous encounter in the swamps of Lakay pitted me against the Night
Folk, a bizarre group of enemies in Red Dead Redemption 2 (2018). The Night Folk are
unusual even for the game they appear in, a game already full to bursting with murderous
cretins and thieves looking to rob me of my valuables or my life. Unlike the usual
collection of bandits, gunslingers, and officers of the law, the Night Folk are completely
silent and are only encountered in the southeastern bayous at night where they emerge
from the swamp to attempt to murder the player’s character or, in a gruesome twist, the
player’s horse. Even when not physically present, the Night Folk cast a shadow over the
swamp. Curious players can discover corpses strung up against trees, wagons filled with
dismembered horse parts, and strange cultish etchings and markings scattered about the
area. The Night Folk appear to infect and infest their swamp, and they rarely, if ever,
venture beyond into the rest of the territory. They are dependent on their bayou in just the
same way as the Murfree Brood is to the area around Beaver Hollow or the O’Driscoll
boys to the plains of Hanging Dog Ranch, but what’s especially fascinating about the
Night Folk is just how little the player can learn about them and how irrelevant they
ultimately are to the game’s linear plot. They just are, an already existing phenomenon of
the game world that marks the player’s crossing of a threshold from the world outside the
swamp to the world inside. No major story elements and exceedingly few quests or tasks
force the player to cross paths with the Night Folk. In that way they violate Roger Ebert’s
Law of Conservation of Characters (Reilly), in which characters who seem unimportant
rarely are. In Red Dead Redemption 2, the Night Folk have unique character models,
designed and ideated encounters, specialized clothing, environmental presence, specialty
animations, and connections to a few voice-acted quests. And yet despite all of that
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investment and development time, they are in fact quite unimportant. They provide flavor
for the world and a puzzle for curious players to debate and theorize, but otherwise could
be swapped out for any number of hostile bad guys with no change to the game’s story.
Such a change would, however, leave a dramatic impact on the game’s
construction of narrative space. In this chapter, I will analyze and explore methods
through which cooposition and hostile ludic rhythms co-create a potent space for both the
game’s narrative structure and its emotional themes, particularly through the use of
“mobs” like the Night Folk, who work to constitute the desperation and bleak psychology
of the Red Dead Redemption 2 narrative section through which they appear while also
shaping, defining, and acting as permeable and passable boundaries for the territory they
rule. Narrative games have used mobs in similar roles for decades, often relying on
variable degrees of opposition, threat, and difficulty to frame their stories, build their
worlds, guide narrative through virtual environments, and reward player agency.
Before advancing, a caution: while mobs will be discussed in this chapter almost
exclusively in terms of constructing narrative space, I acknowledge the impossibility of
untangling space from the concept of narrative time. The two concepts are essential and
inseparable, as Bakhtin rightly proposed in The Dialogic Imagination (84). For now, I
will bracket off the concept of time and revisit in the next chapter when investigating a
particular sub-type of mob, the “trash” mob. In that way, we might think of this chapter
and the next as approaching the overall question of videogame narrative time and space
from two variations of the same taxonomical category of coopositional enemy.
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4.2

Mobs in Spatial Regimes
Confusingly, a “mob” is a singular enemy in a videogame. A group is referred to

as “mobs.” The term did not originate from the English word for a large crowd or from
the informal term for an organized crime gang, instead emerging as the abbreviation for
“mobile object,” a term pioneered by game design legend Richard Bartle in his work on
the early virtual world MUD1 (Bartle 102). Although the etymology is obscure, the word
appears to have filtered into the common language of game players via the enemies in
EverQuest, a massively popular online game in the 1990s that liberally borrowed ideas
and design concepts from MUD1 and its descendants. Somewhere along the way, players
privy to insider lingo crossed the word over into common parlance, where it became the
standard term for roving enemies in videogames, first in the massively multiplayer online
roleplaying game (MMORPG) genre, and then eventually to videogames at large. Mobs
are the primary combat encounter of nearly every videogame that features players in
cooposition with the computer AI. While videogame villains are mostly unseen, offscreen
threats, and boss monsters are figures of specialized encounters in isolated arenas, mobs
are everywhere in videogames. An encounter with an individual mob is rarely meant to
be memorable as an isolated event; instead, mobs distinguish themselves by representing
particular kinds of challenges that recur throughout play. Take, for example, the common
mobs in Super Mario Bros. The Goomba is the first mob encountered on the very first
map and is easily dispatched by stomping. However, another mob, the Koopa Troopa,
isn’t eliminated via stomping. Instead, when Mario leaps onto these turtles, they retreat
inside of their shells. If left alone, they reemerge, but in the meantime Mario has the
opportunity to kick the shell, laying waste to every enemy in the shell’s path. Each of
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these mobs requires a unique strategy to defeat, and so savvy placement of the mobs in a
level promotes particular kinds of actions in the player as they navigate each encounter in
turn. Perhaps a Goomba is sandwiched in between two Koopa Troopas, making it tricky
to deal with it directly. Or perhaps a Troopa will appear at the vanguard of a column of
Goombas, providing an opportunity to wipe out the entire line of Goombas with one
stomp and a kick.
In this way, mobs are the construction material of most action-based videogames.
If a player enters a level with a task to defeat the area boss, the player can be sure that a
small army of hostile mobs lies between the player and her goal. Learning the
peculiarities and strategies of every mob—finding a felicitous rhythm—is the actual work
of the game and the path to progression. But although mobs are the primary essential task
of many videogames, the game texts rarely frame them in such a way. In comparison to
dominant villains or rhythmically challenging bosses, mobs are typically weak and easily
dispatched by a player using the basic skill affordances or verbs granted to their player
character. To provide challenge, mobs are usually scripted to arrive in large numbers in
an attempt to overwhelm the player. Some games, like Undertale or Dark Souls II, allow
players to clear mobs out of a level, effectively ending agential opposition in that part of
the game world if the player wanders through in the future. Many other games—for
instance, the Metroid series—allow mobs to “respawn” after death or when a player
walks through a certain point on the map again so that the challenge remains evergreen.
There are many different strategies to how game designers deploy mobs, but the overall
goal for designers, especially those designers influenced by theories of flow, is to create a
constant challenge for the player that is never too overwhelming or too easy, since, as
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Juul notes, players find games that are too easy just as frustrating, if not more so, than
games that are deemed too hard (2013). In the hierarchy of videogame enemies, a mob is
nearly always subservient to a boss or to another higher form of enemy like a villain. A
standard mob almost never functions as an area boss, but the reverse can happen—some
games introduce a tough mob as a boss first, and then convert that boss to a standard mob
that may appear anywhere in future levels. That players often find this reversal alarming
is deeply instructional; there appears to be a certain expectation with mobs that they are
to provide just enough challenge to give the level some grit and friction on the way to the
final boss, and so the sudden appearance of a monster once thought of as a unique boss
encounter, even a boss that, by definition, the player has already dispatched, can feel like
an unfair move on the part of the game, as if the game is violating some unspoken
understanding.
But mobs embody a myriad of functions far beyond maintaining a consistent
coopositional rhythm. For example, many mobs perform dressage roles as they prepare
the player for larger tasks. The mobs in the classic fire stage from Mega Man (1987) are
vulnerable to the player’s Ice Slasher weapon, affording the player opportunities to
practice that weapon before using it against the stage boss, Fire Man. Likewise, the basic
ghosts found in the hallways of Luigi’s Mansion give the player a chance to practice with
their ghost-capturing vacuum before the stakes are raised in combat with one of the
game’s more robust and combative portrait ghost bosses. But beyond combat, mobs also
serve a vital role as an identifying path of advancement for the player. In an elegant
coopositional move, mobs identify the path forward for players by signaling an increased
but inviting level of challenge. Players navigating through videogame worlds understand
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that they are likely progressing in the “correct” (intended) direction in the videogame
level if they encounter resistance and, counterintuitively, if the player moves too far in a
direction with little to no resistance the player soon feels unwelcome or incorrect in their
orientation within the game space. In essence, players are searching for a sensation of
resistance, feeling resistance as a sign to advance, not to retreat. This is one expression of
what I will refer to this chapter as feeling-through the play experience. Players and games
reach across to one another and feel for resistance. In fact, it is this resistance that
provides the central means through which the player and the game co-constitute the
experience for one another.
We can see this function of mobs in action by examining their placement within
what Arsenault and Cote call different “graphical regimes.” In summary, a graphical
regime is a standard of design in videogames driven by the technological innovations and
graphical fidelity available during a particular period of design. Regimes emerge from the
shared cultural and technological milieu of the design environment, as those milieus
produce a particular aesthetic phenomenon that most appeals to contemporary designers
and players, at what Arsenault and Cote called a “junction point between gameplay and
graphics” (2013) but that we might also think of as phenomena of eurhythmic transaction.
In the below images we can see two different graphical regimes in the martial arts beatem-up genre. The first, from the 1989 classic Final Fight, depicts the sidescrolling
regime that dominated the arcade and 1980s home console technology. The second image
is from Sifu, a 2022 release for personal computers and the advanced PlayStation 5.
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Figure 20: Final Fight's 2D regime

Figure 21: Sifu and the 3D regime
In Final Fight and other typical sidescrolling action games, the player begins on the left
side of the screen and progresses by moving to the right. As the player moves forward, new
mobs appear in a line in front of them, sometimes standing on different planes within a limited
range to create the illusion of depth. The player fights the current set of enemies and, if
victorious, moves forward in the level where more enemies await. Progressing in the game
means facing further resistance. If the player moves in the “wrong” direction, i.e., backwards
from right to left, they will find the way impassable. This is not coopositional resistance but a
direct block. Mobs in the typical arcade graphical regime function quite similar to a public door
that opens when pushed. If I reach for the door handle and pull, the door will form an impassable
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barrier and I cannot progress. But if I push, the door will resist through its own weight and the
pressure of the air on the other side, but with a low level of effort, I will succeed in opening the
door and will move to the next part of my day.
In 2022, however, the graphical regime has changed considerably with high-budget
games increasingly invested in large, open environments that afford players the opportunity to
explore in any direction they like. In Sifu, the player is still matched against a legion of enemy
fighters but is afforded more freedom to move throughout the play field. The game camera has
shifted accordingly behind the player character and follows as the player navigates around mobs,
through doors, and over obstacles. In this contemporary graphical regime, players decide which
direction the scene moves. Instead of a “push” door gating progression, the player in a
contemporary open level game has no clear and preferred pathway to follow through a level and
looks to cues such as the locations of mobs to guide them. Players of these games are reaching
across to the game and feeling-through for renewed resistance. If the player in Sifu has cleared
their hallway or nightclub scene of visible enemies, but the game does not progress, then the
player may explore the space. If no enemies are encountered in a certain direction, the player can
safely assume that this is not the direction forward and may continue to look in a variety of
directions until, at last, a new set of enemies is discovered. The player and the game are reaching
out, one to the other, through an active phenomenon of cooposition that shapes and conjures the
“door” that Final Fight makes very explicit, but instead of Final Fight’s impassable resistance as
the block, it is Sifu’s failure to resist that turns the player away from certain directions and
towards others. In the 3D open world graphical regime, I push the game and only find promise of
progression when the game pushes back.
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4.3

Videogame Space Through Cooposition
The nature, function, and construction of virtual space in the video game is a topic of

great interest in the field of games studies. Aarseth argued that games “celebrate and explore
spatial representation as their central motif and raison d’etre” (2001) because the construction of
space appears to be of fundamental concern to designers—before gameplay may begin, there
must be a field within which the game rules function. Murray agrees, naming spatiality as a core
feature of digital texts and simulations, which include video games (1997). This belief has
history far beyond videogames and into concepts of play itself. In fact, it could be considered
foundational to the field, as one of the earliest and most widely cited and discussed theories of
games and play is Huizinga’s spatial concept of the so-called “magic circle,” which frames the
space of play within a zone where the strictures and culture found in the “real world” are
temporarily suspended to allow for safe and free experimentation through play (1971). Of
course, as discussed in Chapter 1, theorizing play as taking place in a zone surrounded by hard
boundaries is problematic for transactionism, and thankfully has been the topic of thorough
critique from scholars arguing from a variety of theoretical approaches, notably Mia Consalvo
(2009) and Lisa Nakamura (2013), both of whose arguments reveal that attempts to imagine hard
boundaries separating the physical world from the virtual fail to account for what the player
brings with them into the virtual space and what the player takes with them from the virtual
world into the physical, imagining a permeable boundary passable by not only players but also
cultures, ideologies, and hegemonic regimes. Games create spaces for exploration and
experience, as Jenkins claims (2006), but those spaces are not magic, separate, or ephemeral, but
continuous with the physical world and constituted by players in active sensory involvement
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with that space, senses that are extended outward through the means of control, the gamepad, the
character’s actions, and the game’s sensory feedback.
In Media in Mind, Reynolds describes at length the experience of sensing space in the
videogame The Unfinished Swan, which begins as a white void on the screen that only reveals its
depth and pathways as the player hurls balloons of black paint into that void (18-31). Yes, the
splotches of paint splattering against walls gives the player visual cues and feedback to better
understand the contours of the otherwise-invisible environment, but an underlying claim in
Reynold’s account of The Unfinished Swan is that the player’s action—the hurling of the paint—
is itself a sensory action. The action does not simply create new conditions to facilitate
perception. Instead, the actions themselves are transactions of information. The player moves the
character on screen, and by extension the game’s camera documenting the visual field, and hurls
more balloons, feeling-through the space through action, activity, and agency. The void of The
Unfinished Swan resists sensory examination but through coopositional perception gradually
emerges into being. “Perception… is a material transaction among organisms,” Reynolds writes,
making a claim to the transactional role of the perceived as much as the perceiver. Space, in this
construction, constitutes the player by making itself available as a field of perceptual action and,
in The Unfinished Swan explicitly, the perception of its visual rhythms and shapes require a
transactional resistance, a dynamic coopositional stance in which the setting resists perception to
beckon towards being perceived.
We might consider that this explicit transaction only makes clear the implicit transaction
facilitating all videogame spatial perception. As with Dewey and his aesthetic rhythms, through
which perception of the art object utilizes the same bodily perception that attunes the observer to
the rhythms of their environmental milieu, the videogame space does not reveal itself without
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resistance. When entering a new video game, I may see a towering mountain in the distance, but
is it an actual location I can reach, scale, and explore? Or is it background only, a construction
used to establish the narrative setting of the game? In other words, is the mountain in the field of
play or beyond it? As a player, I can decide the answer to this question by pushing towards the
mountain with the verbs available to me—extending my perception through action, as in The
Unfinished Swan—and feeling-through for coopositional resistance. Perhaps I’ll hit a hard
boundary that obstructs me from getting any closer to the mountain, a hard resistance barrier that
I will recognize as a sign that the mountain is off limits. But perhaps I’ll meet increasing
challenges along the path, or perhaps a string of mobs leading up to the chasm. Through
cooposition, I continue toward the mountain and perceive it via action and resistance.
That action and resistance are inherent features of videogame spaces is not a
controversial claim, as such a claim contains obvious similarities to Aarseth’s use of the term
ergodic to describe videogame texts, tying the medium of videogames to the effort they require
of the player to be read. As Nitsche writes in his study of what he calls semiotic and
representational videogame space through player experience:
3D game spaces allow players to crawl, jump, run, fly, and
teleport into new worlds of unheard-of form and function. The
game space we can experience, discover, and manipulate has
become endless and at the same time more accessible than ever.
Video game spaces stage our dreams and nightmares and they
seem to get better at it every year (Nitsche 2).
Nitsche’s list of actions belies the difficulty of thinking of videogame space as
constructed worlds meant to contain the player and the action of the game. Nitsche describes
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actions conceivably offered to the player (crawling, running, jumping, flying) as means of
entering and exploring a virtual world. The player runs through a world, at which point the world
becomes available to the player’s senses. But as we have discussed, the player’s senses are
expanded through videogame play into the space of action. Running is itself a sensory
phenomenon. The potential parameters of the space bound in the videogame’s code reveals itself
through the player pushing against and feeling through the space via action. Just like hurling
black balloons of paint, the player extends into and perceives the possibilities of the space
through the game’s permeable and cooperative resistance. The player moves control sticks with
her thumbs, and the character or camera on screen runs through the environment. The physics of
running emerge from the game’s code and is designed in tandem with the space of the
gameworld. To refashion Carl Sagan’s famous quote, videogame action is a way for the code to
know itself, but the game requires the player to put those systems into cooposition and to fully
constitute the gamespace of the virtual world.
When we consider actions as perception, Nitsche’s list of verbs allowing access to the
game world can be expanded to include “fight.” In games containing enemies, combat is a
character action bound by coded parameters that afford exploration of the world through
resistance, just as any movement or exploration action available to the player in the game’s
design. Many 3D open-world games, defined as games that allow the player free access to the
world map instead of a linear, dictated progression structure, take the affordances of the fight
action for granted when designing to the player experience. For example, in Fallout 3 (2008) the
player begins in a linear tutorial story that takes place throughout the player’s childhood in an
expansive underground bunker called a “vault.” The player makes choices about her character’s
physical appearance, skills, and personality while involved in conversations with non-player
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characters and occasional combat with critters in the tunnels and the vault’s local gang, the
Tunnel Snakes. The tutorial ends when the player emerges from the vault out into the world of
Fallout, an irradiated wasteland forged by global nuclear war. The player isn’t provided with
clear directions on what to do next. A nearby shantytown called Megaton is likely to be her first
destination due to its proximity and visual appeal, but there is nothing that explicitly compels the
player to visit Megaton. Instead, the player can wander off in the opposite direction, or any
direction she likes, walking deeper into the game world. However, the player’s journey is heavily
influenced by the level of resistance she meets along the way. In Fallout 3, the player gains skills
and talents by “leveling up,” gradually becoming more formidable as she puts the wasteland’s
challenges behind her. But some mobs that populate the wasteland are built tougher than others,
and the player may find that the enemies in one particular direction are far beyond the reach of
her initial skills, while mobs in another direction are more easily dispatched. Officially, there is
no boundary or limit to the player’s exploration in the open world. There is no hard barrier
demanding that the player follow a prescribed path. But the player soon realizes that some paths
are more difficult than others—or even near-impossible at her current skill level. In this way,
through combat, the player feels-through a set of permeable boundaries in the space. Fighting a
mob that far outpaces the player’s abilities in an early section of a game sends as clear a
perceptual signal as hurling a balloon filled with black paint against an invisible wall. By moving
against the world, I perceive it. By fighting against the world, I also perceive it.
Through combat, the player and the game feel-through one another. Each pushes back on
the other. For the player, the resistance to her push will be felt somewhere in the coming together
of the coded parameters of the actions and offered extensions afforded to the player and the
player’s skill utilizing those extensions. If the game’s cooposition folds too easily under the skill,
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it’s a sign that the area these mobs populate was intended to be experienced earlier. If the mobs
are barely dented by the player’s actions and overwhelm the player with a quick death, it’s a sign
that the player is not yet ready for this space but may be at a later time. Again, nothing forces a
particular player response; the space called to the player, and the player makes the narrative and
gameplay decision whether to double down on that pursuit, but is under no obligation. The game
will feel-through her choice either way.
To provide another example: In Dark Souls, new players find themselves at a central hub
called Firelink Shrine. Just off from the shrine is a tall stone staircase ascending the side of a hill,
leading to a bridge across a chasm. The staircase is guarded by Hollows, among the weakest of
all Dark Souls mobs. In the opposite direction is a graveyard containing hordes of skeletal
warriors, much more powerful than Hollows and capable of resurrecting after defeat unless the
player commits a special attack to the creature’s corpse. The graveyard is much more daunting
for a new player, and most will opt for the staircase. But savvy Dark Souls players know that a
superior weapon awaits them in the deadly crypt just beyond the graveyard, and so push against
the more difficult path in the hopes of a quick evening of the odds. The world of Dark Souls,
Fallout 3, and many other open 3D worlds suggests a path forward but doesn’t deny the player
the choice of where to lead the action. It can only push back, coopositionally, and move with the
player as the player and the game feel-through each other.
4.4

Feeling-Through Narrative
The previous discussion has been concerned with how enemies, cooposition, and conflict

transactionally create videogame space by dynamically reaching across to meet the player’s own
probing and actively sensed opposition. This next section, however, shifts the parameters and
definition of videogame space to discuss the space of the narrative, the story space within games
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that create coherent fictional worlds. I argue that the play field of possible action in videogames,
the space within which the game takes place and beyond which movement and exploration is
restricted, is continuous with narrative space, which I define here as the boundaries of the game’s
designed narrative activity. The narrative space includes action and incident and, through the
player’s experience and active sensory constitution of the narrative, expands to include
seemingly ephemeral concepts like emotion and theme, struggle and confusion into the realm of
the spatial. Cooposition with mobs is the engine of this expansion.
The literary means of constructing narrative space has been so widely researched and
discussed in literary narratology that it would be impractical to attempt a full recounting in this
project. The general tendency, however, is to rely on cognitive theory to explain how readers
imagine, maintain, and make stable the narrative space of the novel or story. Both Bal (2009) and
Cobley (2014) point to cognitive engagement with semiotics as the prevailing understanding of
literary space construction, with Bal in particular noting that space is often constructed in stories
by use of language appealing to the work of the five senses (133-143). Cobley is careful to note,
citing Barthes’s hermeneutic code found in S/Z (1975), that narrative is also about movement
from one point to another. Movement can be defined in either the physical sense or the temporal;
all narrative implies a movement from a beginning to an end point through time. In the physical
sense, however, movement through a story space that promotes the reader’s understanding of
space is still largely accomplished through appeals to sensory cognition, the description of
floorplans, the sounds of footsteps against stone, the smell of dinner beckoning to the kitchen. As
I claimed in chapter 1, the difficulties that come with applying literary narratology to videogame
narrative are numerous, in no small part because of the apparent differences between the media
and the need for readers to imagine sensory stimuli interpreted from text on a page while the
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videogame player senses firsthand the videogame world. Visual media are likewise bound up
with cognitive narratological models of space construction. Bordwell has written considerable
volumes on the applications of cognitive narratology models to cinema, arguing that schema in
the mind and memory of the viewer allow the viewer to experience and make sense of film space
as it is presented to them, and that filmmakers can use intentional spatial confusion as a powerful
tool in particular kinds of narrative situations (1985). Again, however, these models fail when
applied to the creation of videogame narrative space. A wall in a videogame does not represent a
wall that a player can relate to through schema; the player, through active movement and
sensation, can feel the resistance of the wall and make her own determination about is
impassability. The wall in a videogame is a wall, an actual barrier and border that has to be
reckoned with. Likewise, a mob in a videogame is an enemy, albeit a coopositional one. It
follows, then, that to fully account for a transactional understanding of narrative space, the
player’s sensory experience of that space must come through action, through movement, and
through coopositional resistance.
Marie-Laure Ryan, Kenneth Foote, and Maoz Azaryahu have proposed a geographical
approach to narratology when considering the videogame. In Narrating Space, they propose a
model that maintains the critical importance of cognitive schema while simultaneously
expanding the conditions of schema to include more avenues of human experience, thereby
expanding narratology itself into a fully interdisciplinary field since, under their proposal,
functions of life, media, and social systems may all be considered relevant to schematic
geography, and thus capable of being experienced as narrative through the exploration of
videogame spaces (Ryan, et al. 2016). Transactionism downplays the importance of schema and
mental representations (which Reynolds convincingly argues against in his work [71]) in favor of
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the lived experience of telling and being told the narrative in a contingent, weakly emergent
phenomenon in which the actual experience of the story bleeds inextricably with the telling.
Ryan, Foote, and Azaryahu’s account, although reliant on problematic cognitive assumptions
that have plagued studies of videogame narrative, is at least in one respect a welcome move in
the direction of a more total and expansive approach to both environments and storytelling. Their
take is substantively distinct from the proposal of environmental or embedded storytelling
championed by Jenkins (2007 57) and Pearce (201) during the transition to explorable 3D
environments, often likened to the Imagineering teams at Disney who thread narrative
suggestions and tip-offs into the designed environments of their theme park rides, an exhibition
approach to narrative that Bogost has critiqued as being too removed from told narrative
elements to be studied as narrative at all. Instead of environmental storytelling, Bogost suggested
such sets were “just environments” (2017). Instead, the approach championed by Ryan, Foote,
and Azaryahu is reaching across towards a more actively engaged conception of narrative space,
towards experiencing the creation of narrative as Dewey’s “live creature,” who does not only
exist in an environment but also constitutes that environment by perceiving it, changing it, and
transacting through it.
The emergence of hypertext fiction and new conceptions of the freedoms of digital
narrative encouraged the generation of new kinds of spatial metaphors for narrative, beyond the
geographic, “point A to point B” models mentioned above. One popular metaphor was that
videogames and other digital narratives could be considered like labyrinths or mazes (Ryan 2006
141), in which the player chooses her own path from a selection of twisted and obscure options
to lead to a felicitous end point. Fernandez-Vara argues that the maze is a better fit for
videogames than labyrinths, due to the classical labyrinth design supporting only one felicitous
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solution, while mazes are multicursal and make available many different pathways to success
(2007). But the metaphor of the maze, while potent and appealing for describing the apparent
process of a player entering a challenge, finding their own way, and arriving at the destination,
remains unsatisfying for videogame narrative due to its rigid, pre-constituted, and undynamic
feedback. The wanderer in the maze, standing in here for the videogame player, may feelthrough the maze, pushing against the walls and feeling their resistance, but each response is
binary—either the wall allows passage or does not. The walls of the maze in this way resemble
the hard and fixed walls of the 2D sidescrolling regime, not the dynamic guidance, pushing, and
probing of the environmental and coopositional mobs in the open 3D world. Environments like
these are responsive and involved. Games adjust and move with the player coopositionally, while
a maze is inert. The narrative space of the videogame must be thought of as in motion and fluid,
pushing and pulling the player in equal measures, at all times. The maze metaphor, therefore,
fails to describe that type of space unless it is expanded to include another classical element.
What the maze needs is a minotaur.
A minotaur resembles a boss monster, but it is not. Although the minotaur is a singular
creature, a daunting threat, and often described as a threshold guardian of the maze, popular
depictions of the minotaur reveal the creature as a dynamic, active entity. The minotaur does not
wait and taunt the player from the maze exit like a villain. Nor does the minotaur act as a passage
guardian, a secondary challenge to overcome on the player’s way out of the maze. The minotaur,
instead, moves through the maze, hunting the invader in its territory, dynamically altering the
path forward with every step. As the minotaur moves, it alters the maze itself. The safest path
forward collapses as the minotaur moves into it, and a new path grows more attractive. But the
player is not forced into confrontation with the minotaur. Players may choose to confront the
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minotaur if they are up to the challenge, accepting the results as they come. The minotaur, then,
resembles a single, powerful wandering mob, a dangerous enemy that patrols the space of the
maze and, in so doing, creates new and dynamic parameters for the creation of the narrative of
escape.
The early videogame 3D Monster Maze (1981) for the Sinclair ZX81 understood the power
of the minotaur to shape narrative experience and bring a dynamic element to the maze. In the
game, the player is invited by a carnival barker to witness a sideshow spectacle: a Tyrannosaurus
Rex “preserved in silicon since prehistoric times.” Once the player enters the attraction, the real
situation reveals itself. The exhibit is a maze and the T-Rex is alive and hungry. The player then
navigates the low-resolution maze looking for an exit, with a twist. With each new screen of the
maze that the player reveals, she also receives a warning about the location of the T-Rex
including phrases such as “Rex Lies in Wait,” “Footsteps Approaching,” “He Has Seen You,”
“Run, he is beside you,” and so on. Each turn in the maze, therefore, is accompanied by new
information about the dynamic, pursuing, unseen enemy. This maze is more than the impassable
walls of the structure; it is an ever-shifting and unfixed set of narrative possibilities in a story of
escape, danger, or death. The player moves through the maze and the monster moves in tandem,
and as this happens the story shifts and moves along with them.
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Figure 22: 3D Monster Maze (1981)
3D Monster Maze is simple but effective in its design, and the limited information the
game provides amplifies the suspense of each encounter, making the game an ancestor of the
survival horror genre of games (Rouse III). Alien: Isolation (2014) a popular, more-recent entry
in that genre, escalates and smooths out the design of 3D Monster Maze to offer an intense and
horrific narrative experience that emphasizes and enlivens the dynamic narrative space of
Sevastopol, a dying space station in the backwater nowhere of deep space. Again, although the
signature alien carries many superficial similarities with villains or bosses, its actual function in
the game is as a wandering mob, moving and hunting the player through corridors as she pursues
a means of escape from the station and the beast. Like the T-Rex in 3D Monster Maze, the alien
is unkillable; although it can be fended off in combat using specialized weapons, the effect is
always temporary. Late in the game, in fact, players learn that “the alien” is just one of a horde of
the creatures that have infested the station—an entire class of unkillable, hostile mobs.
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Figure 23: Alien: Isolation (2014) updates the maze
Alien: Isolation is a stealth game. Contact with the alien results in a gruesome and instant
“game over,” and so the player must learn to navigate the ship while hiding from the creature as
it hunts her. Again, like in 3D Monster Maze, the space of the narrative shifts and alters
dynamically as the beast and the player move together and feel-through each other’s presence.
Instead of on-screen text, the player relies on a tracking device to keep tabs on the alien’s
location but may also rely on a host of aural or visual cues. The creature moves through vents
above and around the player, drips saliva from ambush points, and responds dynamically to
environmental stimuli, meaning that while the player listens out for the creature, it also listens
for her. A gunshot or even heavy footsteps will be enough to draw the alien to her location and
end the game. The wandering mob in this maze therefore contributes not only to the visible and
invisible elements of the narrative setting of the station but also to the narrative and emotional
fields of action. The player experiences the claustrophobia and fear of pursuit that the player
character describes and comes to regard the station as doomed, decrepit, and unsafe—all key
features of the narrative, which involves the decommissioning and abandonment of the
company’s workers in pursuit of corporate profit and survival. The narrative space of the game
extends beyond the literal and physical space and into the rhizomatic, a concept Fernandez-Valla
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draws from Delueze and Guattari, to describe a digital narrative structure “in which every point
is interconnected with every other point” (Fernandez-Vala 75), a structure that extends outward
in every direction, experienced as a total phenomenon through transaction and active perception,
i.e., perception through activity.
An analogy of a maze-like, rhizomatic model of narrative occurs in Victor Pelevin’s 2006
experimental novel, The Helmet of Horror. The novel is experienced as a long series of text
message exchanges between a collection of people who have each awakened in strange rooms
adjacent to a massive and unknowable labyrinth. The prisoners, each bound to a fictional handle
and many of whom resemble figures from the Perseus myth of the minotaur, talk and argue with
one another about the particulars of the labyrinth, their lives before their kidnapping, and their
various internal and external struggles. Attempts to explore the labyrinth and reveal a means of
escape prove fruitless, in part because the individual sections of the maze they explore seem
irrational and disconnected from each other, suggesting that the characters are not imprisoned in
proximity, and in part because of the horrifying figure of the minotaur who roams the maze,
described as a powerful male figure wearing a massive helmet—the Helmet of Horror. In a
dream one character, “Ariadne,” fittingly receives a vision in which she sees the minotaur and
his peculiar helmet.
On his head he had a bronze helmet, like a gladiator’s mask—a
headpiece with a wide brim and a plate with holes in it where the
face would be. There were two horns on the helmet… they didn’t
stick out to the sides, they ran backwards, merging into the helmet
to form a block (Pelevin 25).
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These unusual horns that bend inward towards the helmet are revealed in the dream to be
called the “horns of plenty,” and in a later dream she learns that the helmet is not a helmet at all
but a mind, with each part of the helmet receiving an appropriate name and function related to
mental activity such as “the frontal net,” “the separator labyrinth,” and “Tarkovsky’s mirror.”
(76-77). The prisoners are puzzled by this description. The helmet is a mind, but it is also an
object in the world, an object that supplants all other objects, including itself, because all objects
originate in the mind. This logical paradox appears to some of the prisoners to hold a solution to
their predicament, and they spend significant time trying to puzzle through the helmet’s nature,
hoping it will lead to escape. As they reason it, the helmet’s “horns of plenty” bend backwards
into the helmet to provide a permanent feedback loop, in which the helmet appears as a closed
system, but from within which everything and anything the mind can experience must emerge
(78-94). One of the prisoners using the name “Nutscracker” takes a particular interest in this
description of the helmet due to its similarity to devices he’s encountered as part of his work as a
designer of games, simulations, and interactive virtual worlds. Nutscrackers refers to the user of
a virtual helmet as a “Helmholtz,” who believes that the virtual world is a space of limitless
possibility when, in fact, the game must push and coerce the player to move in directions the
designers see fit that will provide the best, unbroken experience. Complete freedom of choice,
for Nutscracker, is the death of the experience. The helmet, then, is the point from which
“reality” springs, containing everything the player’s mind encounters.
The helmet of horror is a confusing artifact—intentionally so—and it is significant that
Pelevin chose to place it as the head of the minotaur (not on; it’s made clear that there’s no space
inside the helmet large enough for a head to fit). Where the characters in the novel, who appear
to each fill particular functions of the mind in Pelevin’s philosophical exploration of the concept,

154

fail to understand the paradox of the helmet, from a transactional perspective the artifact comes
into clarity. As Reynolds explains, the mind is not isolated or contained within the brain or even
the body. When we consider how mental activity and cognition emerge from shared transactions
with our environment, the location of the mind extends and disperses into that surrounding
environment. The contents of the mind are everything in our environment, everything our
dynamic sensory experience can perceive, everything the environment perceives about us—and
it does extend like a rhizomatic maze into surrounding directions, touching point-to-point as we
experience as live beings. Nutscracker confuses the helmet and the mind as isolated, requiring
stimuli to force players into preferred directions, what the character calls “coercive orientation”
(96), but he fails to see that the designed world functions as part of the mind of the Helmholtz,
with the player and game acting and perceiving together. Pelevin may have seen this
construction more clearly, since he chose to associate the helmet—the contents of the mind, and
therefore the sum of experience—with the pursuing threat of the minotaur. “Everyone has his
own Minotaur… but in reality, it’s not he who pursues us, we pursue him. And the labyrinth in
which we seek him is the dopamine chains of the pleasure linking up into the rings of the human
brain” (208).
Setting aside Nutscracker’s gesture to the mind’s corporeality, this statement reveals that
the minotaur, the pursuit, and the threat are elements of the mind, perceived by the mind, and
which promote the advancement of the mind which again is boundaryless and extended as far as
the active perception of Dewey’s live creature extends. The minotaur is coopositional and
transactional, a creature that moves us as we move it, all to advance the experience of being
perceived and challenged and to continue our development—it is a creature of the rhizomatic
maze. Like in the television series Westworld, a series heavily preoccupied with the ethics and

155

practices of AI, game, and world design, the maze is presented as a pathway towards
actualization. It is not a metaphor but a literalization of the working of the mind in a pursuit of
sentience. If a robot denizen of the Westworld park travels the length of the “maze,” which is not
literal but rather a pathway of mental causation and cognitive discovery, she will find herself as a
live creature. But, true to game design, the maze is not inert. There must be challenge and a
pursuing, driving force that harries the entity in various directions, towards the “center” of the
maze. Rote execution of a maze-solving script does not lead to actualization, but dynamic and
active transaction by way of pursuit and obstacle will.

Figure 24: Westworld's maze of actualization
The rhizomatic maze of a 3D open world narrative does not often contain such a clear,
rigid minotaur labyrinth, and yet through opposition, pursuit, and conflict of mobs can lead to
narrative actualization through the process of feeling-through. And, importantly, noting that the
maze is a rhizome that connects in every direction, much like the contents of the helmet in
Pelevin’s novel, means that narrative in videogames is not strictly focused on the destination or
the result. Nitsche writes that narrative “is best understood as a form of comprehension that can
be triggered and affected by the game world” (42) and that the individual incidents and events
along the way—which, as we have stated, in many games can largely be made up of encounters
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with mobs—is “not to tell a linear story, but to provide evocative means for the interactor to
comprehend the virtual space and the events within it, and generate context and significance in
order to make the space and the experience of it more meaningful” (45). The sounds of the alien
hunting the player through the Sevastopol vents evoke paranoia and fear to provide that context
and significance for Alien: Isolation, and as the alien moves dynamically by sensing the player,
the evocative space of that story element shifts, moves, and pulsates under the player’s touch.
The same can be said of games in which the walls are removed and the mobs multiplied.
In Fallout 3 I am free to explore as I wish, but I have to weigh that ability against the dangers of
the wasteland. How can discovering mobs that provide too much of a challenge for my skills
reflect the narrative space of the rhizomatic maze? Wee Liang Tong and Marcus Cheng Chye
Tan have argued that the shift to 3D visuals in videogames promoted the adoption of cinematic
storytelling techniques by developers. Soon, those techniques became shared between the player
and the game as a means of directing the narrative events. The authors argue that just as the
cinematic camera developed to follow the action of the cinematic image, selected and framed by
the director, the videogame offers players the opportunity to share in the direction of the
experience. Players have access to turning the camera, focusing on objects and characters,
pausing the action, and many other cinematic tricks to guide and frame the action on screen in a
way that appeals to their individual tastes (Tong, Tan 2002). The game offers the action to be
tracked in these free-camera situations but rarely dictates the player’s moves. It’s a cooperation,
one that facilitates, in a sense, a shared “credit” on the narrative experience. I argue that this
shared phenomenon extends beyond the use of presentation materials such as camera angles and
focus, and directly into the co-constitution of the rhizomatic narrative itself. If we consider
encounters with mobs as the central site of action in a narrative videogame then, following
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Nitsche, the mob encounters become the stuff of the game’s narrative. Through the rhizomatic
maze, these encounters and our experiences of them reach across to co-constitute the full
accounting of narrative activity, including emotional responses, impressions, foreshadowing, and
so on. In this accounting, if I encounter a collection of overpowered mobs in Fallout 3, my
actions and choices direct the story as much as my choice of camera angle may direct the
presentation of that story. The game offers an action encounter. The game and I reach across to
one another and feel-through the resistance we meet. I decide to continue the encounter or
abandon it, essentially choosing the direction of the story as we, the game and myself as a
coopositional phenomenon, prefer. The game does not require walls to facilitate a coercive
orientation because the game is prepared to walk with me in any direction. The game offers
permeable spatial organization through conflict with mobs, and I, as the player, confirm and
mold and morph that space through my coopositional strikes. Like the minotaur in The Helmet of
Horror, the mobs and the narrative appear to be pursuing me, but I am in fact pursuing them at
the same time. We are reaching across simultaneously, and the result is the gradual progression
through a narrative maze that extends outward in all directions, connecting with all other points.
4.5

The Night Folk and the End of Day
Returning to the Night Folk in the swamps of Red Dead Redemption 2, we can see

through this lens of the maze that they both inhabit and create the actual space of the swamps and
the narrative space of the overall Red Dead Redemption 2 story, which presents the gradual
sunset of a proud outlaw and his longtime friends. A prequel to the original Red Dead
Redemption (2010), part 2 depicts the trials of the Van der Linde gang, presented in the game as
a community of men, women, and children who lives on the fringes of the law across five
fictionalized US states in 1899, a territory that contains within it every major archetype of the
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western setting, from deserts to plains to frigid mountains to major cities like Saint Denis, a
stand-in for late-19th century New Orleans. The player takes control of outlaw Arthur Morgan, a
gruff and level-headed gunman who co-founded the gang years earlier with its unquestioned
leader and charismatic guidestar, Dutch van der Linde. As the game begins, the gang has just
suffered a major setback after a botched ferry robbery and has had to flee their home base near
the city of Blackwater, first finding shelter in the mountains before finally selecting an idyllic
meadow to set up shop, earn money through criminal enterprise, rest, and rebuild. Unfortunately
for the gang, Pinkerton agents are in dogged pursuit, and as the player completes tasks and
advances the story, the authorities close in and drive the gang from their tranquil camp and into
another hiding spot. In a plot structure that gestures to the known western trope of the time of the
outlaws coming to a close as coastal capitalism and statehood take root in the region, the player’s
gang finds that no matter where they travel, the Pinkertons are close behind. Each new hideout
the player sets up is in worse disrepair than the previous, is situated in more desperate conditions,
or is just inadequate to the gang’s needs. In one scene, the gang has barely arrived and set up in
their new home before the authorities make their attack and put them on the run again.
As the player and the gang are harried and harassed further into the wilderness, the
personal stakes grow darker and more dangerous. Arthur and Dutch grow apart as the cheery
leader becomes increasingly desperate to hold the gang together despite the obvious
impossibility of their situation. Worse, Arthur learns he is dying of tuberculosis. As the player
advances the game, Arthur grows visibly weaker and becomes prone to violent coughing spasms.
In the game’s finale, most of the gang has been killed by various means and Dutch, in his
madness, blames young outlaw John Marston. Determined to kill John, Dutch loses Arthur’s
trust at last and the player spends Arthur’s last moments of life attempting to help Marston and
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his family escape to the west. (All of this serves as a set up to the events of the first game in
which the player inhabits Marston on a quest to find the last remaining members of the gang.)
The space of Red Dead Redemption 2 plays a critical role in communicating the story. As
each hideout is worse and less stable, so the surrounding environment grows darker and more
dangerous. There are six camp locations that the Van der Linde gang set up during the story, and
while each has its own environmental features and quirks as narrative setting, the change in camp
is also accompanied by an overhaul in the game’s mobs. Mobs in Red Dead Redemption 2 serve
an important role in keeping the player occupied with plenty of options for incident and activity
as they travel the terrain. This is critical because RDR2’s framing as a construction meant to
resemble the old west means that the game, for the most part, prefers to create believable cities
and towns, providing opportunities for the player to either integrate into society (visiting shops,
collecting and selling pelts, playing poker) or terrorize it (robberies, shootouts, train heists). The
verisimilitude of the game’s setting would dissolve if the player was under constant attack from
waves of hostile mobs. Instead, the world of RDR2 is populated by many dozens of encounters.
As the player travels from one location to another, bandits might rush out of the woods at her, or
may set a trap to block the road, or may simply be found looting a stagecoach on the side of the
road. These incidents are meant to be believable within the context of the game world and reflect
the state of the narrative setting in which the player is currently located. This means, as the
player’s gang picks up and moves locations to a new camp in a new area, the game’s mobs and
encounters change accordingly. In the early phases of the game, the Van der Linde gang finds
itself at constant odds with a rival gang known as the O’Driscolls. The rivalry between the two
gangs is intense enough that the groups will shoot at each other on sight, and the constant
irritation of the O’Driscolls leads to several memorable scenes and missions in which the player
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can neutralize the gang. While the O’Driscolls are a threat to Arthur’s safety while he travels the
territory, they are a threat recognizable to fans of the western genre. The blood feud with the
rival gang has a long history in western literature, owning largely to historical feuds between
families like the Hatfields and McCoys or the Clantons and the Earps. The rivalry with the
O’Driscolls, then, reifies the narrative pleasures of the western that the game will soon
disassemble. As the Van der Linde gang moves on, the O’Driscolls drop out as a going concern
and their role in open-world incidents is assumed by other gangs like the Lemoyne Raiders.
These mobs emerge from a specific narrative setting within the game’s five-state territory,
reflecting the physical space and the narrative space of the game, and as the game’s narrative
grows darker, discomforting, and hopeless, the mobs change to match. As the west grows even
more hostile and the player’s camp becomes less stable, the mobs seem to emerge from the
woods in a similar state of desperation. The Skinner Brothers and the Murfree Brood are smeared
facsimiles of organized gangs, more indiscriminate murderers and savage, half-feral clans than
outlaws. The landscape in which these groups reside is littered with evidence of carnage and
blood. And then, at last, come the Night Folk.
By the time the player encounters the Night Folk as regular mobs after taking up
residence near their swamps, the situation in the Van der Linde gang is in full disintegration.
Arthur is dying, and the genial bonds of outlaw friendship that buoyed the plot earlier in the
game are gone now. When I played Red Dead Redemption 2, I by this point dreaded going back
to camp to check in with the gang because I felt discomfort with what the relationships had
become. My world had grown unpleasant, and the sinister nature of the swamp rose to match.
The Night Folk made me feel the narrative space of the game, beyond a simple matter of setting.
The narrative had entered an unstable, fractured, and hopeless stage far removed from the jaunty
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western tropes that formed its premise, and the enemies closing in on me from the swamp had
likewise abandoned any pretense at offering me encounters I could recognize from a Saturday
afternoon western matinee. The Night Folk emerged from the dark. They killed without passion,
like bad fortune. They made attempts to slaughter my horse, stealing away an item arguably
more valuable than my character’s life. If Arthur dies, the game respawns him. A dead horse is
dead. The Night Folk occupy a tangible, stable space in the game world, and reflect through the
rhizomatic maze the narrative space of the player’s journey through the narrative. Like the rot in
Arthur’s lungs, the Night Folk are silent as death and creep from the moist darkness to pull
Arthur down into the drink. There is no explanation for them, no solution. They are inextricable
with the space; no amount of killing would eliminate them, as the game would always spawn
more. The Night Folk would outlive Arthur Morgan, and there was nothing to be done.
Mobs in video games are often framed as disposable enemies who take up room in a
game world and offers the player simple tasks to accomplish, but mobs like the Night Folk
demonstrate how inextricably tied the enemies are with the story space, geography, and world
navigation. When exploring the world of a narrative videogame, a player feels-through the space
and the narrative of the game, and it is against mobs that they will encounter the most active
resistance and dynamic response. While thinking of game stories and worlds in transactionist
terms, we see the emergence of narrative phenomena as inextricably connected to contexts
beyond the player and the game—the rhizomatic maze that the player explores, a dynamic
construction in which conflict and pursuit, not just from the enemy but at the enemy, promotes
cooposition and advancement through the story space, a space that reaches beyond setting and
location and into the thematic and emotional space of the story. To play a narrative game is to
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actively sort it and perceive it, to discern its rhythms and see it clearly. Mobs provide the conflict
and resistance that shape that process, suggesting the space of action one fight at a time.
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5

TRASH: THE PERIPATETIC TASK OF KILLING TIME

Taken Hobgoblins, Infernos, Peepers, Gajalaka, Spiders, Mobile Alert Systems, Core
Hounds, Boaboa, Skeletons, Gordian Sniper, Vectagoyles, Whelps, Restless Orcs,
Amputators, Scarlet Diviner, Goblinoids, Crullers, Wendigo, Brontaurs
5.1

Introduction: Kefka’s Tower
The world is ruined. Kefka, the emperor’s mad jester, has killed his ruler and

broken the truce of the Warring Triad, three magical statues high above the clouds that
stood in balance to maintain the structure of the planet. By toppling the statues in his lust
to acquire more power, Kefka has doomed the landscape below. I’ve traveled the world
for weeks with a troupe of heroes trying to preserve the world’s order, and although we
once battled enemies across green fields, warm deserts, and pristine valleys, we now
stand on the deck of our airship and see nothing but cracked and broken desolation. No
place has been spared. Every peaceful village where we’ve found harbor is in a state of
desperation. Kefka wanted so badly to hold the world in his hand that he crushed it to
powder.
But my troupe and I aren’t broken. We’ve faced many trials and battled our way
to Kefka’s tower. We know that Kefka now holds the power of a god, but we’re no
pushovers either. We’ve maximized our training. We shine with magical armor, weapons,
and spells. We have faced every threat the World of Ruin has to offer, and we’re still
standing. We break into teams and enter Kefka’s twisted tower. All that matters now is
getting our hands on the villain. Hopefully we can put the world right. At the least, we
can avenge it.
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Unfortunately for us, Kefka isn’t alone. Although we arrive at his tower sanctuary
fully loaded with potions for healing and Phoenix Down for resurrections, we find a
small army of hideous enemies lurking in the tower’s halls, ready to test us and delay our
path to their boss. As we trek through the branching path on the way to our final fight
with Kefka, we’re stopped and harassed repeatedly by critters like Retainers, Strikers,
and Guardians. Sometimes it seems like we can’t get more than a few steps before a
crowd of EvilOscars pick a fight. We’re not here for these creatures, but they’re here for
us. Gradually it dawns on me that getting to Kefka is going to be as much of a challenge
as fighting the mad clown god himself. When we do finally reach our target, we can only
hope there will be enough of our resources left to save the world.
The above description summarizes the final stages of the epic RPG Final Fantasy
VI (1994), originally released in North America as Final Fantasy III for the Super
Nintendo home console, and widely considered one of the most significant narrative
videogames in history. Players navigate the environment through two kinds of top-down
maps. The first overworld map depicts the entire landscape of the world at a reduced
scale, affording rapid travel from place to place. Players initially have to walk across the
landscape, but as the game progresses it allows more and faster means of travel, including
the speedy airship. Players may stop at sites of interest on the map, such as towns or
caves, and when they do the map switches to a tighter-scaled (but still unrealistic) “closeup” of the area for players to navigate. As players explore these areas, no enemies are
visible. Instead, the game processes a random check in the backend; each step the player
takes on the screen has a small potential to trigger an encounter with a local enemy type.
After the game signals an enemy has been found, the game swaps over to a semi-abstract
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battle screen depicting the two “sides” of the battle and a collection of menu options for
the player to consider. A victory in battle puts the player back on the overworld map to
repeat the process. Therefore, if a player is looking to engage with enemies to gain
experience points, gear, or just for fun, she might choose to stay in one general area and
simply walk back and forth or in a search pattern of her choosing, trying to continuously
jump into battles.

Figure 25: The World Map in Final Fantasy VI
On the other hand, sometimes the player simply wants to navigate through a space
or towards some objective and does not want to fight enemies along the way.
Unfortunately, the player’s options are limited. In most situations, there is no way to
reduce the number of encounters. Final Fantasy VI offers an item that prevents random
battles, but it's difficult to acquire and must be held in the party by a specific one of the
fourteen playable characters, often a burden for players who typically settle on a favorite
team lineup. The battles that form the core of the game’s fun and enjoyment for much of
the game become, in this scenario, irritations. Nothing else about the fights themselves
has changed, only the fights’ context in relation to the player’s attempt to feel-through
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other narrative events. And while mob fights benefit players by providing needed
experience and items, that isn’t so in my account of the assault on Kefka’s tower. I
entered the tower ready for my final encounter with the game’s villain. My characters
were strong and well-equipped for the boss fight. However, instead of taking the fight
directly to Kefka, I had to maneuver through terrain, solve puzzles, and defeat minor
bosses to unlock the path. The task was difficult even before accounting for the chance of
random battles at every step along the way. Most of the enemies I fought were familiar to
me. The experience and items they offered in defeat were unhelpful because my party
was so far advanced. Frankly, these enemies were just in the way, and fighting them
became a chore rather than a thrill. The enemies look and perform like standard mobs,
but players contextually perceive them in a different classification. They become a
distinct kind of mob, a kind that many players refer to as trash.
In this chapter, I will examine the phenomenon of trash mobs in videogames
through the context of how they are designed and deployed in games to alter, dilate, and
manipulate the transactional experience of narrative time. While the previous chapter was
concerned with mobs and the construction of narrative, emotional, and thematic space,
trash mobs are designated as such by players who are made aware through context of the
direct relationship trash has with the experience of videogame time. Trash, from one
perspective, wastes the player’s time. From a transactional perspective, however, I will
argue that trash mobs should be considered as temporal phenomena in themselves and
that the player, by engaging with trash, advances and experiences the narrative by
directly “killing time.” Through this discussion, I hope to arrive at a preliminary
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understanding of the space and time milieu of fighting mobs in videogames, on the way
to a transactional and rhizomatic chronotope of videogame narrative.
5.2

Trash, the Time Between Here and There
I first encountered the term “trash” in the mid-2000s while playing in a regular

raid group for the massively popular game World of Warcraft (2004). Raids in WOW are
major tasks designed for large groups, often split into several major events or bosses that
have to be overcome. They can be serious business for players who sacrifice a significant
part of a day to complete the challenge in the hopes of being rewarded with a unique
weapon or special badge. Raids are considered the “endgame” of WOW, the only part of
the game that still offers story, challenge, and entertainment after the player has finished
the major questlines and reached the game’s high “level cap” after which the player
cannot gain more experience for that character. Snatching a new piece of high-level “raid
gear” is perceived by many players as the path to continuing their character’s growth
beyond that cap. Raids, therefore, can feel a bit like a military exercise, with players
encouraged to fill specific roles, to follow commands from a “raid leader,” and to avoid
at all costs making a mistake that might result in death, as any weakness in the raid
group’s formation might result in the entire group being overwhelmed and defeated.
It was in this context that I first heard a raid leader expressing irritation with trash
mobs. By far the most popular and dangerous parts of any raid are the major bosses the
groups encounter along the way. In between each boss are paths to navigate, and each of
those paths is populated by groups of enemy mobs. Raid groups contain high numbers of
top-level characters and players—standard mobs (even the buffed “elite” mobs that patrol
a raid dungeon) do not present any actual threat unless they swarm in high numbers.
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Therefore, the raid leader characterized them as “trash,” mobs to be discarded and
tolerated as little more than irritating litter on the way to the actual threat of the boss.
Like the term “mob” as it refers to enemies, the term “trash” likely originated in
the game EverQuest, the first widely popular massively online roleplaying game
(MORPG). This should be no surprise, considering that with a widespread adoption of an
online videogame came the need to form communities and culture within player
populations, including a shared language to describe the types of challenges found in the
world. One theory is that trash is a shortened version of “yard trash,” as one of
EverQuest’s raids, named “Unrest,” featured a house with low-level mobs wandering its
front and back yards. According to World of Warcraft wiki Wowpedia, “Lower level
players shouted for groups to kill yard trash for experience,” (“Trash Mob” Wowpedia)
leveling up their characters while allowing the higher-level players to avoid the trash and
focus on the major task of the raid. Over time, the taxonomy of the trash mob has
extended into the wider ecology of video game enemies, most prominently in recent years
to the videogame Destiny 2 (2017), which likewise features massive raids and pickup
multiplayer. Players on online forums commonly discuss trash mobs and their roles in
games, and the term has spread to other forms of media consumed by players, including
podcasts (Player1).
What’s especially interesting about trash mobs is the way that players openly
disparage, reject, or fully despise their encounters with them. A typical example appears
in the definition of the term found on the fan site Giant Bomb.
Trash mobs (often just abbreviated as ‘trash’) are dungeon bosses’
lackeys. When players enter a dungeon, it is often for the sole
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reason of killing bosses and getting loot. However, the evil game
designers [emphasis mine] have chosen not to make this task too
easy, so they’ve filled the space in between bosses with countless of
lesser, easier mobs. These mobs rarely provide any profit, hence
the name ‘trash mob,’ and they’re essentially just road blocks for
the players (“Trash Mobs”, Giant Bomb).
The editorial aside within what is mostly a straight definition of the vernacular
labels game designers as “evil” for placing trash mobs into dungeons, which raises
questions. Does the author believe the game designer is seeking to cause pain and
suffering through “road blocks,” perhaps believing the designer a sadist abusing
privileged access to the game’s code to inflict harm on players? If so, what is it about
trash mobs that does harm? By the author’s own admission, trash mobs are typically easy
and are defeated using the same tactics that, in other situations outside the dungeon,
players identify as part of the game’s usual design. In other words, placed into a different
context, trash mobs are just mobs. Even the designation as “trash” reveals a deep disdain
for the experience of this type of combat, in this scenario. As I suggested above in my
description of the trash mobs in Kefka’s tower, dislocating mobs and enemy encounters
from the rhythms of progression—that is, progression in the sense of experience, items,
or the completion of levels—shifts these encounters towards sensations of labor. When
fighting trash, the player goes through the same motions, uses the same combat verbs,
presses the same buttons, and feels-through the same zone of rhizomatic narrative space
and contextual rhythm as in any combat with mobs, and yet the experience is
qualitatively different. Trash often appear using the same models and skins, the same
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abilities, and the same programming as mobs found elsewhere, but they are another kind
of enemy experientially. The encounters that emerge when players fight trash are
fundamentally altered by the contingent emergence of the battle. Therefore, trash are
relational expressions of cooposition that neatly demonstrate how the promotion of
narrative phenomena is co-constitutive. Understanding how and why many players feel
frustration with the relational experience of trash, separate from other expressions of
encounters with mobs, allows us to analyze the functioning of that coopositional
phenomenon, specifically the ways in which mobs—all mobs, not only trash—construct
and guide videogame narrative time.
5.3

Peripatetic Event Time
Trash mobs are time, literally. As we’ve seen in previous chapters, successful

players seek eurhythmia with individual enemies found in videogame levels. When a
player first encounters a mob, the combat might prove difficult because the player is
attempting to attune with an unknown rhythm. After many encounters with the same
enemy, however, eurhythmia may emerge and players may settle into an expected pattern
for the fight. In Final Fantasy VI, my characters have been battle-tested through their
journey to Kefka’s tower. I have settled on a collection of characters whose individual
skills and talents best align with my personal rhythms of play and with the combat
rhythms encountered in the game. I feel-through the game using my combat actions, and
the game feels-through my resistance using its own actions. For example, when
encountering a group of Veterans (oddly named floating orbs with cyclopean eyes and
tiny bat wings), I know from my coopositional encounters that it is best to allow Cyan,
my noble swordsman, to charge up his SwdTech ability, for my clown Gogo to drop an
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Ultima spell that affects all Veterans at once, for main hero Terra to use her own
destructive magic to do another sweeping attack on the group, and for my wizard, Strago,
to use healing magic to keep my party upright. I will do all of these in my first set of
actions. I know that the Veterans will attempt to cast Death spells on my characters, after
which I can return to my rotation of abilities. Given the standard variables involved—the
hit points of the Veterans, the amount of damage my spells and weapons inflict on the
creatures, the speed at which my actions become available, the typical selection of attacks
the Veterans will try—every encounter with a group of Veterans or any group of
similarly designed enemies will go much like any other. Give or take a surprising attack
from the enemies or a tactical error on my part, the combat will end with my party
victorious and will take roughly two minutes of real-world time. If my party is trying to
cross a room, I know that each combat that’s triggered randomly by my steps will delay
my crossing by that approximate two minutes.
In games like Destiny 2, trash enemies are clearly visible along the path one has to
travel to complete the larger raid, and players know that each group of enemies will cost
a fairly standard amount of effort and time to eliminate. This is why I say that trash mobs
are time. They stand openly as temporal objects that can be read by a player as easily as
any clock. One of the worst offenses a player in a World of Warcraft raid group can
commit is a mistake (perhaps missing a heal on the “tank,” the player drawing the
attention of the enemies in the area to protect more vulnerable players) that results in a
complete team “wipe,” or the death of every player character. This is a disastrous,
upsetting turn of events for serious players, but in World of Warcraft the only item of
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value that is lost in a team wipe is time—time taken by players to run their ghosts back to
their bodies, time for the team to reassemble, regroup, and recast spells and buffs.
Many game scholars have noted the relationship between character death and a
player’s lost time (for starters, Juul 2006; Abraham 2009; Keogh 2018; Engelstein 2020).
While a common design trope in some older games was to penalize players for death by
taking away perks, items, or experience points (the online game City of Heroes [2004]
infamously put defeated players into experience point “debt” that had to be worked off
before they could again gain progress at the standard rate), contemporary design trends
largely treat the loss of the player’s time as enough of a penalty. Over decades of industry
practice, designers appear to have decided that nothing is more precious to a player than
his or her time. Games are expected to move, and to avoid backtracking or obvious timewasting tactics; even explicit narrative elements that found early popularity and adoption
by designers, such as pre-rendered cutscenes that interrupt gameplay, have largely been
pushed out of mainstream videogames, or are routinely skippable. Other games,
especially predatory social and mobile games that advertise themselves as “free to play,”
place time barriers into the core game design and charge small amounts of money for
players to skip ahead to the reward. Even a moderately successful “free to play” game
can collect massive profits in what designers sometimes call an “impatience tax.” The
webcomic Penny-Arcade summarized the feelings of many players recently with a comic
inspired by the popular speedrunning indie game Neon White (2022). In the comic, a
character representing the game’s narrative designer is told that the studio will make his
narrative work as skippable as possible, because in a game focused on fast-paced action,
narrative activity is perceived as a liability and counter to the game’s goals.
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Figure 26: Penny-Arcade for June 22, 2022
But these are common complaints in the history of videogame narrative play.
What distinguishes trash mobs from player frustration with interruptive narrative
elements is that trash are not interruptions from the game loop; they in fact are the loop
for most combat games, or at least an essential phenomenon within the loop. In games
focused on hero narratives, allowing the player to set out on a task-focused quest, trash is
peripatetic, constituting the journey through the raid dungeon, tower, or other narrative
edifice of the event. Raids in Destiny 2 or other massive multiplayer games are typically
designed as spaces to be traversed from one point to another with trash mobs constituting
the space of the path between. If the raid is an undertaking with a commitment of time
and effort on behalf of the player and the game, then trash is a visible and tangible
extension of time—the more trash, the more time the raid consumes. Trash, therefore, are
calibrated, designed phenomena that alter and distort—through rote repetition—the
experience of time within the play experience, an arrhythmic interference in the player’s
peripatetic time. Drew Davidson once described the experience for his wife as she
watched him play Uncharted 2. “She enjoyed it best when I played on the Easy setting.
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Anything harder caused me to take too long with the various combat sections [where I’d
tend to die the most often] and she would lose a sense of the thread of the story”
(Davidson). Davidson’s wife was spectating rather than playing, but in both her
experience and the player’s experience with trash, the disruption in the rhythmic flow of
the event that, critically, players perceive as unnecessary is enough to alter the game loop
relationally from a sensation of progression to one of pettiness or irritation, sensations
that arise from the relational exposure of how trash function as interruptive units of
digressive time. To examine this point further, we must explore videogame time as a
transactional phenomenon of the play experience, an idea that departs from traditional
game studies accounts of game time, which tend towards the cognitive and the structural.
Through this analysis, I will demonstrate how my account of trash differs from these
accounts and turns the discussion towards the transactional and continuous, as rhizomatic
as the previous chapter’s discussion of inseparable videogame space.
5.4

Videogame Time, in Brief
Videogame scholars have long been interested in the unique qualities of

videogame time, and far more has been written on the subject than I could effectively
summarize in this chapter. Instead, I will focus on a few major approaches that exemplify
particular lines of thought before addressing the difficulties with reconciling those
approaches with transactionism and contingent, continuous experience.
Videogame scholars have paid close attention to the nature of videogames as
temporal objects, finding fascination with the various kinds of temporal experiences
players and games facilitate and perceive. As with questions of narrative and space,
opinions on the nature of videogame time have trended towards the cognitive. Igarzabal,
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in what he describes as a cognitive-formalist approach to videogame time, begins from
the position that time is a mental construction (13) “dependent on mental states and the
ways these are altered by the environmental and bodily signals” (17). In this approach,
the player engages with the game as a discrete, technical and constructed artifact and
perceives and analyzes cues in the videogame to process and perceive time and, by
limited extension, space. This approach of cognitive construction of time is familiar in
game studies writing, which often attempts categorization or taxonomical designation of
various kinds of videogame time that allow for cognitive engagement. Zagal and Mateas,
for example, propose four distinct, parallel categories of videogame time that they refer
to as “temporal frames”—Real-World, Gameworld, Coordination, and Fictive (2010). In
their account, the player lives their physical life in real-world time while simultaneously
experiencing the gameworld time as a separate track. Elden Ring, for example, progresses
from day to night and back again in a full cycle that takes roughly one real-world hour,
meaning that a player who spends six hours on their couch playing the game will
experience six full days of Elden Ring’s gameworld time. Other games, for example
Animal Crossing: New Horizons (2020), use a day/night cycle that mostly fits to the
player’s own real-world time, meaning that if the player plays in the late evening, she
will find that the sun has set in her gameworld as well. There is, however, a loose and
often illusory relation between gameworld time and the game’s “fictive” time. My
playthrough of Elden Ring was around 50 hours in length, meaning I progressed through
50 day/night cycles. And yet my character never slept or ate and could cross the game’s
entire massive continent in less than an hour of running. Since it’s implausible to
accomplish such a feat in the physical world, it seems reasonable to say that the
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gameworld time cycle is not analogous to the fictive time within which the story unfolds.
The same is true of Animal Crossing. Despite its tighter connection to the player’s realworld time, buildings and bridges may still be built within just a few hours, or even
instantly, depending on the task. In Red Dead Redemption 2, my character is diagnosed
with tuberculosis and then dies from the disease all within roughly a dozen or so hours,
during which an incredible number of fictional events, spanning seemingly months, take
place. Again, the fiction time and the gameworld time appear to be running on separate
tracks. Zagal and Mateas suggest a fourth category, coordination time, that accounts for
the time taken to facilitate the game in menus, loading screens, matchmaking lobbies, and
other such spaces (Zagal and Mateas).
Although the names and characteristics of the categories differ, Zagal and
Mateas’s project shares similarities with proposals from other prominent game scholars.
Elverdam and Aarseth offer two broader metacategories of External Time (real-world)
and Internal Time (gameworld), further breaking those categories down into Teleology
and Representation time in the external or Haste, Synchronicity, or Interval Control time
in the internal (2007). Juul prefers to separate game time into a duality of play time (realworld) and event time (gameworld) (2006), while Lindley proposes four “levels of
temporal structure”—Discourse (player experience), Performance (gameplay events),
Simulation (fictive time), and Generative Substrate, similar to Igarzabal’a coordination
time (Lindley). At the risk of overwhelming the subject with taxonomy, all of these
various categories are, in different but similar ways, attempting to make sense of how the
player can seemingly exist in several different temporalities at once while experiencing a
videogame. Many of these approaches are productive for descriptions and forensic
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exploration of videogame play, but they remain inadequate for enveloping the loose and
flowing temporality that players experience phenomenologically. In order to apply any of
these taxonomies to narrative experience, it becomes necessary for scholars to lean on
terms from cognitive narratology, with many lists asserting that one category or another
amounts to a game’s story, while others act as discourse (for example, Zagal and
Mateas’s fictive time/story versus gameworld time/discourse). As always, however, this
approach produces problems accounting for player activity and perception, again
distancing the player permanently from the temporal activity of the narrative even as she
participates in its creation. Since the player does not control, or has exceedingly limited
control, over fictive time and gameworld time, then how can the player be co-constituting
the narrative with the game? Time as a purely cognitive construction denies its nature as
carnal and felt, a sensed and experienced rhythm of the world.
Zagal and Mateas note that accounts of game temporality must “be able to
describe a broad range of phenomena,” (Zagal and Mateas) and for that reason choose to
dismiss a fixed and rigid Platonic understanding of time in favor of what they call a
relational understanding, which they characterize as the difference between believing
time is objective, even while in pure stasis, versus time existing as a measurement of
change. They describe the relational approach this way: “discourse about time and
temporal relations can be reduced to talking about events and the relationships between
them. Without change (events) there can be no time” (ibid.). Videogames are media of
change and thus temporal artifacts, even in otherwise still moments where the player has
chosen not to act. The game continues to reach across for the player, continues to process
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and adjust. The “ambient actions” in the game Shenmue are only one visible example of
this fact (Galloway 8-12).
But how do players experience that relational, change-driven understanding of
time? The general consensus of the cognitive approach is that games run on a series of
temporal tracks which are processed by the player simultaneously through oscillations
from one track to another dynamically, as needed. In Final Fantasy VI, I may cognitively
process and acknowledge the gameplay time before considering that time relationally
against my cognitive understanding of the fictive time. Perhaps I lose myself so
completely in the game that by the time I oscillate back to my real-world time, maybe by
checking the clock on my phone, I might be surprised at how much time has passed in the
real-world. In his phenomenology, Keogh has noted that videogames are multi-modal,
but are experienced in a fashion similar to what Harraway calls “in the splice” of film, or
in the simultaneity of the experience. “Videogames exist in all of their processes at once”
(2018 17). I agree with Keogh that the experience of videogames is holistic, but where I
depart from Keogh and from Zagal and Mateas’s definition of relational time is in my
consideration of that phrase, “all of their processes.” While it is often useful to think on
specific videogame processes as individual phenomena (and certainly it becomes useful
when thinking of various natural rhythms or the total rhythm of a complex superstructure
such as a city [Simpson]) transactionally there is no firm or fixed separation between
processes. Two processes change each other and become inseparable. A hundred
processes (or more) in a contemporary big-budget videogame change a hundred more and
are perceived and felt by the player as a single process—the game. The experience that
emerges from the game and the player feeling-through with one another is a phenomenon
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that could only result from the processes of the game and the processes of the player
growing inseparable. If videogame time runs on different tracks, those tracks are not
separate and cannot be oscillated between. They are one, uniform. All processes of
videogame time are continuous with each other from the real-world to the fictive time,
creating a unique temporal phenomenon that is read by the player as a fully contingent
experience. In Chapter 4 I introduced the concept of the rhizomatic maze to describe how
many kinds of space become inseparable in videogame play through cooposition. The
seemingly antagonistic coopositional relationship with trash helps us to see that
videogames perform on a rhizomatic clock.
Imagining a rhizomatic clock is more difficult than imagining the maze in which
all ends connect to all others, but if it were possible to see temporal activity in
videogames as a physical readout, it might approach the experience of videogame
temporality. A true rhizomatic clock would have an unlimited face on which are
countless measurements of various kinds of time, the time tracks that Juul and others
argue we oscillate amongst. And yet there would be an ever-shifting time at the center—a
result of the temporal accounting of our experience in all the other times at once. Since
our lived experience of time is registered on the clock, just looking at the clock would
change the central reading in some small way. The central reading is the temporal result
of my lived experience, and so any arrhythmic disruption in one of the temporal tracks
disrupts the entire clock.
For a more practical example of how the rhizomatic clock functions, consider the
much-derided final sequence of the otherwise beloved shooter Bioshock (2007). In the
game, you play an unnamed man shooting his way through Rapture, an objectivist
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paradise built under the sea that has descended into madness and ruin. After uncovering
the history of Rapture’s fall and slaying its founder (while also discovering your own
identity as an assassin driven by mental conditioning and subliminal orders) the game
continues for a long stretch as you pursue a bigger villain in the hopes of freeing yourself.
To that end, you must collect the pieces of a massive suit that will transform you into a
“Big Daddy,” a hulking monster tasked with protecting “Little Sisters,” small children
who scavenge the station for a powerful substance called ADAM. The sequence
culminates in a level where the player must stand guard and wait while a Little Sister
does her work, guarding her against waves of hideous enemies who want to steal the
ADAM in her possession. The sequence is generally despised by players, in part because
it changes the core gameplay style from a fast-paced action to stationary defense. Players
want to be moving, but Bioshock now requires them to pause, wait, and then repeat the
cycle. It’s clear that the change in playstyle alters the temporal rhythm of Bioshock late in
the game experience, but it’s less clear on which “track” the change takes place?
Certainly not in the fictive time, or the coordination time of the game’s internal workings.
Gameworld time seems like the most likely candidate, but that temporal track alone
cannot account for the way in which the player experiences the delay. The gameworld
time in Bioshock has only barely changed; the same is true of the player’s real-world
time. In fact, what has changed is the coopositional time of enemy encounters. The game
is now presenting events that require a slower feeling-through, which is a drag on the
transactional track of the gameworld time and the real-world time as they affect and feelthrough each other. The game reaches across to the player’s real world time and
elongates it and distorts the experience of it as the player suddenly feels the time it takes
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to accomplish the task, while the player reaches across to the game and discovers new
resistance to her temporal expectations. The enemies in this sequence, while functionally
identical to enemies found in the rest of the game, emerge with new temporal qualities
that are met by the player’s coopositional reach to dynamically change the experience of
play time. The player feels this temporal shift, i.e. “reads the rhizomatic clock,” and
grows frustrated with new arrangement. The mobs in this Bioshock sequence are
transformed dynamically into trash.
5.5

Killing Time
Players reject or dismiss trash mob encounters because trash disrupt and distort

the rhizomatic clock. Through transactional play, by assessing rhythms and actively
perceiving the experience of the gameplay and narrative, the player and the game feelthrough each other and generate the play phenomenon. But the contextual emergence of
trash is a taken as coopositional betrayal. As all videogame time is perceived at once,
inseparably, the player is aware that the temporal shift that accompanies trash encounters
alters the player’s perception of real-world time. Players may express this feeling as a
complaint that the game is “wasting” their time, despite the encounters with trash
offering peripatetic productivity, moving the journey of the experience forward, which is
the same implicit goal of play outside of the context that creates the experience of trash.
This seeming contradiction might be explained by the relative triviality of trash
encounters, as Juul has suggested trivial videogame tasks belong to a separate category of
“dead time.” Although Juul considers dead time the domain of such trivial tasks as idle
animations, inventory sorting, and the like, he does acknowledge later in the same essay
that killing mobs can be trivial (2006). Yee points out that some players feel the same
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way, recording an interview with a City of Heroes player who describes the task of
“grinding”—repeatedly killing mobs for no other purpose than to acquire incremental
rewards—to provide “a certain feeling of Zen […] hours on end in the same area, doing
the same thing over and over, watching the XP bar creep slowly upwards. Just soloing,
just me and the Monsters” (Yee 80). But fighting trash is not relaxing, nor is the time
spent fighting trash “dead time.” As noted above, trash are common in raid dungeons,
which are highly structured and approached very seriously by advanced players. And, of
course, the peripatetic function of trash shares remarkable similarities with the function
of standard mobs, which is to constitute the time and space between larger encounters
(Bryant and Giglio 106-107).
Perhaps we should be thinking differently about that time between. Its specific
context—the condition that allows for the emergence of trash as peripatetic time—
distinguishes the time between as an arrhythmic temporal phenomenon, or at least as a
part of the larger game phenomenon in which arrhythmic temporality can emerge.
Perhaps, then, the contextual milieu of the time between alters it into a different kind of
play. Ethan Tussey writes about “day parts,” discrete blocks of time media companies use
to artificially segment the day and target different groups with different kinds of media.
For example, prime time viewing is a day part discrete from late night and carries media
with distinct content standards and audience expectations. He goes on to suggest that
digital media has allowed for a more malleable and permeable mobile day part filled with
media designed solely for the purpose of killing time between larger events—commuting
on a train, in a waiting room, and so on (Tussey 2018). Applying that same permeable yet
identifiable definition to the space between major events in gameplay would allow us to
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perceive a “play part.” Irrevocably connected to the major events on either side, the play
part is the span of space and time across which the major events on either side reach
across to one another, and through which the player transitions away from the one and
towards the next. In Tussey’s mobile day part, a person might mediate the moment by
accessing trivial tasks like simple games, social media, or quick news bites on their
digital device to “kill time.” In the play part, the player does the same. If a unit of trash is
a unit of measurable time, then the player in the transitional play part accomplishes
peripatetic progression by literally “killing time.”
Here we arrive at a crucial distinction, however. In Tussey’s account of the
mobile day part, digital media users occupy a subject position created by companies that
mediates “the tension between productivity and entertainment […] for those who are
waiting, procrastinating, and/or killing time” (29). Tussey’s point is that procrastination
media in the mobile day part justify their capitalistic colonization of our otherwise “dead”
time by providing content that normalizes the time not spent working as time for
recreation; in other words, justifying the existence of the mobile day part (and its
invasion of our time) by providing the glittering content to fill it. “Each time people
complete a level or advance in a mobile game, they are reminded that the time they spend
waiting has value […] ‘killing time’ in the procrastination economy is about making a
mark and asserting the value of a person’s time” (Tussey 110-111). But in the transitional
play part, where the player is literally killing time, one trash mob after another, the player
has an opposite reaction. Killing time still reinforces the value of that time, but the player
does so only unwillingly. That’s because the game and the player has an inverse
relationship in the videogame trash encounters. The player isn’t procrastinating. The
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game is. And because the player and the game are inseparable in the phenomenon, the
player feels the disruption in the rhizomatic clock, and is forced into attuning to the
game’s procrastination—into making it happen, in fact—to stay aligned and attuned with
the game’s rhythms.
Videogame designers rely on trash to achieve desirable market conditions related
to time. Take, for example, the Destiny 2 raid titled the “The Last Wish.” An experienced
team can complete the raid in about three real-world hours, although times of four and
five hours are not uncommon. The most important elements of the raid are the boss
monsters found within, but there are only a handful of them. Without trash mobs, the
experience of The Last Wish would be significantly shorter as players moved from boss
to boss throughout the raid.
Despite player irritation with trash mob encounters, however, The Last Wish has not been
and will not be reduced to its boss fights. That’s because there is a strong market incentive for
Bungie, the parent company that owns Destiny 2, to maintain—and even maximize—the time
cost for the raid. For many major video games, time is explicitly the product sold in marketing
materials. Destiny 2 is not unique in the space when it promises players will need “hours upon
hours” to complete major tasks (“Destiny”). As game prices have risen in recent years,
publishers and studios increasingly rely on promising players a massive return on their
investment in the form of play time. The length of raids is a selling point, despite the shared
understanding that the easiest and most effective way to increase time is to increase trash. As we
have seen, every encounter with trash adds a quantifiable number to the rhizomatic clock. From
this perspective, then, we can see that although the player is literally “killing time” by fighting
through waves of trash, it is the game that is drawing out the time between major tasks,
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protracting play time with methods that lay bare for players the distortion to the rhizomatic
clock.
5.6

Peripatetic Temporal Presence
Lefebvre writes that time and rhythm—and therefore the lived, natural rhythms that

constitute an individual’s experience—are inseparable, as shown by the repetition of rhythms,
which are found “in the workings of our towns and cities, in urban life, and movement through
space” (viii). To move, then, is to experience time, and thus peripatetic action is temporal action.
This is significant when considering the journey between spaces and its relationship with the
sensory experience of the videogame because it confirms that videogame experiences happen in
the present moment; the journey is a rhythmic, temporal act that progresses now as opposed to
cinema or photography, which Barthes correctly noted are media that never fully arrive in the
present moment (Barthes 1980) because the image was captured in the past and the viewer
perceives it as a document of such. “There is no now in film. The arrival of the cinematic image
imbued the sphere of representation with the potential overcoming of the desire for presence”
(Tucker 23).
Videogames resist any move away from now, however, because although they are images
videogames privilege the present. Even videogames utilizing full-motion video over digital
graphics (The Complex [2020], for example) are transformed in the transactional play
phenomenon into presence. The player and the game each together apprehend the present by
feeling-through each other. The player does not experience the game as a document of the past
but an activity of the now. Even if the image on the screen is still or evokes a history (such as a
note or a diary entry offering itself for reading, like the item shown in Figure 4 for the game
DreadOut [2014]), the player feels the experience of discovering the image as part of her
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present, not another character’s moment in the past during which the narrative occurred. The
videogame image is always both being and becoming, reaching across the present to a future
present always about to arrive. The experience of mutual feeling-through of experience means
that the player and the videogame, together, constitute the temporal horizon of experience at all
times.

Figure 27: A note in the present about the past in DreadOut
Returning to Jenkins and others who see videogames as places, actual spaces bursting
with potential action and narrative activity, it is the very nature of the peripatetic drive—largely
constituted of encounters with mobs—that works to stabilize the image by encouraging the
experience of progressive rhythms. “Places are always in a process of becoming, seething with
emergent properties, but usually stabilized by regular patterns of flow that possess particular
rhythmic qualities whether steady, intermittent, volatile, or surging” (Simpson). Fighting mobs
creates peripatetic rhythm. The encounters shape the phenomenon of videogame space and time,
giving shape to the chaos of digital polygons on screen, and in narrative games, forming the
permeable boundaries of narrative activity. Trash, however, once again disrupt this experience in
a way that frustrates the rhizomatic clock. In a medium about presence, the experience of trash
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and the needless, valueless repetition required to overcome it complicates and confuses the sense
of peripatetic progression and places the player awkwardly into the past, present, and the future
of the event simultaneously. While the player struggles through the present event, the sudden
disruption of the coopositional rhythm draws attention to the designers behind the code (in much
the same way a bad strike call suddenly calls attention to the otherwise-invisible umpire in a
baseball game). The player is forced into experiencing now as a connection to then, the moment
the designer chose to load the level with trash. Worse, the player in the present may look ahead
to trash lying in wait on the path up ahead (or, as in Final Fantasy VI, the invisible trash that
could potentially pounce on each step of the journey) and can see, in a literal sense, the becoming
time yet to be killed. I have argued that players already exist in these times all at once because
there is no true separation between them in a transactional sense. But trash lays bare the nature
of the rhizomatic clock. Instead of seeking eurhythmia with the central reading of the clock—the
total experience of time during play—the player is shunted into awareness of the many faces of
the clock, a disruption that feels like punishment. Cooposition has turned sour. The player sees
manipulation where once there existed partnership. I have argued that trash are a phenomenon of
the game procrastinating, but what that is true it is the player who must kill the time being
wasted by the game. This is an uncomfortable, arrhythmic position. Cooposition still occurs, but
the tone is hostile and frustrating.
5.7

Narrative Dilation and Dead Time
And yet trash mobs remain a familiar, standard element of narrative videogames, even

well-received and popular games. Like standard mobs, trash are usually themed and designed for
the larger narrative structures they support. While the trash in Final Fantasy VI don’t appear to
have any direct link to Kefka and, in fact, seem quite arbitrary in their selection, trash in World
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of Warcraft are often chosen for raid dungeons specifically because they make narrative and
thematic sense for the event. In Chapter 4, I argued for mobs as a coopositional phenomenon for
establishing and constituting narrative space through what I called a rhizomatic maze, or a space
that can move in many, twisty directions, connecting in on itself and other expressions of space
from narrative to thematic to emotional. In the same way that Bakhtin proposed the chronotope
as a measurement of space and time in narrative, and that Lefebvre argued that space and time
cannot be thought of as separate entities because space emerges from temporal rhythm, I am
arguing that the narrative rhizomatic maze and the rhizomatic clock are inseparable phenomena.
They are rhizomatic together, with all spatial and temporal phenomena connecting across to all
other spatial and temporal phenomena. And just as the minotaur/mob functions to direct the
player through the rhizomatic maze, so mobs—and trash—function as peripatetic temporal
phenomena. To be clear, I do not only mean that trash functions in this way in the spaces
between, where narrative events reach across to one another, but to all temporal phenomena in
the play experience. As Taylor writes, the “player must perform at multiple levels while playing
a video game. In this regard, the player in play is present in more than one spatial domain”
(Taylor). Of course, I would add “temporal” to Taylor’s domains and argue that the multiple
levels cease to remain as separate levels during play, but it is true that the player feels-through
the experience of the game in all directions at once, both through the maze and through the
temporal, just as the game feels-through the player’s involvement dynamically to determine the
processes and experiences that must emerge in the next moment, and the next, and so on. As I
have argued, while trash remains functional coopositionally, it is a feature of trash that it has the
potential to disrupt coopositional rhythms and force the player to become aware of the various
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faces of the rhizomatic clock, a discomforting and irritating experience because it conflicts with
the lived sensation of unified game time.
However, that does not mean that designers and narrative writers have found no narrative
use for trash. In fact, many games, including those we have discussed in this chapter, take
advantage of trash to accomplish something that is otherwise difficult in a medium that
privileges presence—the dilation of time through narrative technique.
Writers and authors of narrative texts have an astonishing number of literary tools at their
disposal for manipulating the reader’s understanding and experience of narrative time. Through
the use of varying rhythms in the text, focusing on minute details or moving the perspective
outward to broader events, descriptive language, and many more, writers can take an otherwise
innocuous narrative event (say, falling down a staircase) and dilate the time around the event
until it takes pages, or even a chapter, to fully manifest in the text. The reader can be made to
feel the event as it is unfolding precisely as the author intends, either as a quick and brutal
happening that shocks the reader or as the culmination of pages of setup or any number of
permutations in between. The same can be said for narrative film; Sergei Eisenstein famously
dilated the time it takes to descend the Odessa Steps into one of the landmark sequences in
cinema. Videogames, however, have long had difficulty developing the same kinds of narrative
techniques precisely because of the videogame’s irrevocable existence in the present, as a
medium of now. Zagal and Mateas argued that a player’s experience of time could be
manipulated via “tasks that trigger specific forms of metaphoric temporal cognition,” (Zagal and
Mateas) but I remain unconvinced that metaphor alone can overcome the working of the
rhizomatic clock. When I play Five Nights at Freddys (2014), I am bombarded with metaphoric
tasks meant to represent the passing of a single night as a watchperson at a haunted pizza
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restaurant. Creatures change positions on security camera feeds faster than would be plausible; I
have to keep an eye on the slow emergence of a hostile animatronic from its curtain; I have to
keep my office secure until the end of my shift, represented by the appearance of a clock.

Figure 28: The space of temporal labor in FNAF
And yet, during all of my playthroughs of the game, I never lost myself or felt affected by
those metaphors. The rhizomatic clock also accounts for my own lived time, and I knew while
playing that a full night at Freddy’s took precisely six minutes of real-world time. That time was
both a work shift and six minutes at once. No metaphor could alter my experience with the
singular time of the game. Instead, I argue that space and time in videogames shape each other at
all times, and any technique of time dilation for narrative events would have to account for both,
at once, in a contingent way because of the medium’s presence. Players must be made to feel the
dilation of time directly, not metaphorically. Trigg has argued that time and space shape one
another, and that space in particular has the power to seize time and hold it still. Trigg considers
this essential to the establishment and creation of memories, which he argues are embedded in
spatial presence (2013 8). If we consider mobs and trash as spatial and temporal phenomena—
literally connecting at all points through rhizomatic processes—than it follows that those enemy
types can and do function as technique for stopping, dilating, elongating, and otherwise
manipulating both space and time. By careful design that acknowledges and expects the mutual
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feeling-through of the experience, “killing time,” literally eliminating time (trash) placed before
the player by a procrastinating game, the player and the game may mutually dilate a moment or a
series of moments to create narrative impact that might otherwise fall flat in a milieu of presence.
Critically, this narrative technique of time dilation does not belong solely to the designers or to
the game because the player is the one who must kill the time. The time dilation technique is
dispersed across the coopositional activity—the narrative dilation occurs through the continuous
and co-constitutive field of play.
Take, for example, the story that began this chapter, of my fight up Kefka’s tower and the
irritating trash that haunted my steps, whittling down my health potions and hit points on my
way to Kefka. As I’ve established, the trash had only the flimsiest of narrative connection to
Kefka himself. There was, to put it mildly, no clear reason for them to be there. Kefka had, in
past narrative moments, revealed himself as in control of certain kinds of minions, but these are
not the trash mobs that appear in his tower. They are arbitrary, annoying, and frustrating. And
yet, consider Kefka’s tower without trash. Final Fantasy VI was released during a trend in
videogames towards more cinematic presentation via cutscenes, and a substantial cutscene
precedes the descent to the tower for the final fight. Cutscenes could be considered time dilation
events (and, like trash, they promote frustration and irritation in many players). But walking
straight into Kefka and triggering the final battle just seconds after that last cutscene would
hardly feel satisfying in a narrative sense, even if, in the structure of the narrative, that is the only
event on the tower that “matters.” The fight with Kefka comes at the end of a long journey,
almost 40 hours of my real-world life, and much longer for the characters in the game world. We
have witnessed death, ruin, and the destruction of our world. The final moment with Kefka is a
narrative moment improved by time dilation and attrition. Instead of landing directly on the mad
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clown’s boss arena, my heroes arrive for the final battle bedraggled, harried, and less than sure of
their chances. The fight with Kefka is more dramatic and elating because of the contingent
experience of the trash that maneuvered me here. When I defeat him, I feel an overwhelming
sense of relief and associate it with myself, with the characters, and with my accomplishment.
To be clear, I’m not arguing that all game designers are acutely aware that trash in
videogames could be used as a form of narrative temporal technique. Business and marketing
concerns are still the most likely reason for the protracted time costs for some of the most
difficult raids and dungeons in games. But, as a former designer, I can personally affirm that I
often designed via what just “felt right,” and the addition of trash to a significant encounter is a
tool at the disposal of designers looking to dilate a temporal event until it “feels” right. While
trash will likely remain a controversial and unpopular expression of cooposition with many
players, what I am arguing here is that the phenomenon of trash points towards the possibilities
of developing narrative techniques of presence, of active cooposition, and of continuous and
contingent perception. While trash disrupts the rhythm through which we “read” the rhizomatic
clock, that disruption has been turned into productive and meaningful game design that promotes
narrative experience in the present tense, as it’s happening, and as the player makes it so. The
nature of trash, then, suggests a possibility of better and more refined tools for designing—and
therefore experiencing—coopositional narrative through a rhizomatic chronotope.
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6

CONCLUSION

The circumstances that forced me from my village were less than ideal. My foster father
confronted me on the streets of Candlekeep and pushed me and my traveling companions from
the safety of the town walls and out into the wilderness. He promised to explain his reasons, but
shortly after that he was killed by a demonic figure who was clearly looking to turn his
murderous weapon towards me. Now, hours later, I have fought my way through the wilderness
and into the iron mines at Nashkel to root out an evil half-orc poisoning the ore. I had to do this
just to keep my pockets lined with coin, as any adventurer on the Sword Coast must do. In
between adventures and temporarily without a target, I find myself and my companions standing
in an empty plain and I take a moment to reflect. Surely new threats and adventures await me
just beyond my line of sight. I know this, but for this one quiet moment I decide to consider
where I’ve been, and where I might choose to go next.
This interlude from 1998’s Baldur’s Gate is a moment without enemies. The game and I
are feeling-through one another and agreeing to temporary détente. The game awaits my move. I
know it will move with me. But this moment is about stillness and possibility, and a story that’s
still being told. It’s a story that both the game and myself will choose to make together.
Throughout this project, I have attempted to examine videogame enemies from original
and, no doubt for some readers, unusual perspectives. Relying as it does on a controversial
theory of a mind as continuous with its environment, transactionism remains a subject of debate.
However, through the pages of this project I hope to have demonstrated many of the productive
possibilities that emerge when thinking of videogames from this relatively fresh point of view. I
have suggested that we reconsider the perceived interactivity of the rigid computer answering
player choice through the illusion of the interface, or of videogames as strong platforms or
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prosthetic devices. Instead, I have offered a perspective on games as bodies and as phenomena
engaging at all times in a dynamic movement and co-constitution with the environment within
which they are involved. John Dewey once wrote about dance—between people, yes, but we
might consider the dance between the player and the game—as bringing pleasure to the
participants because through their movements and partnership they bring order from chaos
(Dewey 16). Dewey asserts that the same is true for art and aesthetics, and my argument
supposes that the same is true of narrative.
But if we derive pleasure from bringing order, what is the chaos that we are ordering?
The chaos is our natural milieu, the cosmic rhythms of the world, the environment that never
stops shifting and churning around us. Art, aesthetics, and narrative all seek to exist within the
chaos of the natural world, harnessing chaotic rhythms and bringing order to them in service of
technique, communication, and emotion. What transactionism reminds us is that we are not only
within the chaos, but that the chaos is within us. We are made up of the chaos of the natural
world, and we always shift and move dynamically with the environment as it does the same
around and within us. Videogames are a specialized phenomenon within the natural world, but
they are still inseparable from it. They are dynamic and our experience with them is the same as
any natural phenomenon. This includes our experiences with videogame narrative, which emerge
from our attempts to bring order to the chaos, to make sense of what we are experiencing as we
feel-through the game and it feels-through us.
Players who experience narrative videogames bring rich and varied stories to order from
that chaos, and yet narrative videogame studies continue to struggle to account for precisely what
mechanism allows those stories to emerge because our existing traditions were not designed to
examine those rhythms. Rather than “colonize” game studies through cognitive narratology, my
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approach has been to examine the narrative phenomena that emerge from what has been one of
the central verbs of videogames from Spacewar! to Elden Ring: combat with enemies.
But as I conclude this initial proposal to see through transactionism and naturalist
philosophy, I am that traveler in the woods in Baldur’s Gate. I know that my adventure could
take so many different paths forward, all of which will lead to new and dynamic challenges, even
challenges that go far beyond the nature of enemies and antagonism. If, as I suggest, we adopt a
transactionist perspective on games and media, it becomes possible to explore the rich and
complex industrial and cultural issues surrounding games in entirely new ways. In one direction,
deemphasizing the avatar as a literary construction and elevating the player herself into the
weakly emergent platform of the game has potentially huge ramifications on common critiques
of representation and culture, including the possibility of radical change within gaming culture
brought forth by the differently-oriented bodies and minds of individual players and their
eurythmic relations with the larger gaming culture and industry. In another direction, we can
envision a new model of game and narrative design that takes transactionism and player
involvement as its baseline assumption and promotes developers to push the limits of the means
by which games reach across and feel-through their coopositional foil. In still another direction,
we can explore the implications of multiplayer games and the nature of the rhizomatic
transactions from which multiplayer cooposition emerges.
I chose enemies as the subject of this dissertation project to reexamine a fundamental
plank of videogame play from an entirely new perspective but, as I indicated in the introduction,
there are so many more transactions and phenomena that surround the player in the milieu of the
gameplay experience—as with all media experiences. Having journeyed this far, more directions
are possible, and the best way to reveal them is to feel-through and see what pushes back.
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